Month: May 2019

Can Leicester Make the Leap Under Brendan Rodgers?

Posted on by admin

Of all sides in the Premier League, Leicester might have had the hardest time in recent years of gauging what realistic expectations should be.

The highs of winning the title in 2016 may never be beaten by any team in English football for a generation. Of course, this set the bar at a certain level, and Claudio Ranieri’s brief flirtation with relegation (though the numbers always had them relatively ok) saw him get the sack the following year. Successor Craig Shakespeare rode a huge positive conversion rate into a long term contract, with a negative one getting him the axe shortly afterwards. Claude Puel did stabilise things, but a little too much in the eyes of many, with the perceived dullness of his side giving way to the hoped for excitement of Brendan Rodgers.

Results have been good, with 6 wins out of 11, and the general sense is that fans are happier with the more positive playing style. But is this form sustainable? Is Rodgers helping to build the foundations for a strong Leicester side that can challenge the top six, or is it a false dawn? Let’s take a closer look.

What Rodgers Inherited

Leicester were not a bad side under Puel, but they also weren’t anyone’s idea of a good time. By expected goals per game, they had the 12th best attack in the league and the 7th best defence. They defended deeper than the average Premier League side, ranking 16th in the league in terms of how high up the pitch they made their average defensive actions. Sitting back without the ball was likely not in and of itself a problem for Leicester supporters, with it being a cornerstone of the magnificent 15/16 season. What may have caused more irritation is the attacking approach. The side’s pace towards goal, the speed at which their possessions that end in shots reached the chance, ranked them as the 6th slowest attackers in the league, and the second slowest outside the top six. Similarly, the team was rated 15th in the division for “directness” of attacking moves. For the most part, fans in England are often comfortable accepting a deeper defending style if it’s met with fast counter attacks. A combination of compact defending without the ball and a stale, slow approach with it, however, tends to frustrate people to a great degree.

The shape of the side was a fairly conventional 4-2-3-1. Puel’s preferred midfield partnership of Wilfried Ndidi and Nampalys Mendy might sum up his approach. Ndidi is a ball winning defensive midfielder, while Mendy is a patient recycler. The pair rank 8th and 10th for Leicester in terms of moving the ball into the final third, but that’s not what Puel wanted his midfielders to do, instead putting an emphasis on screening the back four and retaining possession. This was an effective team, yes. But it irritated fans (and, according to rumours, the players) enough that the change was made, and with Rodgers came the promise of exciting, entertaining football.

So What Is Rodgers Doing?

For all that Rodgers likes to present himself as a hero of playing “the right way”, the truth is that he has embraced a number of different approaches in his career. At Swansea, he certainly embraced a ball-dominant approach, managing to dominate possession in most games with a team newly promoted to the Premier League, a feat almost unheard of. Upon moving to Liverpool, the assumption was that he’d continue the so-called “Swansealona” approach but scaled up to the superior talent available at his disposal at Anfield. This was clearly his initial plan. “Brendan’s philosophy”, Luis Suarez claimed in his autobiography, “was to play on the floor, keep possession of the ball and, if we lost it, to pressure to get it back. Don’t panic, don’t play so fast as we had the previous season, look for the spaces at the right time”. A poor first six months, however, saw him make a dramatic u-turn towards a faster, counter attack based style aimed at maximising the threat of Suarez and new signing Daniel Sturridge. A million different formations were seen along the way. The following year, with Suarez having left for the Camp Nou, the team’s best results came when playing a defensive minded 3-4-3 system. At Celtic, he returned to a possession-heavy approach, but that’s hardly a shock considering the talent disparity at play. Rodgers is and remains something of a tactical chameleon, borrowing systems and ideas from elsewhere more than building a singular cohesive style at a club.

So what has Rodgers been up to at the King Power? Well, first of all, he has overseen an improvement in the side.

Leicester were putting up an expected goal difference per game of 0.02 under Puel that has risen to 0.35 since Rodgers took over. The majority of the improvement has come at the attacking end but there has been a defensive bump as well.

It seems a slightly odd quirk that Rodgers has overseen such an improvement in defending set pieces considering his reputation in that part of the game, though this is a small sample size so it might not be something we’d expect to continue. Stylistically, though, we can see that Leicester are pressing higher up the pitch, and now make their defensive actions further up than the league average, if not by a huge margin. The team have added an extra 4% to their possession figure, again not a huge change, but an indicative one. Kasper Schmeichel is passing it shorter than previously, and Leicester now have the shortest passing goalkeeper outside the top 6. This couldn’t be further removed from the kind of football that saw the Foxes win the Premier League, but it’s a style with an attacking intent at its core, and for that reason it seems to be going down easier with the fans.

The saying is that good artists copy while great artists steal, and Rodgers is certainly a great artist in that regard. The main place he seems to be stealing from in this case is Manchester City. The first idea seemed to be to play a broad 4-3-3 system but, and taking particularly from Guardiola’s shape in this regard, using James Maddison and Youri Tielemans as “free eights”, given the freedom to push higher up the pitch than traditional central midfielders with Ndidi covering as the lone pivot. This passmap, from an early victory against Fulham, shows the shape of the team fairly clearly.

This system was trusted for most of the remainder of the season, even as Marc Albrighton came into the side for Harvey Barnes. The free eights would take up advanced midfield roles and the wide players would stay relatively wide. The very difficult run in for Leicester, with the final three fixtures against Arsenal, Manchester City and Chelsea, saw an important tweak. Hamza Choudhury, a natural ball winning midfielder, came in alongside Ndidi, with Maddison now positioned narrow on the left flank. Going for a more solid double pivot in big games is a fairly obvious tactical tweak, and Maddison’s instincts to drift inside from a wide position only added to the numerical superiority in midfield. Since there generally isn’t as much need to stretch the play and move the ball from side to side against stronger teams, as they are less likely to defend deep and form a compact block that’s difficult to crack, this is a move that doesn’t seem to have too many consequences. It speaks to Rodgers’ flexibility that he was comfortable making the change, and 4 points from 9 in these games is a return he can be proud of.

Leicester have felt for a little while now like a club on the cusp of really pushing on. The team’s average age of 26.3 is one of the lower figures in the league, but even that number doesn’t tell the whole story, with older players such as Jamie Vardy (32) and Wes Morgan (35) pulling the mean upwards. The new core of this team is with players such as Ndidi, Maddison, Choudhury, Harvey Barnes, Ben Chilwell and Demarai Gray, all yet to turn 23. Tielemans also fits into this category, and would be a terrific signing if the club can strike a permanent deal for him, though that remains to be seen. Rodgers seems well positioned to reap the rewards of a young squad likely to improve even if no major additions are made.

That transfer question, though, has raised some concerns. Leicester recently announced Lee Congerton as the club’s new head of recruitment, which appears to be a very direct Rodgers choice. With Congerton’s track record at Celtic and Sunderland, it’s hard to see any reason for hiring him other than a strong working relationship with Rodgers, so it certainly seems like the club have fully bought into the Northern Irishman’s ideas. Leicester do have good people working behind the scenes, with Mladen Sormaz newly hired as head of analytics among a seemingly strong team. In his time at Liverpool, Rodgers very famously clashed with then head of technical performance Michael Edwards, with the apparent view of Rodgers being that Edwards’ analytics-focused signings were not fit for standards. Since Rodgers left Liverpool, Edwards has been promoted to sporting director and overseen a hugely successful recruitment process that has led to the side reaching two Champions League finals. Granted, we’re obviously going to be in favour of the numbers people here at StatsBomb, but Rodgers might be wise to break previous habits and listen to the analytics advice this time. The odds of that happening, though, seem rather slim.

But Rodgers’ success has never come in building for the long term. In all of his jobs (save for a rough spell at Reading early in his career), he’s overseen a rapid improvement of the side in the first two years, then either left or seen things decay. It’s not hard to imagine the same trajectory happening here, and recruitment is a concern if the squad becomes weighed down with his own signings. For next season, though, things look bright, with Rodgers’ playing an attractive style of football while also improvising for specific players and situations. The club could be in for a really bright future, so long as they remember that the time will come to cut Rodgers loose.

Header image courtesy of the Press Association

Chelsea Season Review: Moving to Stand Still

Posted on by Kevin Lawson

Chelsea’s season was certainly full of sound and fury, but in the end it signified, mild, and possibly fleeting, improvement.

It was always going to be a year of transition for Chelsea, although at this point the more cynical supporters at Stamford Bridge might suggest, “aren’t they all?” The transition from Antonio Conte to  Maurizio Sarri certainly seemed like a dramatic one. Conte emphasized and organized defensive structure while Sarri believes in always always always having the ball.

And the team did change. They went from playing 55% of the passes under Conte to 63% under Sarri. Under Conte the team didn’t care much for building from the back, the average length of a goal kick was 38.39 yards, under Sarri that dropped dramatically to 31.90. On the defensive side of the ball, they went from this:

To this:

There were real changes in how the team played. But, when you stop looking at how they played, and start looking at the results that those tactical shifts led to, it’s just not clear there was very much improvement. In attack, the possession heavy version of Chelsea actually took fewer shots than Conte’s defensive side, though those shots were on average better, leading to a slight improvement in expected goals scored. Under Conte the team took 604 shots leading to 59 goals and 50.99 xG. This season the goals were virtually the same, but the xG did tick up by about three.

Defensively the story is similarly marginal. They went from conceding 36 non-penalty  goals to 38 and their xG conceded went from 31.01 to 32.36. These are relatively small changes which is perfectly in line with their relatively small increase in points from 70 to 72 points. Although that increase proved to crucially be the difference between a fifth place campaign and Europa League rewards and a third place finish and a return to the Champions League.

It feels weird to say Chelsea aren’t very different. Watching them play is a very different experience. Their tactics are clearly very different. Instead of being positionally disciplined they get cut open with ease, but it happens rarely because they have the ball all the time. They frequently spend long passages of play with multiple players working the ball around deep in their opponent’s territory, while last year they attacked quickly and without numbers. But, neither method of attack has proved more fruitful than the other, even if one seems in moments to be more aesthetically pleasing.

Normally this would be a reasonably encouraging first season from a manager. Come in, get the talent that was used to the old system all lined and ready for the new system, improve mildly and lay the groundwork for a big second year. Chelsea’s problem is that this summer is not going to be normal, not in any way shape or form.

For starters, Eden Hazard is, somewhere between possibly and likely, on his way to Real Madrid. He’s 28, and it’s entirely reasonable for Chelsea to listen to offers if Real Madrid back up that money truck, especially if the Belgian is himself set on moving. But, still, it’s going to be hard to replace all that production.

That’s obviously true if Chelsea can’t avoid their looming transfer ban, but even if the ban gets stayed pending appeal, there’s a lot of work to be done. The frontline without Hazard consists of Willian, Pedro and the on loan Gonzalo Higuain, all of whom are on the wrong side of 30. Chrisitian Pulisic will be arriving, and he’s certainly an exciting young wing option, but he’s also not Eden Hazard, even if Chelsea hope he might become the same star level player in a year or three. Callum Hudson-Odoi may or may not be healthy and may or may not be transferring to Bayern Munich. Ruben Loftus-Cheek just suffered a ruptured achilles and the man he replaced in the lineup, Matteo Kovacic may or may not be headed back to Madrid when his loan spell ends. It is not only possible, but likely that only N’Golo Kante and Jorginho are likely to be long term starters on a Sarri side, and while Kante is obviously beyond reproach, there’s a whole lot of reproaching left to do when it comes to Jorginho’s ability to defend in space and the ease with which teams began taking him out of the game by man-marking him.

The case for natural progression and improvement under Sarri rests on increased tactical cohesion going forward. But that case is undercut by the fact that if Hazard leaves then most of the players, especially most of the attacking players, are going to need replacing and upgrading. Now, maybe it’s possible that the new players will be better suited to Sarri’s style (although Kovacic, Higuain and Jorginho were all brought in specifically for the Italian manager), and therefore will take to the system quickly, but even so, as Sarri enters his second year, from a personnel standpoint it’s likely to be as chaotic as his first.

There are, of course, reasons for optimism. In addition to the incoming Pulisic and the injured Loftus-Cheek and Hudson-Odoi there are a number of young talented prospects on the book at Chelsea. Guys like Mason Mount, Tammy Abraham (still), maybe even Michy Batshuayi are possible contributing players in attack. Beyond that, Chelsea have absolutely been willing to spend in recent seasons, and if they aren’t banned it’s reasonable to expect that they will be aggressively looking to add pieces to this team, especially in midfield.

For much of Chelsea’s recent history the relationship between the transfer market and stability has been presented as a binary choice. Either the team can commit to staying the course, keeping their manager, and bringing through young talent, or they can splash the cash in the transfer market. But, given what their squad looks like, that’s no longer a choice. If Hazard goes then the team he leaves behind will both need to spend big and also need to get contributions for it’s handful of developing young players in order to keep moving in the right direction. Only doing one or the other will likely not be enough.

Chelsea had an acceptable season. They made the tiniest of strides in the right direction all while changing the way they played. But, the composition of their roster, and the possibility they’re losing their star means that the second step is going to be harder than the first. In order for Chelsea to progress from a contender for the Champions League places into a Champions League and Premier League contender themselves they’ve got a lot of work to do. That means the kids are going to have to step up and it means that their going to have to add big, impactful pieces this summer. If that happens, they way forward is clear. If not, well all the continuity in the world won’t get them enough points.

Header image courtesy of the Press Association

Arsenal Season Review: Now What?

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The 2018–19 season was always going to be something of a transitional season for Arsenal. With Arsene Wenger’s 22 year tenure concluding last season, Unai Emery was inheriting a flawed squad that was top heavy in talent. The appointment of Emery in of itself was met with some trepidation, as there was a school of thought that Arsenal should’ve gone for the more unknown option in Mikel Arteta because the upside could’ve been greater. While the goal was to get back into the Champions League (preferably by finishing in the top 4), getting Arsenal to play a more modern game was also of importance. 

On the face of it, one could say that season one of Emery has been a success. They finished with a higher point tally this season versus last (70 vs 63) while jumping up a spot in the table. They still have a shot at winning the Europa League and getting back to the Champions League, which is crucial given Arsenal’s current financial situation. Job well done, right? Well this type of thinking would be falling into the trap of looking at the results and foregoing the process. Arsenal’s declining performance has been a point of discussion on this site multiple times, but it bears repeating that there was a real decline in shot metrics from last season (which itself wasn’t a vintage Arsenal season) to this.

As the shot maps show, this season's goal return is mostly a mirage. They came in over expectation for the second season in a row.

But, even if you believe that there is some systemic reason for overperformance, the fact is that they are still going the wrong direction, and their expected goals decreased despite the increase in goals scored.

Things don't look prettier on the defensive side of the ball. The team came in ahead of where xG predicts, and despite that, the team still conceded more than last year.

Last season, as the shot charts show, Arsenal were bad defensively, and also ran cold. This season they ran hot and were even worse.

While there’s a degree of sympathy to be had towards Emery because of the weird state that Arsenal were when he took the job, it’s still worrying that their statistical profile resembles a mid-table club rather than one that pushed for the Champions League.

The aesthetics of Arsenal’s play haven’t been exceedingly better. A theme to have come out of preseason was Arsenal having more structure in their attack compared to the improvisational nature under Wenger, and while strong arguments could be made that this was for the betterment of Arsenal long-term, that did lead to growing pains in the intermediate. Part of those growing pains include a greater adherence to crossing the ball to create chances, going from 1st to 5th in lowest percentage of penalty box entries to come via crosses. Even during the good times, it still felt a bit textbook.

A trend under Emery in season 1 was the constant alternation between a cautious approach and a more aggressive game plan, and more times than not, leaning more towards the cautious end of the spectrum. Perhaps that was due to the suspect defensive talent that was on hand, but Emery’s cautiousness spread into other areas. There were matches when Arsenal could’ve loaded up heavier on attacking talent against inferior PL opposition without too much fear of it coming back to bite them, but that didn’t happen. That fed into Emery having to be aggressive with substitutions, and while it’s nice that he had a quicker hook than most managers, it’s fair to point out that was a byproduct of cautious squad selections.

It’s hard to talk about Emery’s handling of player usage without mentioning Mesut Özil and Aaron Ramsey, particularly in Özil’s case. We could debate the merits of his contract extension, but that’s its own separate discussion. Given the enormous wages + length of term that was given, there was no other feasible option coming into this season for Emery other than making use of Özil’s skillset and trying his hardest to make it work. That wasn’t the case though, as Özil only played in 1845 PL minutes. That low minute total might partly be chalked off to injuries, but it was abundantly clear that Emery didn’t think of him as a core player. From November 28 to March 1, Özil played a grand total of 364 PL minutes and only started 2 matches. That’s not an exemplary showing of maximizing resources, especially during the busiest part of the year.

Certainly, there have been bright spots this season for Arsenal, particularly the midfield duo of Lucas Torreira and Matteo Guendouzi. Between the two, Torreira was much more of a known commodity and was locked for a move to a big club by the end of the World Cup last summer. Guendouzi amounted to a lottery ticket that worked beyond even the most optimistic of scenarios. For a club that’s been criticized (rightfully) for their aversion towards accumulating young talent in the past, getting two above average young midfielders for less than £40M is a massive boon that will pay dividends for years to come.

The acquisition of Bernd Leno was a contentious one given both the amount of money Arsenal paid for his service, along with the underwhelming shot-stopping track record that he possessed from the Bundesliga. To his credit, he performed closer to his best case scenario, ranking within the top 3 in StatsBomb's proprietary goals saved above average, and was a big reason why Arsenal didn’t concede even more goals than they did. While this in of itself was great, the fear is that Leno’s performance this season was such an outlier compared to previous ones, that it’s more likely he experiences a decline moving forward. If Arsenal’s defense doesn’t improve, anything short of a repeat performance from Leno could spell further trouble.

What’s interesting with Arsenal's positive variance in attack is that it wasn’t primarily driven from their striker duo in Pierre-Emerick Aubameyang and Alexandre Lacazette, but rather a collective effort. Certainly, Aubameyang and Lacazette had noteworthy seasons. Lacazette once again had his xG contribution per 90 hover around the 0.5–0.6 per 90 range (0.5 to be exact), while Aubameyang compensated for a modest shot volume (2.75 shots per 90) by having ruthless efficiency in his shot location. Averaging an xG/shot of 0.195 is elite territory, and it highlights just how great Aubameyang is at leveraging his off-ball movement into creating quality scoring chances for himself in the box.

Bright spots notwithstanding, It’s hard to escape the feeling that even with the built in sympathy that Emery had coming into Arsenal, his debut season was somewhat of a disappointment. Their performance indicators declined from last season despite having comparable collective talent, and given how Tottenham, Chelsea, and Manchester United did all they could to gift wrap a top four spot for Arsenal, not being able to take advantage of those numerous slip-ups stings even more. Even if one was to be forgiving of missing out on a top four spot, having a 38-game sample that produced more questions than answers in terms of style of play and balancing conservatism and proactive football doesn’t assuage concerns.

If we were to compare Emery’s first year with other managers within the big six, one comparison that would be tempting to make is with Mauricio Pochettino’s debut season at Spurs in 2014–15. Despite Spurs finishing 5th that season, they were buoyed by Hugo Lloris’ shot stopping along with Harry Kane and Christian Eriksen’s finishing. Even then though, it was clear what Pochettino was trying to implement, but he didn’t have the horses to make it work right away. The problem is that it’s harder to make that argument with Emery at Arsenal.

Moving forward, Arsenal’s outlook is far from rosy. Though qualification for the Champions League (via the Europa League) is crucial, they’ll still looking at a massive rebuild/retool job that will be hard to cover with the transfer budget they’ll be allotted this summer. Arsenal need to inject new blood in numerous positions (CB/LB/CM/Wings), and they might not have the funds to cover a couple of needs unless they do extremely well on the margins. There’s further worry coming from the fact that there are worthy candidates below the big 6 in Leicester and Wolverhampton, who if they execute good-great summer windows in their own right, could realistically convince themselves that they could pounce on an opportunity to vault into the top 4–6. Though it feels like forever that the big 6 has been a staple of the Premier League, it’s only been the last three seasons where that’s been the case. While many have assumed a future where the PL will be status quo up top, these things are more fluid than perhaps it’s given credit for.

Arsenal should be mildly worried about the potential of slipping into mid-table because they have downside risk coming from the current squad construction, the reliance on older players, and the limited amount of assets that can be sold at close to top value. A good number of Arsenal’s main contributors are late peak-age or already at the wrong end of the age curve. More than anything, a big worry for Arsenal has been the collective decline in athleticism and dynamism over the years. Look up and down the roster, and there’s a noticeable lack of eye-popping young talent. This is the byproduct of years of neglecting to prop up a young, talented nucleus. Even with Arsenal ranking as one of the richest clubs in Europe, bridging the gap between themselves and the very top of European football has to involve taking more educated shots at young prospects. Getting Guendouzi and Torreira last summer was a good start, but that’s all that it was, a start.

Certainly despite the budget constraints, there are still ways for Arsenal to go about trying to fill as many holes as possible this summer through young talent accumulation. With Guingamp relegated from Ligue 1, Marcus Thuram should emerge as a cheap young option for Arsenal to look at who could replace Danny Welbeck as a utility option, with perhaps some further room for role upside given his age. Arsenal could do much worse than reviving their interest for Cristopher Nkunku and adding him to the young core of talent that they are trying to build. With this being the summer that PSV will probably look to sell high on their young talent, Angeliño is an option at LB that Arsenal could explore, even with the usual caveats involving young Eredivisie talent translating into the Premier League.

The seven point increase from last season to this belies the precarious situation that Arsenal are facing, and the grim reality that they were lucky to accumulate 70 points despite only having mid-table shot metrics. The 2018-19 season was far from a vintage Arsenal season, having to rely on lots of positive variance in attack along with an excellent Leno season. It brings into question the coaching job that Emery did, even though some have pointed to an increase point total as proof of a successful debut year. The cumulative damage from years of squad mismanagement has left them with a roster that is short on prospects that are worthy building blocks, and having limited transfer funds to cover up the holes in place (especially if they don't win the Europa League).

It is certainly possible that Arsenal could win the EL, and execute a very good summer window where they bring in ample amounts of young talent on a tighter budget. However, if that doesn't happen, then there's the real potential of Arsenal slipping out of the big 6 and descending further into chaos.

Matías Almeyda's Great San Jose Earthquakes Challenge

Posted on by admin

Matías Almeyda is not afraid of a challenge. He started his coaching career by taking on the immense pressure of leading River Plate back into the Argentinian top flight following the first relegation in their history; next, he inherited a relegated Banfield side; then, he confronted the task of reawakening a giant in the form of Mexican club Chivas.

So far at least, he has also proved capable of rising to them. He achieved promotions at the first time of asking at both River and Banfield, and then produced a series of triumphs at Chivas, twice winning the Copa MX, delivering their first league title since 2006 and finally going all the way in the CONCACAF Champions League in what was to be his farewell to the team.

But even by his standards, his decision to join the San Jose Earthquakes was a bold one. The team finished bottom of the MLS standings in 2018, recording just four victories alongside nine draws and 21 defeats, and have made the playoffs in just two of the last 10 seasons.

Immediately, though, the vibes coming out of pre-season were positive. “We’ve trained really, really hard,” midfielder Magnus Eriksson explained in February. “There’s a new philosophy, and we believe in it. It’s a lot of changes from last year in the way we play, but everything is positive.” That counted for little when San Jose lost their first four matches of the season by a combined score of 14-2, but things have got a lot better since, with a subsequent record of three wins, two draws and two defeats raising hopes for a decent campaign.

Almeyda’s plan for revitalising the Earthquakes revolves around the implementation of an entirely different tactical framework to the one that they used last season. “Our scheme involves everyone playing and everyone running,” Almeyda told MLSSoccer.com last week. “Everyone is committed and whoever is not committed is left to be exposed.”

“Marcelo Bielsa is probably the coach who has influenced him the most,” explains Lucas Marinelli, author of La Estrategia de Almeyda, a book that breaks down Almeyda’s approach. “Due to the constant pressing, the use of wingers, the high-tempo impressed on most attacks, and the positional rotations. I do see an evolution through Almeyda’s career, but those main characteristics have been the same throughout.”

In San Jose, the most outwardly evident change has been the degree to which the Earthquakes seek to press and disrupt opposition build-up play. Last season, they were one of the most passive teams in MLS, allowing 13.88 opposition passes per defensive action.

This season, they are one of the most aggressive, allowing just 7.81 opposition passes per defensive action.

As Marinelli explains, it isn’t always the case that Almeyda’s sides press high up the pitch. San Jose are pretty middle of the road in MLS in terms of how far from their own goal they perform their average defensive action. But once their opponents reach the point at which the press is scheduled to begin, the commitment with which they charge down the ball and hassle receivers is impressive to see. Their predominantly man-marking scheme sees players regularly stepping out of position in pursuit of their men, lending the system a somewhat chaotic look at times.

In the below clip, it is the right central defender Harold Cummings (number 31) who can be seen following the Seattle wide-forward Jordan Morris (13) back towards the centre circle and then swiping at the ball when Kim Kee-hee (20) takes a heavy touch into his reach.

Learning the specifics of this pressing system and being able to put it into action has been one of the key challenges for the squad since Almeyda’s arrival.  The hardest part “is understanding exactly when to follow guys and when to switch,” midfielder turned full-back Tommy Thompson recently told The Athletic. “It’s a delicate balance of making sure you stay with your guy, but then if your guy is going all over the field, you can’t just follow him.”

But it isn’t just in defence that the group has had new ideas to take on board. San Jose are also attacking in a different manner this season, with more of a focus on possession. “In his beginnings at River, Almeyda used to play a fast-tempo, really vertical game, without playing the ball out from the back and looking to get it wide as quickly as possible so that the wingers could win individual duels,” Marinelli. “It was at Banfield that he adopted the possession style. The team played out from the back more and built attacks from their own goal. At Chivas, it was kind of a higher level of that style.”

The Earthquakes’ possession share has gone up from 48% last season to 55% this time around, and they are completing over 35% more passes per match than they did previously. That focus on playing short out of defence is demonstrated by the decrease in their average goalkeeper pass length, from 46.60 metres last season to 35.78 this season -- from the sixth longest in MLS to the fourth shortest. There is clearly a learning curve associated with the implementation of such a style, and there have been occasions during their matches to date when that has been painfully clear.

Although Almeyda has changed the manner in which his teams work the ball forward as his coaching career has progressed, one thing has remained constant. “He wants his teams to use a lot of width, and wingers are a usual thing in his formations,” Marinelli explains. “He likes them to be vertical and dangerous in one-on-one situations, so that they are able to beat their markers or create interior spaces for the midfielders to profit from.”

On the right hand side, Cristian Espinoza, a loan signing from Spanish side Villarreal, certainly fits the bill. Of all those who have seen at least 600 minutes of action, he leads the team with 2.04 successful dribbles per 90 and often helps create space for the right-back, usually Thompson, to overlap outside or inside of him depending on which way he goes. His role is primarily creative. He leads the team in both xG assisted and passes into the box per 90, even though he is also the team’s second most frequent shooter, with 2.43 shots per 90.

On the left of the team’s normal 4-2-3-1 formation, Shea Salinas has a divergent role. On that side, it is usually left-back Nick Lima who provides the attacking width. Salinas is generally positioned further upfield and infield than Espinoza. Aside from primary striker Danny Hoesen, no one touches the ball inside the area more often than Salinas (6.35 touches inside the box per 90 versus 3.49 for Espinoza). While he only gets off just over a shot and a half per 90, they are of excellent, albeit unlikely to be sustained over a larger sample size, quality.

Salinas, primarily a left-back in recent years, has notched four goals to date, already making it the highest scoring season of the 32-year-old’s MLS career. He joins Lima (previously a right-back), Thompson (previously a midfielder) and Eriksson (a wide man turned central attacking midfielder) in taking on an unfamiliar position under Almeyda.

But how have all of these changes transferred to chance creation and results? Last season, San Jose’s average expected goal difference (xGD) per match was 0.63 -- the second-worst record in MLS. It has improved, but it is still in negative territory, at -0.44 xGD per match. That is one of the six worst records in the league, although it must be noted that it is heavily influenced by a pair of dreadful defensive performances in early defeats to New York Red Bulls and Los Angeles FC. At both ends of the pitch, things are starting to trend positively (the second vertical line on the graph indicates the start of this season, and thus Almeyda’s time in charge).

There seems to be confidence amongst the players that things will continue to improve as they get used to Almeyda’s system and the demands it makes of them, but there is certain to be a point at which he begins to push up against the limitations of the squad. Even with some solid pickups in the off-season -- Espinoza chief among them - this is still largely the same group who came bottom of the pile in 2018.

San Jose finished a full 28 points shy of the playoff places last season, and expecting Almeyda to turn that deficit around in one season, even after a promising start, would be asking an awful lot. This should be a campaign for bedding in his ideas, identifying personnel deficiencies and putting a framework in place to make a proper push for a playoff place in 2020. Almeyda has showed himself capable of turning teams around if given time to do so, and the early signs are that he might just be able to repeat the trick in San Jose.

League One Playoff Preview

Posted on by Oliver Walker

The annual four-way royal rumble promotion-deciding showdowns are here, kicking off this Saturday with 12 semi-finals across the three EFL divisions packed into nine days back to back. The stakes are high, the football is daily.

The League One contest will be typically tight: Charlton Athletic, Portsmouth and Sunderland are all given a near-identical chance of going up by the bookmakers, with Doncaster Rovers given an outside chance. Who’s going to do it? Nobody knows, but there’s a case to be made for and against each side.

Charlton Athletic

Despite finishing 3rd in the table, Charlton weren’t ever considered a serious challenger to the top two - their final position was actually the highest position they’d occupied at any point earlier in the season after a return of 32 points from their last 13 matches propelled them above Portsmouth and Sunderland.

This is Charlton’s second successive play off campaign and manager Lee Bowyer, a Champions League semi finalist in his playing career, has the Addicks in red hot form going into the season extension despite losing key forward Karlan Grant to Premier League Huddersfield in January.

How will they setup?

 

 

An increasingly popular shape, Charlton’s 4-4-2 diamond leans heavily on the quality of their midfield and their recent strong form correlates with their first-choice players in this department getting fit and available at the same time.

Out of possession Charlton won’t look to press high, instead using the system’s numerical advantage through the middle to force their opponents wide before squeezing them against the touchline.

 

 

The numbers and quality they have in midfield allow them to play through the thirds in build up whilst up front Taylor and Vetokele are both willing runners, pulling wide and working the channels to allow their team to gain entry into the attacking third.

Strengths

Have I mentioned their midfield? Krystian Bielik and Josh Cullen are Premier League loanees from Arsenal and West Ham respectively, Joe Aribo has been strongly linked with Arsenal, RB Leipzig, and Benfica in recent months, whilst Jonny Willams is playing at a level lower than he ever has done, with 12 Premier League and 100+ Championship appearances to his name prior to this season. All are perfectly suited to the system, all are likely to play the majority of their future careers at a higher level.

It’s also worth noting Charlton’s hugely impressive record against their fellow top six sides: P10 W5 D3 L2 - putting them top of the ‘mini-league’ of matches played between the top six teams.

Weaknesses

Zooming in on their underlying numbers, Charlton don’t really stand out as a team that should be strongly favoured for promotion. Their expected goal difference through the season has been solid, good even, but never in the sort of echelons to match their hugely impressive results.

 

 

They could be doing something that's not picked up by expected goals as their season long expected goal difference per game stands at just 0.15. One theory is that their habit of winning penalties, a league-leading 15(!) penalties across the season whilst conceding just 5, with 12 and 4 respectively being converted, could mean that Charlton have simply not been pushing to create as much from open play due to already being ahead from the penalty spot.

One(s) to Watch

Lyle Taylor is the outstanding goal threat with 21 goals, Naby Sarr has been very effective at building the play from centre-half this season, but it really is the midfield that will give Charlton the best chance of success. Picking just one is tricky, but Joe Aribo, probably playing his last games in a Charlton shirt, excels at everything required of him from the wide midfield role: breaking the play up, carrying the ball through midfield, whilst also contributing 9 goals in attack. Besides Taylor, he’s the most likely match-winner.

 

 

Portsmouth

Title challengers until matchday 45, Portsmouth will be led into the play offs by one of the most experienced and respected coaches at this level. Kenny Jackett has accumulated more years and matches in management than his three direct competitors combined and has real pedigree at this level, having previously led Millwall to play off success in 2010 before breaking the League One points record in 2014 with Wolves. It’s been no surprise that his Portsmouth side have been title contenders up to now.

How will they setup?

 

 

Jackett’s 4-2-3-1 makes up in substance what it may lack in style. Their mid-to-low block gives a stable base to play off, geared towards controlling the middle of the park and dominating their defensive third.

 

 

The bulk of the attacking work is left to the front four with the wide players particularly dangerous and one of the central midfielders, namely Ben Close, given license to bomb on and provide a goal-threat from deep.

Strengths

Their underlying numbers are good on both sides of the ball. Defensively they’ve conceded an average of 0.96 xG per match across the season – the third best record in League One – whilst in attack their 1.34 expected goals created per game is again up there with the best, ranking fourth best.

They’re one of the strongest sides in the division on set plays with a goal difference of +7 on goals from corners and indirect free-kicks; scoring 15 and conceding 8. Regular readers in this parish will know all about how important this can be and all 3 goals in last season’s play-off final were scored from set play situations.

 

 

Weaknesses

Their recent defensive record. Yes, they look good in terms of their underlying numbers but actual, good old-fashioned clean sheets are hard to come by on the south coast. Three clean sheets in the last 26 league games tells its own story and suggests that despite being generally quite dominant defensively, there’s a soft underbelly to this side that can be, and has been, penetrated on a regular basis.

They also don’t boast a particularly strong record in the top six mini-league. P10 W2 D5 L3, with their two wins coming rather fortuitously at home to Luton on the opening day and at home to Sunderland who were down to 10 men.

One(s) to Watch

Matt Clarke is a dominant centre-half who’s future lies at a higher level. Ronan Curtis has contributed 12 goals and eight assists from the left wing. Potent forward Brett Pitman has adapted well to a deeper role behind the main striker. Jamal Lowe on the right wing has finished the season especially strongly though and will take some stopping, having already scored at Wembley this season in Portsmouth’s EFL Trophy win over Sunderland.

 

 

Sunderland

Like Portsmouth, Sunderland had sustained a title challenge until the very late stages of the season, occupying second place as recently as matchday 42. Manager Jack Ross has just about hit par in his first season, failing to sustain that title challenge but some slack should be cut considering the serial failure surrounding Sunderland in recent years. Daniel Farke couldn’t even manage a top-half finish in his first season with Norwich – look at what they’ve achieved now after giving him time.

How will they setup?

 

 

For a time they dabbled with a 4-4-2 shape in order to accommodate £4 million January deadline day signing Will Grigg in the side but that move was quickly abandoned with their midfield too exposed so expect Sunderland to deploy their most commonly utilised 4-2-3-1.

League One Team Of The Season member Aiden McGeady is unsurprisingly Sunderland’s main attacking outlet, expect their most dangerous attacking moves to come down the left.

Strengths

The narrative around Sunderland is of a side that has never really ‘clicked’ this season and that still doesn’t know what it’s best XI is. Those things are probably more true than not and yet Sunderland still managed to score in 45 of 46 league games this season, a record certainly not to be sniffed at. They also lost the fewest games, five, with two of those coming in their last two games when Ross rested key players with little to play for.

They have a very respectable record in the top six mini-league: P10 W4 D5 L1 – the loss coming when down to ten men vs Portsmouth.

Lastly, we can’t talk about Sunderland without mentioning expected goals. Having been a major outlier in the expected goals table earlier in the season for massively overperforming their numbers, they’ve actually improved in the latter part of the season and are now posting the kind of underlying numbers you’d expect of a promotion contender. Because this is Sunderland though, obviously this has coincided with arguably their worst form of the season.

 

 

Weaknesses

Whilst they boast the fewest defeats in the league, they also claimed the most draws and it’s their inability to pull away from teams that has cost them an automatic spot.

Of major concern is the starting XI though and the aforementioned cliché of the manager ‘not knowing his best team’. It may be true, but Ross hasn’t been helped by virtually all of his centre halves being out of form at the business end of the season. The 5-4 home defeat to Coventry in early April prompted both regular centre halves to be dropped with Alim Ozturk recalled to the side for his first appearance since December, keeping his place since. It’s not ideal preparation.

One(s) to Watch

Bryan Oviedo and Aiden McGeady were both seasoned Premier League performers before Sunderland’s rapid descent to the third tier and the drop in class has certainly shown. The vast majority of Sunderland’s best moments come down their left flank and the pair compliment each other well with McGeady often coming inside on the ball, allowing Oviedo to attack the space out wide. Whether this ultra-attacking combination pays off in the knife-edge scenario of these play off games is another question.

 

 

Doncaster Rovers

Sixth placed Doncaster only confirmed their entry to the play offs with victory on the last day despite being in a position to wrap it up much sooner. A return of W5-D5-L5 from their last fifteen games paints an image of a side out of form and that is certainly true, but it also coincided with injuries to key players who, thankfully for Donny, have made their return in time to feature in the extended season.

How will they setup?

 

 

Doncaster are a free-flowing, attacking side with the players given licence to interchange and get into offensive areas of the pitch. The strategy has paid off with a return of 76 goals, fifth best in the league, but also left them exposed defensively as they gave up 58, ranking them the 11th best defence.

It’s entertaining stuff and the players have spoken about how McCann has tried to instil the positive philosophy into his players, with even giving the ball away framed as a positive as it gives them the chance to immediately go and win the ball back.

Strengths

Their attacking play. At their best, Doncaster are one of the best attacking units in the league and if they can get close to that level then they’re capable of scoring against anyone. They’ve unfortunately been far from their best in recent weeks with their current performance level in a real trough compared to the rest of their season, though they have had to do without influential midfielders Ben Whiteman and Herbie Kane through injury. Both have returned in time for the play offs.

 

 

Weaknesses

Doncaster have one very obvious weakness their opponents should look to exploit and that is their inability to defend set plays, conceding 21 goals from these situations – meaning one in three goals Doncaster concede is from a set play.

 

 

The top six mini-league doesn’t bode well for Donny either, where they place sixth out of six. Their return of P10 W1 D5 L4 suggests that Doncaster could well just be proverbial flat-track bullies who get found out against the better sides. Even their best asset, their goalscoring, has fallen flat against the good sides; finding the net just five times in those ten matches.

One(s) to Watch

John Marquis is the main man for Doncaster and was spoken about in the last piece I wrote for Statsbomb. A complete forward at this level; working hard out of possession whilst creating and converting chances in possession. Ben Whiteman dictates play from deep, Mallik Wilks has supported Marquis well in the goals department, but it’s Herbie Kane who’ll steal the show if he plays to his best.

It's been a very successful season from the Liverpool loanee, he’s shown his potential time and time again. His form dropped slightly in the new year after playing through injury but a spell out of the side to fully recuperate looks to have done the job. As good a midfielder as you’ll get in League One.

 

 

Charlton vs Doncaster provide the first match up, one that Charlton are backed to come through. The other will be contested by the two EFL Trophy finalists, Portsmouth vs Sunderland, who could only be separated by penalties then with a similarly tight encounter a likely repeat. Four will enter, only one will leave. The prize of the Championship awaits the victor.

StatsBomb Data, One Year On

Posted on by Ted Knutson

One year ago today, I stood in a lecture hall in South London, waiting for StatsBomb’s launch event to start. The Data project was secret, and had been under wraps from the outside world since inception. This event was the culmination of nearly a year of work.

It was also probably the biggest personal and financial risk I had taken in my career.

Needless to say, StatsBomb Data came as quite a surprise to the data world. That's because StatsBomb Data wasn’t supposed to exist.

It wasn’t supposed to be possible to build the infrastructure necessary to produce detailed event data at a higher spec than Opta and the other competitors in the space - at the quality we knew we wanted - without far more time, far more money, or both.

But there I was, happily setting up the room with our team as we prepared to officially announce our new baby. One of my favourite things in the world is releasing new products to an audience, but this was special.

A year later, one question I often get asked is why? Why would we take all this risk to go after a market that already existed, and one where one giant company had developed a near monopoly on top quality data?

Because someone needed to do it better.

The need to improve our understanding of football demanded it, and it was pretty clear that none of the major suppliers were going to deliver a better product. I know, because I talked to a number of them about it.

“Hey, what about this?” Silence.
“How about collecting this new thing?” Silence.
“We are a paying customer and have this problem - could you, I dunno, answer your customer service emails?” Silence.

In the end, I came to the conclusion that StatsBomb could do it best. So we did.

And boy was it hard. Like, not from a from a technical perspective - that was fairly straightforward. Collecting data from video has been around for ages. Adapting the software to allow collectors to add new events and qualifiers was not terribly difficult, and we had a great partner in Arqam FC (now part of StatsBomb) to help us pull it off.

But from a design perspective? A process perspective? A quality perspective? Really, really hard. So many difficult choices were made, challenging problems were solved. Many more problems had no solutions, they only had consequences. You can make it this way or that way, but neither answer is optimal. Apparently kids these days call this “adulting.”

“I don’t think we expected this, but you are now our most important data provider.”

That’s a recent quote from one of our Champions League teams, and a huge compliment to the team at StatsBomb and Arqam for what we developed.

A compliment of a different sort is that teams who are on StatsBomb Data right now improved their points totals by 20% versus a year before. Better data = better analysis = better performances. It's something I hoped for when I started this project, but it's been pretty amazing to see it play out in the real world.

As I said, this stuff is hard, and often in ways I didn't even expect. We’re still not perfect, but like the teams that are our customers, we work our asses off every day to get better.

In fact, a lot has happened in a year. Maybe it’s best to review how StatsBomb has changed as a company (and a website) in that time.

Flashback one year: On May 9th, we introduced our new Data to the world. About an hour before our launch, Opta threw this tweet out. What curious timing.

Followed by this one a day later, and a blog explaining their new qualifiers.

Thanks for keeping us on our toes, folks! And for designing a data upgrade that can apparently only be interpreted via 3x3 matrices before disappearing from the world again. This announcement came as a huge relief to us because it proved to be so far inferior to what we had developed that we now knew we had a chance to succeed.

In contrast, StatsBomb customers know how much pressure a shooter is under from exactly how many defenders and the GK, in which locations, on every shot. This information has been available since we launched. We have even documented our research in this area extensively, here, here, and here.

Back to our story… new data also meant we were no longer shackled by restrictions from our old data provider, which meant we could turn StatsBomb.com into a place to post analysis and insight from whomever we wanted, on whatever topics we wanted, five days a week. So that's what we did. We recruited Mike Goodman to both write and develop content, while allowing a new crop of talented writers to show off so many cool new things.

For example, we started to profile "pressures", something we now view as the basic unit of defensive activity and an event that is unique to SB Data. Our research shows having actual pressing data (not derived info, like our competitors) dramatically changes how you evaluate teams and players defensively. Why is Roberto Firmino amazing - he's a striker that doesn't score many goals? How can we better show just what made Burnley's defending in 17-18 so unique? Pressures unlocked this information in a way that simply wasn't available before.

Or how about pass height, which is unique to StatsBomb Data, and is a fascinating indicator of team style. It's also a key component in creating better pass difficulty models, which is a hugely important area of research in a game that is largely comprised of passes.

James Yorke recently wrote about pass footedness, which is also unique to StatsBomb Data. Why does this matter? Because with this information, we built a new passing model that lets teams fully profile the quality of player passing with each foot. Maybe one player is amazing with his right foot, but only attempts 5-10 yard passes with his left? That’s in the data. Maybe your coach demands a two-footed player who can make difficult passes with both feet? The model lets your recruitment department uncover those types of players easily.

And possibly the thing that got us the most attention that we released to StatsBomb IQ in the last year was our Goalkeeper Module. Because our data has the location of the GK and defenders on every shot, we are now able to evaluate GKs via data in a way that was never possible before. Data scientist Derrick Yam used this to question the fee Chelsea spent on Kepa Arrizabalaga at the season’s start, and his framework for GK evaluation was accepted for poster presentations at the massive Sloan Sports Analytics Conference in Boston.

Beyond the public-facing research, we also have done unique and fascinating customer-only research as well. This includes detailing the new expected goals models, more information on GK evaluation, a groundbreaking analysis of [REDACTED] that I hope to be able to talk about in the future, and a recent study of how the Danish Superliga has changed over time, plus how it compares to bigger leagues like the English Premier League and German Bundesliga. This is above and beyond the typical head coach and player research we produce for our consulting customers on a monthly basis.

Behind the scenes, we produce regular white papers for customers, detailing our research, and unlike most companies, we discuss in detail where our research has failed. We think this is hugely valuable for customers to see, partly so they understand what we are working on for the future, and partly so they can learn what approaches to modify or steer clear of. Data science is hard and data scientists are expensive. Saving your customers time by educating them on failed approaches is a hugely valuable service, but one you'll never see out front.

I designed the initial data spec, but I've still been somewhat shocked to learn that there are so many new, useful elements inside of StatsBomb Data that it will take us years to explore it and learn what it has to teach us. However, as noted above, customers are already using it to succeed.

Speaking of teaching, we also recently launched our first analysis courses to help anyone interested in the sport better understand how it works through our research. The introduction course is suitable for literally anyone who likes football, while the Set Pieces courses are geared for coaches and analysts who want to learn more about this phase of the game.

Although it is increasing every year, data use in football is still in its infancy. I decided we needed to get out there and teach the information to the masses, and I think what James and Euan have produced with these courses is both unique and exceptional. If interested, you can find more information here.

So That Was the Past Year, Wrapped Into a Tiny Bow - What’s Next?

We will keep getting better. We recently announced data upgrades for next season, including a video explanation of the new stuff we are collecting and why. We are pretty sure Shot Impact Height will improve the accuracy of expected goals models, so we have incorporated that into our data collection. We have also added body pose information about GKs on every shot and save into the data spec. From a football perspective, GK position on the pitch isn’t just a dot of x,y information, and our data will now convey a lot more about what GKs are actually doing when it comes to shot stopping.

We also have exciting new things coming to StatsBomb IQ, including a tactical suite that will change how coaches and analysts are able to use data to analyse their own teams and their opponents. It’s the culmination of our own work in football combined with years of talking to coaches and analysts about how they look at the game, combined with understanding how data can improve that process. There’s no hype when I say our product will be great, and there is nothing else like it. Expect to see more information on this product as European teams get into their preseason camps.

We will also continue to release free data to the football world. The FIFA Women’s World Cup data will go out to the public daily during the World Cup itself, and we will keep producing FAWSL and NWSL seasonal data for free. And... there will be a new release of free men's data beyond the 2018 World Cup that's already there, but I don’t want to say any more because I don’t want to spoil the fun.

Another thing that will happen this year is that our competitors will continue to try and copy us. That’s just how business works.

They copy, we innovate. They market, we produce. They appear in media…

We change football.

If your team isn’t using StatsBomb products and services right now, you’re already behind. And given how quickly we are releasing new things that help our customers perform better, that is the one thing that will probably not change in the year to come.

--Ted Knutson

CEO, Co-Founder
StatsBomb
ted@statsbomb.com

Coaches Talking Data: Chris Summersell

Posted on by Tim Keech

In the last few years football analytics has made inroads into the media, with expected goals featuring on Match of the Day, and Sky Sports regularly featuring more in depth statistics when previewing and reviewing matches. With clubs increasing their focus on analytics and data science there is no doubt that interest and appreciation of the usefulness of data has never been higher.

The final frontier for analytics is coaching. Do coaches value the data? Does it influence their coaching? Is it only useful at the elite level?

To answer these questions Chris Summersell, a UEFA B  coaching licence holder and English FA coach educator, joined me for a chat.

Hi Chris, tell us a bit about yourself, what is your footballing background?

Hi! I’m a football coach, coach tutor and analyst based in London.

I’ve been coaching now for about 7 years and hold a UEFA B Licence. I’ve recently finished a job working for a Premier League club development centre, and also still coach a grassroots team.

Recently I became a tutor with the English FA, tutoring the Level 1 coaching qualification and soon will be tutoring the Level 2.

As well as this I am an analyst for Total Football Analysis.

Playing wise, I was reasonable without playing at a level of any note, but importantly it was an experience that has shaped my journey in football. I have also followed Spurs home and away as a fan since I was 7 years old.

You could say I have grown up in a very ‘traditional’ football environment. When I played I was always in a 4-4-2 as one of the strikers but I spent half the time dropping in to midfield to collect the ball only for it to sail over my head down the channels. I spent almost my entire time playing the game fighting against bad ‘coaches’ who only knew one way of doing things. This experience led me into coaching, where I wanted to do things differently.

Latterly I have become extremely interested in the growing influence of data and analytics within the game. It has helped me understand the game a great deal better, but I can’t help think a lot of it exists inside an echo chamber - as a coach first and foremost, I’m interested in how we take the knowledge off of the laptops and onto the grass.

The echo chamber bit is really interesting. Do you find a willingness among the coaches you work with to embrace data? I know a lot of analysts would love to work with coaches to see what they actually want from data, and to chat about what is and isn't possible with various types of data.

By echo chamber I mean that there is some absolutely astonishing work done out there with data, but I wonder how much this is really influencing coaches throughout the game, other than a notable few exceptions.

I sometimes think analysts need to read what they’ve written back to themselves and ask, ‘what is a coach going to think of this?’. It’s not about dumbing things down, it’s communicating in a language that coaches speak themselves. I too fall into this trap.

This also works both ways, and it frustrates me hearing coaches dismiss data and analytics so readily.

I must stress that I work predominantly within youth football, so my interaction with coaches is generally within this area. I do not see a huge deal of interest in data and what information it can provide at all. It is a common refrain to hear coaches say ‘I don’t mind statistics, but...’ - this is in my experience generally code for ‘I agree with all statistics that support my pre-existing views’.

One view of mine is that the insight and understanding that data can provide can be used at all levels of the game. No matter what level or age group you work with, concepts such as xG, packing data etc can help us understand the game more, make better decisions and ultimately help individuals and teams develop and improve. This isn’t saying you should be hammering your U12s for shooting from low value locations, but more how can you work with them to understand how they can create shots from better situations.

The other day I read on twitter that Dele shows up very highly on his pressing data, for both England and Tottenham. Why as a coach wouldn’t you then go and watch him closer to see what exactly what he does that makes him this good? If you watch him and disagree with the numbers then challenge it. This is how the game develops - if you put coaches and analysts together on the same page, then the potential is limitless.

Ultimately it’s a two way street and I don’t think either coaches or analysts have quite yet worked out how best to complement each other.

I have to try and remember that before I wrote about football I used to write a lot about how bad use of data - produced by people with no on the ground knowledge of the sector - was terrible for the school system. Just because Eton gets great exam results it doesn't follow that teaching kids in the lowest performing school in exactly the same way, wearing the same uniform would get exactly the same results. Context matters.

It is the same in football. I can look at Liverpool or Manchester City and then say "I want Cambridge United to play like that" but the reason that those two can play like that is they have some of the best technical players in the world and a huge team of staff catering to their every need. Cambridge won't ever have that but you can look at Liverpool's pressing or City's interplay and use elements of it to improve your own game.

Data cynics would say "Yes that is called video analysis and good coaching" but where I think data goes further is that you can pick out teams / players at similar skill levels who are achieving the results you want to. Much like a normal secondary school in a poor area might be far better learning from a school with similar intake with higher levels of achievement rather than Eton. You can then use the data to see if what you are doing is actually working. Are you pressing in the right areas? If not why not?

So if you were going to try and bring in analytics informed coaching at a lower league or junior level what type of data do you think would be most useful both for individual player development and for the team as a whole?

I like that schools analogy! Yes I agree context is very much key - and I think mainstream audiences are still subject to statistics that are meaningless like distance run/number of passes etc. This does have an effect, I think, and doesn’t help the cause of advanced analytics gaining a foothold. It’s obviously more predominant now, but still seen with great scepticism within football circles.

Speaking of context, I remember not so long ago there was a story that when he was Man United manager David Moyes told the players that he expected them to make at least 600 passes in a game. It was like saying in order to be a successful club you need to buy a large trophy cabinet, because Barca and Madrid have one.

I think at the top level we’re starting to get a lot smarter than that now, but it wouldn’t surprise me if this still goes on as you drop down the divisions. Also, just because a club has an analytics department and smart people, it doesn’t mean this translates to the pitch if you don’t have an open line between data and coaching staff.

In terms of using data at lower league and youth level, firstly I think coaches need to understand simply what data tells us about the game - they don’t have to be data experts themselves. Most obviously is xG, and at the fundamental level it is telling us to better think about where we shoot from - this is something that coaches need to know and plan for when working with players.

At non-league level you are not likely to have access to xG data, but knowledge of the concept can help. I hear people all the time say ‘he’s got to score from there’ etc - often these are really difficult chances. In the absence of xG data it isn’t too difficult to record where your team takes and concedes shots from each game, you can divide it between six yard box, penalty area, outside the box etc. Then you have some form of basic notational data to work from, understand your players, and then come up with your individual and collective coaching plans.

All you need as a lower league coach is a set of flat discs to mark out danger zones to shoot (or deny shots) from and you can start training the idea of generating good shots.

Set pieces are another completely under appreciated aspect of the game, which is funny because in UK football crossing and heading is so much a part of the game. I really like what the guys at Statsbomb are doing with their set piece work, and any club that can afford them should be banging down their door trying to hire them. There is so much to explore in set pieces, and I think any club - from Premier League to non-league should be looking how to gain advantages in this area. If they’re not, then they’re doing something wrong.

With more limited time at Non league level on the training ground, then a playbook of set piece routines can mean you’re adding X amount of goals a season which can be massive.

Individually, I’d encourage coaches to consume as much information from analytics as possible. Find out what players show up high on certain metrics, see what they do differently, why are they showing up so well on these numbers and then try and relate it to your own coaching, and see if it works.

I also think that with data only going to become more of a central part of the game, National FAs may look to run their own courses on data in football, and its most certainly should be an aspect that is included in the UEFA B/A licence courses. If you want to work at that level, understanding how to apply data driven insight surely has to be something you are exposed to as part of your coach education.

Where do you stand on pragmatism versus "philosophy" management. I generally think recruitment works best if you are trying to implement a style and can recruit accordingly but I have a huge admiration for managers who can find a way to squeeze out points and adapt their game to counter the opposition. I also think data can help massively with creating game plans.

I like this question. It’s something I think about a lot - I think in an ideal world you have a joined up philosophy and style of play which in theory should make recruitment simpler in terms of identifying players who match the profiles of each position.

It was these clubs that got me into coaching in the first place, watching that Barca team for instance was obviously a huge inspiration and like a lot of others became insistent that this was the ‘only way to play’. I’m glad I don’t think like this anymore, and I have so much admiration for coaches who are not wedded to a certain style and adapt to their circumstances (Benitez, Ancelotti), or even those whose style is seen as regressive but continually get results like Tony Pulis and Sean Dyche. I remember a few years ago I listened to Pulis talking about using the correct body-shape to defend crosses and I realised there was a whole load of detail behind how they do things. It might not be pretty, but it often gets results, often in very trying circumstances. I’d love to see how these guys recruit players, whether they use analytics, and what analytics could do to recruit players to fit their styles.

This season Fulham’s story may serve as a cautionary tale in the future as they came to play expansively and have been dumped unceremoniously -  I’m really interested to see how Norwich and Sheff United get on next season in the Premier League. If Leeds go up, we know Bielsa won’t change his style so that will be really fun to watch but as much as I love how his teams play, my gut says they would be chewed up and spat out again. They’re already overperforming relative to player quality in the Championship, which is testament to his brilliance as a coach.

Going back to the question, one thing that interests me in terms of using data to recruit players based on style/profiles is how does a team with a defined style identify and recruit players that play for a team that play in a completely different manner. I know there are adjusted stats which have tried to combat this to a degree, but I do sometimes see player radars and articles about players and I’m there wondering – is this metric like this because the player in question is simply following the coaches instructions, or simply isn’t able to demonstrate their full skillset because of the way their team plays? I guess this goes back to getting analytics and coaching experts working together better.

I think a really interesting case study into ‘philosophy vs pragmatism’ is at my club, Spurs. Many people would have Pochettino down as a ‘philosophy’ type coach but I think it’s more complex than that, and this season I think we’ve really seen him be adaptable in squeezing every single ounce out of this current squad.

When he took over we were absolutely wedded to a certain style of play, very rarely changed shape (4231 for the first two seasons) and set-up faithfully to press and possess against everyone. Even when we were individually inferior to the opponent, we’d rush off head first into the fire and get burned to death. At the time I said it was a price to pay in implementing his style of play, where he had a young committed bunch of players willing to learn, but we’ve really stepped it up a notch now in terms of adapting to opponents, and to the state of the game, that has meant we are now playing in a Champions League Semifinal.

One such player that has become integral to our season is Moussa Sissoko. This signing was roundly panned by the analytics community – and I’m not saying they were wrong at the time – and not long after that Poch came out and praised Sissoko for how he helped us deal with transitions. We now play more transitional type games, and Sissoko has more than come into his own. Obviously my take on this is that Poch is a magician.

I agree that analytics can really help with gameplans, and I think having data to work with can really increase your chances of spotting weaknesses to explore in your opponents. Let’s face it, even a team of analysts watching videos of their upcoming opposition a week before the game isn’t going to pick up every small detail. I’d want to use data to look at how opponent players tend to react in certain scenarios. Let’s say an opposition full-back - you can use pressure event data (if you have it – I don’t!) to see how that player tends to deal with the ball, where they turnover the ball under pressure. Do they go long, turn backwards, play the ball blindly inside? Use this data with video analysis and you’ve got a data informed pressing trap. I’m certain this level of detail does go on, clubs aren’t that likely to divulge what they do, but I’m also pretty sure lots of clubs leave lots of things to chance, or the quality of the eye test. Data can help.

It may well be happening already, but it struck me that as soon as Spurs drew Ajax (as an example), how much would it cost them to go out and hire a number of analysts to go and extensively scout each Ajax player, have a real deep dive into the data and report back with areas that you can exploit, or must stop? This relatively small investment could mean you find that one weakness that gets you into the Champions League final.

La Liga's Big Races: Everything but the Title Is up for Grabs

Posted on by admin

With just two rounds of matches remaining, it says much for just how competitive and unpredictable La Liga has been this season that champions Barcelona are the only one of the league’s 20 teams who are guaranteed to finish the campaign in the position in which they currently stand.

Some other things have already been decided. Atlético Madrid and Real Madrid are both certainties to join Barcelona in next season’s Champions League, while at the other end of the table, Huesca and Rayo Vallecano have both already been relegated. But there are still European places, the final relegation spot and one individual award to be contested.

European Places

Getafe (58 points) are currently in pole position to finish fourth and so secure Champions League football for the first time in their history. They may not have made many friends along the way, but if they are able to get themselves over the line it would be an incredible achievement for the team with the fifth lowest budget in La Liga.

Their three-point cushion over both Valencia and Sevilla (55 points apiece) may, though, look a little more shaky after Sunday’s match away at Barcelona. If Getafe lose there, it is entirely possible that the three of them could all go on to finish level on points. The head-to-head record from matches between the sides would then dictate their finishing positions.

In those circumstances, Valencia would claim fourth, having taken eight points from their four matches against Getafe and Sevilla. Getafe’s haul of seven would see them come home fifth, while Sevilla’s solitary point from those encounters would see them finish sixth. The latter pair would thus qualify for the Europa League group stage. Valencia also have the upper hand in their individual head-to-head records against both Getafe and Sevilla and so look well-placed to capitalise if Getafe cannot get the results they need.

With Valencia now guaranteed not to drop out of the top seven (and so potentially take a Europa League qualifying place away from the league by defeating Barcelona in the Copa del Rey final later this month), seventh place in the table will also yield a place in next season’s Europa League, albeit in the second qualifying round. Athletic Club (50 points) are the current occupants of that position, although they have three teams clustered just three points behind them: Real Sociedad, Espanyol and Alavés.

Athletic have not exactly been a fun watch since Gaizka Garitano came in to replace the sacked Eduardo Berizzo as head coach in early December. They and Leganés are the only two teams whose matches have averaged less than two goals in that time, while Athletic’s fixtures have also averaged a league low of 1.45 xG per match. But by focusing on defensive solidity, he has been able to wrestle a team who averaged an xG difference (xGD) of -0.47 per match under Berizzo into positive territory, at 0.06 xGD thereafter, and accumulate enough points to put them in European contention, even if their qualification is far from certain.


Alavés are unlikely to overtake them. Abelardo’s side began the season superbly and were as high as fifth just eight rounds ago. But their underlying numbers never supported such a lofty standing, and just seven points from their last 10 fixtures have seen them drift away from the top seven. They are also the only one of the three sides within striking distance of Athletic with an inferior head-to-head record.

Athletic’s Basque rivals Real Sociedad have won two on the bounce, but they had triumphed in just one of their previous 10 fixtures, have not won more than two consecutive matches all season, and face Real Madrid this weekend and then fellow European hopefuls Espanyol on the final day. That leaves Espanyol as the team most likely to pip Athletic to seventh. They’ve had pretty solid underlying numbers throughout the campaign and have found their feet again in recent months after a disastrous run of nine defeats in 10 from mid-November through late January which saw their early hopes of a top-four challenge subside.

If all four of those teams fail to pick up enough points over the final two weekends, Eibar (46 points, but with the sixth best xGD in the division at 0.15 per match) and Leganés (45) are both still in with a mathematical chance of grabbing seventh. It would take a very strange set of results to get there, but even Betis (44) could still claim it.

Relegation Battle

The two teams who have spent the most time in the drop zone have already been relegated: Huesca and Rayo Vallecano. By contrast, Girona (37 points), the team now most likely to join them, first fell into the bottom three as late as matchday 34.

As I discussed in my relegation roundup in January, Girona leaned heavily on unexpectedly strong performances from goalkeeper Yassine Bounou during the first half of the season, when they had some of the worst defensive numbers in the division. Through 21st January, Bounou prevented 8.67 more goals than the average goalkeeper could have been expected to. In that time, Girona picked up an average of 1.2 points per match. As his numbers have come back down the earth, so his side have gradually dropped down the table. Since that time, he’s conceded 1.39 more goals than expected, and Girona have picked up just 0.82 points per match. Over the last 10 matches, no one has a worse record than their haul of just six points.

Girona host Levante this weekend in a make or break encounter. Win it, and they’d draw level on points with Levante with the better head-to-head record (they drew 2-2 at the Estadi Ciutat de Valéncia earlier this season) and gain some form of control over their own fate; lose it, and results elsewhere could relegate them before the final day, where they would nevertheless again be relying on others to slip up in order to avoid the drop.

Real Valladolid (38 points) jumped ahead of Girona and out of the bottom three with a 1-0 win at home to Athletic on Sunday. Another win away to already relegated Rayo Vallecano this weekend would see them confirm their survival if Girona fail to win against Levante. With a superior head-to-head record against Girona (in addition to an equal or better haul of points against the other sides the pair of them could possibly finish level with), they just need to take no more than one less point than Girona over their last two matches in order to beat the drop.

The three remaining relegation candidates are tied on 40 points: Levante, Villarreal and Celta Vigo.

Levante have lost the mystical, xG-beating powers they displayed through the second half of the last season into the first half of this one, but a pair of strong home victories -- 4-0 against Betis on April 24th; 4-1 against Rayo Vallecano on Saturday -- in recent weeks mean that three points against Girona would confirm their survival. A draw there and another at home to Atlético on the final day would also be enough. Anything else would depend on results elsewhere.

Celta and Villarreal don’t have that same assurance of a single victory definitely being enough, although Celta’s six points from the two matches between them this season (both 3-2 wins, the second of which featured a star turn from Iago Aspas on his return from injury) would be decisive in the event of them finishing level on points and likely so in seeing Celta avoid relegation if three or more sides are tied. Villarreal are in a slightly trickier position, particularly with Eibar (home) and Getafe (away) left to play, although the swift decision to sack Luis García and reinstate Javi Calleja as head coach after García’s terrible six-match spell in charge either side of the New Year has at least provided them with the opportunity to go into the penultimate round with a solid chance of staying up.

Individual Awards

At an individual level, barring abnormal occurrences over the final two weekends of action, two things are already clear: even if he doesn’t further add to his tally of 34 goals, Lionel Messi will win the Pichichi prize as top goalscorer for the third time in a row and the sixth time overall, while Atlético goalkeeper Jan Oblak will claim the Zamora Trophy for the best goals-conceded-per-game ratio for a fourth consecutive campaign.
In a season in which he has arguably been more important than ever to Barcelona, Messi is also in with a shot of ending the campaign as both La Liga’s top goalscorer and top assist provider for the second year in a row. His main challenger is Sevilla’s Pablo Sarabia, currently level with him on 13 assists, although Villarreal’s Santi Cazorla -- whose comeback from injury is one of the feel-good stories of the season -- remains in touching distance on 10. Messi is currently running below his xG assisted figures, with 13 assists from 17.60 xG assisted. If he gets the necessary game time in the midst of Barcelona’s other commitments, it would be far from surprising if Messi ends the season atop that ranking too.

The Premier League Middle Class is Coming

Posted on by Kevin Lawson

Over the last couple of weeks on the site we’ve run pieces looking at how Leicester City and Wolverhampton Wanderers might ascend to the heavens of the top tier in the Premier League. The fact that both teams might have credible paths forward is a testament to just how strong the midtable in the Premier League has become.

A quick look at the table shows that behind the elite pairing of Manchester City and Liverpool, the next eight teams in the top half of the table are grouped tightly into two groups of four. Tottenham Hotspur, Chelsea, Arsenal and Manchester United are all between 70 and 65 points. Then there’s a nine point gap down to seventh place Wolves where Wolves, Leicester City, Everton and Watford are all grouped between 54 and 50 points.

That eleven-point gap looms large. It’s a break between tiers in the table that any argument for the improvement of the Premier League middle class has to contend with. Afterall, last year the gap between sixth and seventh was only nine points, with Arsenal finishing the season with 63 points, and Burnley with 54. So has anything really changed?

The answer to that is absolutely yes. For starters, the dynamics of the table are different. Arsenal’s 63 point haul from last season has already been bettered by all of the team upper tier teams this year. It is, at least, possible, that all four of the none elite top six teams will still manage to crack 70 points. The gulf between the top two and the rest is larger than its ever been, but the overall quality of the worst top six team this year, at least by points, is better than last.

So, it’s against that backdrop that we measure the improvements of the middle class. And, here too, we see improvement. Last season the seventh, eight, ninth and tenth spots finished with 54, 49, 47 and 44 points. With two games to go this season those spots are already at 54, 51, 50 and 50. So, the middle class could lose all eight games down the homestretch of the season and still get a better points total in each spot (except for seventh where Wolves would tie Burnley) than similarly situated clubs last year.

As we move deeper into the numbers, the improvements become even more stark. During the 2017-18 season, there were only seven teams with positive xG differential. It was only, surprisingly enough, 11th place Crystal Palace that joined the top six on the positive side of the ledger. The top six dominated the league on both sides of the ball. In attack, the top six teams were the top six teams.

It was only very slightly more varied in defense, where seventh place Burnley managed to sneak ahead of sixth place Arsenal.

This season is an entirely different story. The entire top nine are in the xG green. Watford, tenth in the table, has recently dropped just below to -0.13 which actually places them with only the twelfth best xG difference in the league. Last season that number would have been the ninth best. Even more amazingly, Wolves and Leicester, in seventh and eighth, actually have better xG differences than Arsenal and United in fifth and sixth.

Split things by attack and defense and the lack of separation between the big six and everybody else becomes even more apparent. While the big six retain their stranglehold on the top attacking size, the difference between them and everybody else has lessened dramatically.

And on the defensive side of the ball. Well, you’d really be hard pressed to see a big six at all.

Last season the gap between sixth and seventh was representative of a large gulf in class between teams. This season, the same gap seems to come from a confluence of unlikely results. Take away the unlikely Arsenal winning streak from the beginning of the season, or the Manchester United new manager miracle, or the unlikely string of defeats that cost Claude Puel his job at Leicester, and the table looks very very different indeed.

The interesting question is what happens next? Part of the reasons the top teams are the top teams, and that money is a predictor of success, is that the normal course of events would be for the upstart squads to get raided for talent. Arsenal and United are in desperate need of center backs, and Watford, and Leicester City have tons. Chelsea need a creative attacker and Wolves’ Diogo Jota or Everton’s Richarlison would clearly fit the bill. At fullback, Matt Doherty would make an appealing option for United as well. The list goes on and on.

The talent of upstart Southampton gets turned into the supporting cast of Liverpool. Mikel Arteta goes from Everton’s star, to Arsenal’s conductor. Leicester win the league and their midfield goes to Chelsea and their star winger later heads to Manchester City. When the middle class takes a step forward, the richest clubs buy their shoes, and leave them standing two steps back, and the natural order reasserts itself. That’s how the world has always worked.

It’s not clear if that’s what’s going to happen this summer though. Chelsea still have the specter of a travel ban looming over them. Arsenal are rumored to have financial constraints (though perhaps qualifying for the Champions League by either the top four, or Europa League route could lessen them). Spurs have not spent money in forever, and while the opening of their new stadium means they might be back in the market, they could also conceivably lose Christian Eriksen in addition to Toby Alderweireld meaning they’d have to contemplate climbing out of the hole those players would leave before even beginning to consider improvements. Only Manchester United seem likely to splash cash, but for various reasons commercial and otherwise they have always seemed more interested in shiny objects like Jadon Sancho, than the more meat and potato possibilities closer to home.

Meanwhile Everton’s ownership show no signs of decreasing their spending. The Wolves project (or whatever more pejorative term you might like to use for it) has both money to burn, and an incentive to reach for the Champions League stars. And while Leicester City spent last summer selling Riyad Mahrez, they also spent it not selling Harry Maguire. It’s not hard to envision a transfer window where the middle class teams spent months effectively improving their clubs, while the sides above them struggle to do the same. If that turns out to be the case then next season will truly be a different world.

Despite what a cursory look at the table might tell you, this season has definitely seen an improvement for those teams chasing the top six. That’s not all that remarkable by itself. But, if that improvement continues, then what happens next could get very very interesting.

Header image courtesy of the Press Association

A Man, a Plan, a Promotion, Norwich City

Posted on by Nick Dorrington

Two years after initiating a substantial squad and institutional reset, Norwich are back in the Premier League after wrapping up automatic promotion with a with a 2-1 victory at home to Blackburn Rovers on Saturday. They will be champions of the Championship if they take a point from their trip to Aston Villa on the final weekend.

Norwich are probably even a little ahead of where they expected to be at this stage. Two summers ago, new sporting director Stuart Webber came in and trimmed their wage bill, released older players and brought in a series of lower-budget replacements, primarily from Germany. In his previous position at Huddersfield, Webster had hired Borussia Dortmund’s then-reserve team coach David Wagner to successfully oversee a promotion push; at Norwich, he repeated the trick by signing Daniel Farke, Wagner’s replacement at Dortmund.

Initial results were mixed at best. Norwich finished the 2017-18 season in 14th, a full 15 points off the playoff places. They then sold two of their key attacking contributors in James Maddison -- both their top scorer and top assist provider -- and Josh Murphy during the off-season. But they again bought smartly last summer, the squad started to fully assimilate Farke’s ideas, and after a slow start, they began to emerge as prime promotion candidates playing an attractive brand of attacking, possession-based football.

A quick glance at the league table will tell you that it is Norwich’s attack that has been the driving force behind their campaign. They are the division’s highest scorers, having averaged over two goals per match. Their underlying numbers aren’t quite as spectacular, but they still top the league with an average of 1.47 xG per match.

That is achieved with a good mix of solid shot volume (14.77 per match, third in the league) and quality (0.10xG/shot, again third in the league). The latter is accomplished in two ways. First, the team quickly converts turnovers of possession into shooting opportunities. Norwich rank inside the top four in the league for both counter-attacking shots and high-press shots. In their 3-1 win away to Leeds in early February, all three of their goals came after they had won the ball back in the attacking third. Second, the Canaries are very methodical in their manner of progressing the ball forward and fashioning shooting opportunities from moves that start in their own territory. Their central defenders are generally comfortable stepping forward with the ball at their feet, and the movement in the attacking midfield line helps manipulate opposition defences to work space between the lines.

Here is an example from their 3-3 draw with Nottingham Forest on Boxing Day. As is commonplace with Norwich, the three players behind the main striker in their habitual 4-2-3-1 formation have all come narrow. As central defender Timm Klose strides forward, left-winger Todd Cantwell drops back to draw an opponent as right-winger Emiliano Buendía dashes into the gap behind him. A little moment of pause from Klose helps open up the angle for the pass.

 

 

That kind of neat passing and movement is a regular feature of Norwich’s play, particularly once they get into opposition territory. Their primary route there is Marco Stiepermann, a tall and skilful attacking midfielder who acts as somewhat of a budget Franco Vázquez. He is the primary back-to-goal reference point for those looking for a forward option.

 

 

The other two players in that attacking midfield line, usually Buendía and Onel Hernández adjust their positioning in line with that of Stiepermann to create onward options. Hernández is a decent if slightly wasteful player, who carries the ball competently and provides a solid attacking contribution; Buendía has been one of the standouts of Norwich’s season. Technically gifted, with wonderful close control, he ranks second on the team in terms of xG contribution (xG + xG assisted) per 90 but also leads the way in terms of defensive pressures.

 

 

Indeed, Buendía is the only player in the Championship and one of only 15 (with more than 1000 minutes of action) across the big five European leagues, League One, the Scottish Premiership and Dutch Eredivisie this season to have combined at least 0.20xG per 90, 0.20xG assisted per 90 and over 20 pressures per 90. Picked up from Getafe for just £1.5 million last summer, the 22-year-old will be one to watch in the top flight next season.

When chances are created, the man usually on the end of them is striker Teemu Pukki. He gets through a good amount of running, but doesn’t have much involvement in build-up play -- he is one of only three players in the Championship this season to have taken a shot with more than 6% of their total touches. His job is simply to get himself in prime central positions and finish well -- a mandate he is very much meeting.

 

 

Norwich’s matches have been the most action-packed in the Championship, seeing an average of 3.27 goals. Their two-goal-a-match attack has been coupled to a defensive unit that has conceded over a goal per match on average. In the context of the Championship, their defensive record is okay. Their xG conceded per match stands at a league third-best 0.96 per match, and while they don’t do a particularly good job of suppressing shots (conceding 12.36, ninth best in the league), those they do concede are generally of low quality (0.08 xG/shot conceded, second best in the league).

As the below defensive activity map shows, they mix a mid-to-low block with spells of higher pressing. While they aren’t quite as crazily disruptive as Marcelo Bielsa’s Leeds, who only allow 5.48 opposition passes per defensive action, Norwich still rank third in the Championship by that measure, allowing 7.86 passes per defensive action.

 

 

Norwich are a decent defensive team, but not without their flaws. The lack of mobility down the central spine is particularly notable, leaving them open to being rather too easily bypassed. The aforementioned win over Leeds in February provided a good example of that. While Norwich prevailed, Leeds created a shooting opportunity almost every time they moved forward during the opening 30 minutes. None of them were even one in 10 chances, but this is still not exactly a series of shots you’d like to be giving up within such a short period.

 

 

Later, Kemar Roofe was also able to waltz straight through from kick-off and get off a decent effort on goal.

 

 

Going up a level, with goals likely to prove harder to come by, that sort of openness will be punished more frequently. One would think that a dynamic midfielder or two would be a priority for the club this summer.

In general, it will be interesting to see how Norwich deal with the step up to the Premier League, especially as Webster has indicated that they don’t have the financial leeway to invest as heavily as some may expect them to. “We have to ignore all the noise and all the experts telling us how much we need to spend,” he said recently. “We have to look at the model of Fulham, who spent £100 million and unfortunately for them, it’s not gone great.”

Norwich have a group of good young players who have received significant minutes this season. Classy central defender Ben Godfrey (21) and good all-round full-backs Max Aarons (19) and Jamal Lewis (21) have been regulars, as has Buendía. They are all players who could be backed to move up a level and develop their games further.

But Norwich will also have to hope that a lot of players in their mid-to-late twenties and beyond, many of whom have never received regular playing time in a big-five league, can also meet the challenge. This is the most prolific the 29-year-old Pukki has ever been over a decent number of minutes; it is far from a perfect measure of performance, but based on TransferMarkt data, midfielder Mario Vrancic, their most creative and incisive passer, was a negative contributor on a points per match basis in each of his three full seasons (one at Paderborn, two at Darmstadt) in the Bundesliga; the feeling persists that they have plenty of good, well-coached role players who might not necessarily be apt for the top flight.

Norwich have reaped the rewards of putting a clear plan in place and seeing it through. If they believe in their approach and the potential for development within the current squad (bolstered by a few shrewd pickups), it makes little sense to make wholesale changes this summer, especially if doing so would further endanger them financially. The way they’ve played and the results they’ve achieved this season have been reward enough for the work put in to date. Next, an even bigger challenge awaits.

 

Header image courtesy of the Press Association