Tag: Team Analysis

The first half of the Bundesliga season was characterized by a crowd atop the league table. Now, a couple weeks into the second go-round of the league we — inevitably — are seeing a few teams come back down to earth, with Schalke 04 and SC Freiburg as prime examples of ‘over-performers’ who simply cannot maintain their hot finishing streak any longer. But here at StatsBomb, we choose to value fun stuff above a grim come-down story. So, in that light, we examine the two Bundesliga teams that seem primed to turn things around in 2020.

Vfl Wolfsburg

Allow me to go full-on football hipster on you, and tip a squad that has picked up a paltry four points in the last seven weeks. If we look at Wolfsburg's shot chart, it clearly shows they could put forth viable complaints in the luck department. They're running six goals behind their expected goals total. Since former LASK Linz manager Oliver Glasner took over this summer, Die Wölfe boast one of the league’s best defences.   Glasner built a sturdy defensive side by implementing a rigid but beautiful pressing style, the same style that allowed his lowly LASK side to put up really impressive performances in the Austrian Bundesliga in recent seasons. But Glasner’s squad also has the personnel to drop back deeper at times, with physically strong, tall players like John-Anthony Brooks (6'4"), Josuha Guillavogui (6'3") and Marcel Tisserand (6'3") playing in the axis. Glasner has three decent wing-backs at his disposal on the flanks: summer-signee Kevin Mbabu, anonymous-but-good Brazilian William and, most importantly, French leftie Jérôme Roussilon, who, given his extremely specific dribbling skillset. seems set for a big club move next summer. Judging by their January transfers — they replaced a mediocre centre back (Jeffrey Bruma, loaned to Mainz) with a much more promising one (Salzburg’s Marin Pongracic) — Wolfsburg won’t crash on defensively in the second half of the season. The question is whether their attacking numbers will turn around. Certain offensive woes are down to squad management, but Wout Weghorst is a truly excellent target man, whose intense running suits Glasner’s pressing style perfectly. But Wolfsburg has had real trouble providing Weghorst with much-needed creative talent. Glasner rotates five players through the two positions supporting the Dutch forward: João Victor (ex-LASK), the talented but inconsistent Josip Brekalo, Swiss players Admir Mehmedi and Renato Steffen, and utility man Felix Klaus, This fivesome currently boast a disappointing cumulative goal total of six strikes in nineteen Bundesliga matches played. Not good. Finding non-Weghorst goals will be key for a successful second half of the season for Wolfsburg. Hopefully Victor in particular, who is playing well behind his xG numbers, can come good

Eintracht Frankfurt

Football can be so weird, y’all. Remember the 5–1 shellacking Eintracht Frankfurt dealt to Bayern München? Well, that happened on November 2nd. Frankfurt grabbed only one point in the remaining seven league games of 2019. The side's only hope during this horrid run of games was that their level of play — although not good, of course — never dropped to super worrisome depths.  And lo and behold! Frankfurt have stormed out of the gate in 2020. They re-opened their league campaign by beating Hoffenheim 2–1 on their turf, and followed that up with a 2–0 victory against league leaders RB Leipzig.  On paper, Eintracht manager Adi Hütter has opted for a much more defensive style than the one at which his team excelled last season. Since the winter break, Hütter has traded in the 3-4-1-2 system for a 4-4-1-1 setup, with Timothy Chandler and Filip Kostić — both wing-backs in the old system — as wingers, and the intense running of Mijat Gaćinović as the only support of central striker Bas Dost.  As is often the case, a team’s reality can differ wildly than what's on paper. Powerhouses Bayern and Leipzig, alongside fifth-placed Leverkusen, are the only teams to put up more shots on a per-game basis than Hütter’s heavy-pressing squad (a solid 15.89 per game average). Super impressive, if you take into account that Frankfurt sold their shiniest players — Sébastien Haller (West Ham), Luka Jović (Real Madrid) and Ante Rebić (AC Milan) — this summer, a three-headed offensive monster who accounted for a whopping 41 league goals in 2018–19.  The only star player on offense who stayed with Die Adler last summer, Serbian winger Kostić, has been sensational this season. After 19 match weeks, Frankfurt’s leftie is second in the league in key passes (46) and in successful dribbles (53), whilst only Robert Lewandowski and Timo Werner have put up more shots than Kostić (55) so far. With Hütter seemingly settled on his favourite starting eleven for the coming months, Eintracht’s main concern is improving their set-piece defence. Before the winter break, only Mainz conceded more goals than Frankfurt from corners and free-kicks (8 in 17 games). With Frankfurt playing a free-roving style in open play, a somewhat acceptable goal balance from dead-ball moments is pretty crucial to avoid arcade-like scoring lines.  However, much more quietly than last season, Hütter has done well with Frankfurt this year, and their nine-point gap behind sixth-placed Schalke does not seem impossible to close in the remaining fifteen weeks.

This May will mark seven years since Manchester United last won the Premier League title. And it is unlikely they will hold up the trophy anytime soon, either.

It’s a familiar story at this point. Upon Sir Alex Ferguson’s retirement in 2013, United made a whole host of bad decisions, blowing a fortune on the wrong players and having them coached by the wrong managers. Ole Gunnar Solskjær’s gang are just the latest iteration of how they continue to relieve the same ugly chapter.

Currently fifth in the table, the underlying numbers show a modest improvement, but nothing drastic. An expected goal difference per game of +0.55 is an entirely respectable fourth-best in the division, with a fairly supercharged Leicester season keeping them out of the Champions League places.

 

 

It’s on the defensive end where their real strength lies. United are a good shot suppressing side, with their 10.22 conceded per game the fourth-best in England’s top flight. They combine this with a solid xG per shot conceded of 0.10, the sixth-best in the league and better than the other top shot suppressors. United are not supremely talented at any one aspect of defending, but the strong performance across the board makes them a tough side for any opponent to break down.

 

 

This represents a genuine improvement—and a necessary one— as United no longer have their defensive cheat code. In many of the dark post-Ferguson years, David De Gea almost single-handedly kept his team afloat. His decline has been exaggerated by some, but it’s been a while since he’s performed many heroic feats. He’s looked a smidgen above average this season, and with the difficulty in finding long-term repeatability in xG overperformance, United probably shouldn’t bank on him saving them a significant number of goals going forward.

 

 

United's defensive solidity has come at the cost of the attack just kind of . . . being there. Their1.26 xG per game is almost exactly the league average. Both their shot volume and quality are fairly mediocre. It’s all very whatever.

 

 

The one area where they do clearly excel is in counter-attacking shots. This intuitively makes sense given what we see on the pitch. United’s primary attacking weapons are Marcus Rashford, Anthony Martial and Daniel James, while Jesse Lingard and Mason Greenwood have also stepped in this season. All primarily want to run into open space on the counter rather than build in possession in front of a deep block. A significant part of the side’s disappointing performances is that they don’t have obvious answers when denied the space to launch counter-attacks.

Perhaps surprisingly, Rashford is their primary creator in the final third. He leads the side in open play passes into the box per 90, well ahead of fellow attackers Martial and James, despite not being primarily thought of as a “passer”. That he’s added this to his game recently, in addition to his decent scoring and dribbling threat (as seen below), is impressive, especially given the underlying mediocrity of the team's attack. It’s so frustrating that he's now out injured, given he looks on the cusp of making the leap to being a genuine star.

 

 

Some might point out that Liverpool also have three attackers who primarily want to counter into open space, and they would be correct. Mohamed Salah, Sadio Mané and Roberto Firmino certainly thrive in counter opportunities much more so than when forced to break down a deep block. Jurgen Klopp’s side, though, have two critical advantages over United. The first is an expertly drilled counter-pressing situation aimed at forcing such opportunities rather than waiting for them to come naturally. The other is their use of the fullbacks as additional playmakers in wide areas, stretching the play and forcing opponents out of a narrow shape with their crossing threat. At right-back, United have Aaron Wan-Bissaka, a defender with a superb ability to shut down opposition wingers but real limitations in possession. He’s better at many things than his Liverpool counterpart Trent Alexander-Arnold, but there’s a humongous gap in quality on the ball when breaking down sides. On the other side, Luke Shaw isn’t incapable, but he lacks both the athleticism and technique that Andy Robertson possesses (Brandon Williams has shown some promise, but at this point nothing more than that). Solskjær’s side do not have the option of creating for their attackers through the fullbacks.

 

 

If creating for the attackers through the fullbacks is not a viable option, the work must come from the midfield. Let’s start with the elephant in the room. Paul Pogba has not played a lot of football for United this season and it seems possible that he won’t ever again do so. This would be a great shame, as Pogba is the only midfielder at the club with genuine vision and a consistent ability to move the ball forward into dangerous areas. In his brief appearances this year, mostly early in the season, he’s shown this, unlike everyone else at the club.

 

 

After Pogba, United’s player second in deep progressions per 90 is Fred. Yes, Fred is, in Pogba’s absence, the player most responsible for moving the ball into the final third for this team. Next is Ashley Young, but he's now at Inter Milan. It is obvious to pretty much everyone that these players are not the playmakers a club needs to compete at the highest level. This club just does not have playmakers in the side. There are many ways for a team to build well in possession and create opportunities, but no coach has yet devised a system that can consistently create dangerous chances without anyone who’s good on the ball.

This is, first and formost, a squad construction problem. At the very least, no one at the club seems to be under the illusion that this is a squad capable of challenging for major titles, or will be any time soon. After a number of big-name, high-price signings brought in under David Moyes, Louis van Gaal and José Mourinho, the club seem to have accepted that targeting mostly younger players who fit their desired style of football is a much more sustainable model. While none could be dubbed a huge success so far, the summer 2019 signings James, Wan-Bissaka and Harry Maguire have all broadly done what they were bought to do, and by this club’s recent standards that’s a big success. United do have a plan, and seem intent on sticking with it. That’s a marked change from 2013–18.

Having a plan is the first step, and it’s a big one. But the next step is having the expertise to execute it. United need to target and acquire the right younger players capable of high tempo attacking football. That their summer signings consisted of the highest-profile English centre-back, the most promising young right-back in last season’s Premier League not named Alexander-Arnold, and a young winger coached at the international level by Ryan Giggs does not suggest a great reservoir of knowledge lurking within their recruitment setup. The next challenge is to take these players and coach them into a proactive style that fits into the fast-paced, Ferguson-esque mould but who is capable of breaking down the many teams who will sit deep and allow United to keep possession. Solskjær has the aforementioned squad limitations to deal with, but even in their best performances, his side have played reactive, counter-attacking football all season. There has yet to be real evidence of a plan while in possession.

There are any number of talented people working in recruitment at football clubs who would jump at the chance to transform United's process. On the manager side, Mauricio Pochettino is currently sitting at home, while almost any manager not currently in an elite job would be interested in the challenge, prestige and salary delivered by Old Trafford. It’s not that Solskjær is doing a bad job, per se. It’s just that there’s no obvious reason to think he can build the side the club need to challenge for titles again. United are currently looking like a competent side, which seems like a miracle compared to recent years, but it’s still well short of what they need to get back to the top.

Stats of Interest

Sticking with Manchester United for a moment, it’s now been over a year since Jesse Lingard last scored a Premier League goal. Considering he did not previously have a reputation for poor finishing, this seems like a bad streak that should come to an end sooner or later.

 

 

Alisson became the first goalkeeper this season to earn an assist at the weekend, and on his first key pass of the campaign. But he’s not the most creative goalkeeper in the league. That honour falls to Nick Pope, with 4 key passes adding up to 0.55 xG assisted this season. We all knew Burnley were direct, but using the goalkeeper as an actual attacking weapon like this is quite something.

Moise Kean finally got off the mark for Everton last night. It’s been a tough start for him in England, made all the more frustrating by some poor finishing from reasonable production. The goal is overdue, but it may signal the moment when he really kicks on.

 

Thanks to a strong finish, RB Leipzig have secured Bundesliga’s imaginary autumnal championship called “Herbstmeisterschaft” in German and start the second half of the season as league leaders. What distinguishes the team? And where are its vulnerabilities?

The last five Bundesliga games ahead of the winter break largely serve as the foundation for this analysis. In these, Leipzig without fail played in a 4-4-2/4-2-2-2 formation which has once again become the customary formation of the team after an asymmetrical 3-5-2 had intermittently been used. 

Attacking organisation

On the whole, Leipzig show themselves, especially in games against visibly inferior teams, to be a dominant unit that has developed confidence in its qualities in possession. In that way, this differentiates this Leipzig team from the ones in previous seasons in which the possession game seemed less competent.

The first build-up phase, typically starting a few metres ahead of their own penalty box, is coined by a distinct calmness. The central defenders aim to establish this phase of the game with initial passes and thus prepare a move without hastily forcing an attacking passing lane. Instead, the first passes go toward one of the central midfielders or fullbacks without those passes carrying much consequence.

The most common move entails the ball being played to a full-back, who forwards it diagonally to a winger who has moved inside. From there, the ball is either laid off to a team-mate behind or around him or the player opens himself up into the open space. The fullbacks, though, differ from each other in terms of their play-style and positional characteristics quite severely. Lukas Klostermann, for one, is someone who wants to make forward runs early, while Nordi Mukiele hangs back much more often and thus receives more touches of the ball in the first build-up phase.

This is how Leipzig's initiating of play presents itself. The Pass Sonar underlines how the central players at the halfway line—most commonly the central defenders—rarely play vertical passes into the attack, rather shifting play toward the wings.

Furthermore, the two holding midfielders serve different functions. Konrad Laimer clearly is the more attacking-minded of the two central midfielders which expresses itself in his aggressive advancing up the pitch. Laimer works very well as a receiver for the aforementioned layoffs from one of the wingers—in this case the right winger. On the half-left side, though, Diego Demme hangs back further and so covers the space behind. Instead, it is Timo Werner who moves toward the left side and thus offers the left winger an option to forward passes to him. Thus, while Laimer is actively looking for tight spaces and high-pressure situations, Werner attempts to evade the tightness and to penetrate the opponent's defensive formation from the flank.

The Passing Network and Average Positions illustrate the diverging roles of players in the position groups. Klostermann is the full-back that advances higher. Laimer most often pushes forward a bit from the half-right space. Comparing the wingers, Nkunku typically chimes in more concretely in the No.10 space.

Occasionally, Demme will produce a different build-up structure by dropping between the centre backs and thus automatically pushing the fullbacks a bit more forward. When the wingers move inward more quickly accordingly, this opens a lane for Klostermann, for instance, who can use it to sprint and receive the ball at full speed.

As attacks develop into the final third of the pitch it becomes apparent how Leipzig use simple, but well-thought-out, positional play. The wingers usually move inward with the left winger adapting himself to the movements of Werner, who himself can also fall back into the half-space. The inward movement of the wingers and the advancing runs of the full-backs create a consistent staggering in terms of width, without it becoming too flat thanks to forward and backward movements within the lanes themselves.

This GIF shows the processes when Leipzig can advance into the opposing half without much resistance, which happened time and time again in the win over Düsseldorf, for example. 1) Werner presents himself in the half-space and does not evade toward the left flank due to limited space. 2) Sabitzer and Forsberg or Nkunku shape their runs toward the middle or into the points of intersections based on personal preferences and in adaptation to the strikers' movements.

On the whole, Leipzig create a strong presence at the points of intersections even against a back-five and thus occupy the entire back line. 3) Both full-backs use the open wings for runs and at times position themselves at the offside border, thus occupying their immediate opponents. Alternatively, one of the full-backs receives an uncontested pass. 4) The four-man block in behind is responsible for coverage and can transition into Gegenpressing in case of a loss of possession.

Defensive Transitioning

Typically, Leipzig are able to avoid being surprised by counters after losses of possession deep in the opponent's half. Often times, singular proactive movements from the defenders prove sufficient, with them looking to duel with the intended receiver of a long ball and thus pushing him off the track. In situations in which Leipzig give up the ball a short way ahead of the box and centrally, usually one or two players immediately behind will step in. On the right side that might be Laimer and Sabitzer who are in close proximity to the ball anyway. High pressure on the opponent is being applied especially ahead of the halfway line, so that there is little time for decisions and the new ball-carrier cannot even get into position for a long shifting pass.

Looking at them individually, some players behave differently in defensive transitioning. Laimer, for one, is an aggressive defender, whereas Demme is a man-orientated pursuit-player, mostly trying to eliminate his direct opponent as a receiving option. When losing possession at the halfway line, and thus in situations where only defenders will be behind the ball, the back-four typically moves back toward its own penalty box in orderly fashion and also moves closer together in an attempt to fend off potential crossing attempts in the middle and not to let potentially fatal holes develop by going into early duels.

Laimer's Defensive Activity over the entire season thus far shows how he behaves quite dominantly on his usual half-right position. The picture is slightly distorted because he played a number of matches on the right wing.

Defensive Organisation

Against the open build-up play of the opponent, so, when they build-up in an orderly fashion from the back, Leipzig often play in a 4-4-1-1/4-2-3-1 formation. The allocation of the two strikers at times will adapt to the opponent and may even vary within games slightly. The players have some liberties in these aspects. Interestingly, in the 4-4-1-1 it is not rare for the more physical Patrik Schick to be positioned as the temporary No.10 and stay in proximity of the opponent's central midfield. Werner is then being used further ahead as a runner who tries to push wide-standing centre backs toward the flanks and to guide passes that way as well. 

The flanks, though, are not being defended head-to-head. Especially in the 4-4-1-1, Leipzig's wingers are positioned more centrally in the midfield line and only move in on the opponent when he receives the ball, in order to prevent an uncontested diagonal pass forward. Leipzig's central midfielders, in turn, are typically man-orientated when an opposing player pushes forward through the centre in an attempt to present himself as a receiving option behind the halfway line.

Leipzig's pressing structure in the 4-4-1-1 distinguishes itself by the staggering between Werner and his striking partner as well as the adapted movements of the wingers who will orient themselves either to the full-back, a dropping holding midfielder or even one of the opposing centre backs.

Sporadically, Leipzig's defenders in the back line tend to pursue dropping movements from the wingers or central strikers, thus abandoning space at the offside border. This can take its toll, however, when another opponent runs into the space behind the defender for a layoff pass from a winger or central striker. Most of the time, the defenders will abort their pursuing runs in time, but a certain, albeit small, risk of danger remains.

Leipzig's defensive problems are, in fact, larger when the team moves back in a 4-4-1-1 or a 4-4-2 and tries to defend while using a low press. The statics of Leipzig's defensive formation are then a curse for the team, since it only rarely allows immediate access, instead turning into a passenger when the opponent turns to quick passing moves. Leipzig live off their strength in duels and intensity in proximity to the ball, but they can only develop when the team is in movement. Otherwise, they turn into a relatively simple man-orientated defensive team that is constantly a step too late and only rarely manages to block passing lanes, simply because it fails to disengage from its own man-orientation.

Over the last five matches, Leipzig failed to decisively disturb the opposing passing flow. This was especially true for the games against Hoffenheim and Dortmund. Still the team manages to defend opposing attacks in a way that no shot is actually fired off. Attempts on goal by the opponent mostly are a result from an attempt to play on the counter or from a very inviting position from open play when Leipzig's defence is ultimately beaten.

Building up with a back-three and full-backs that are positioned higher up the pitch seems like an effective means against Leipzig. The full-backs would push Leipzig's wingers back, while the numerical advantage in the first build-up line would allow for a secure passing and, situationally, for advances through the half-spaces. Rarely, Leipzig tinker with their pressing formation in a way that at least one of the wingers moves toward one of the opposing centre backs. 

Of course, someone like Emil Forsberg will occasionally make such a run, but usually, high-positioned opposing wing-players and dominance in the early build-up phase should make Leipzig turn to a retreat into passivity.

Offensive Transitioning

The aforementioned structure in pressing, with Schick as a hanging striker, has the major benefit of the Czech being able to immediately function as a pass receiver after winning the ball. Schick is the first target player who can, for example, lay the ball off for a sprinting Laimer. Laimer most often leads the first wave in advancing after winning possession, while the third ball will more often than not end up at the feet of the defenders who themselves move forward. Especially after third balls, the next pass usually is a medium-length ball toward the flanks where, for instance, Timo Werner or Christopher Nkunku will be located to move away from the contracted defence and receive the ball.

Set Pieces

Corners are not necessarily a Leipzig speciality. Defensively, the team again and again seems vulnerable, which is also down to the staggering. Most often, five players position themselves more or less behind one another at the edge of the six-yard box, with one of those five possibly taking on a man-marking task. Ahead of them, there are three more Leipzig players in a tight man-marking scheme, trying to defend against the opponents' runs. Since a number of players are positioned exactly on a line, the inner five-man block can be levered out, for instance with a short corner and a flick-on toward the far post—be that straight-away horizontally or diagonally from the corner of the six-yard box. The block remains static, after all, forming a density of defenders that is restricted in its reactivity. 

Example of Leipzig's staggering for a defensive corner…

…and how an opponent can beat Leipzig following a corner.

For attacking corners, three Leipzig players may, for example, position themselves centrally ahead of the six-yard box. Three more players stand further back at the penalty spot, with one of them often dropping back from there toward the short side of the penalty box. In other cases, five Leipzig players stand ahead of the penalty spot and run in a diversified manner and in timely accord to the corner's being taken toward the six-yard box. Here, Werner, as the player bringing up the rear in that block, will move away a bit and not make a direct run inside. Another player mimics a run toward the corner flag, however abandoning it when he's pursued. Schick, then again, occupies the six-yard box in this alignment and works as a nuisance for the goalkeeper as far as the rules will allow it.

For crosses from free-kicks in the half-spaces, four Leipzig players will occasionally position themselves in the opposite half-space and start their runs, almost classically, shortly ahead of the offside border. Three more players hang back a few metres and can free themselves for a short pass. Schick, in turn, will sometimes gain more of a head of steam from further back and thus enter the box with more dynamism as long as he is not running into an offside position before the free-kick is being taken in the first place.

Leipzig's major advantage is the pure physicality that Schick, as well as Yussuf Poulsen or Dayot Upamecano, brings to the table for corners. Even from static positions, when they are situated at the six-yard box, they can win aerial duels.

So how do Leipzig distinguish themselves?

• The team no longer lives off only their intensity and speed, even though those elements still play an important role since almost no other Bundesliga team can piece together this many exact passes and receptions at high speeds.
• The many movements within the structure in possession make life hard for man-orientated defensive lines. They also train the passing communication of Leipzig and encourage their intuitive actions high up the pitch.
• Werner more present than ever by not only chiming in on the left side, but also more and more actively asking to receive the ball in the half-space. Spending time as a play-making or heavy-on-touches striker in a 3-5-2 also bears fruit.
• The strength in duels by which Konrad Laimer and also Stefan Ilsanker distinguish themselves is of high importance in defensive transitioning, since it puts a stop to a number of attacks. Only rarely a physical collision will be interpreted as a foul by the aggressor when defending counter-attacks, as long as there is only minimal contact between the legs.
• Passiveness is a curse for Leipzig just as much as a match in which they are too dominant. At times, the team will give up a bit on their strong positional play when they are in the lead, while also becoming less precise in the transition into the final third of the pitch. This lack of precision results in a loss of dominance and a less strong Gegenpressing because of the weaker staggering in the initial phase.

How can Leipzig be beaten?

1. Building up with a back-three, in connection with secure ball-circulation and constant advancing of the wing-players without the general aspiration to actually include them immediately into the passing, can force Leipzig into the role of a passive defender.
2. Once dominance is achieved, the challenge is that the attacking players have to be in constant movement to be available as receiving options and to create opportunities for layoffs and subsequent through-balls. 
3. To defend against Leipzig's build-up, it has to be attacked at its weakest point. The weakest point is the well-used pass from the full-back to the winger that has moved inside. Here, an opponent has to give the winger a little space at first to provoke the pass, but then force the immediate attack to either intercept the pass or create a loss of possession through a duel.
4. Corners offer a number of options with short-flight balls and flick-ons toward the far post.

At the beginning of this season, I wrote that we should all be grateful to Gian Piero Gasperini for letting us admire Josip Iličić's best season ever. An undoubtedly gifted player who, until last season, had not been able to fully express his immense talent to finally blossomed, albeit at a mature age — not uncommon for attacking players in Serie A.

In the past, Iličić has been hampered by a seemingly endless string of minor injuries. The aches and pains often limited him both in games and in training, so much so that his teammates gave him one of the most hilarious nicknames in European football: “Grandma”. Perhaps his mercurial character hindered his performance and development. After all, the only thing he hates more than fantasy football is warm-up exercises.

Yet, after an infection in his neck lymph nodes forced him to miss two months and meditate on his retirement from football, Atalanta's number 72 came back in September 2018 with renewed enthusiasm and the desire to enjoy playing football while making it enjoyable for everyone’s watching him. 

With Iličić as their most skilled player, Atalanta went on to earn a place at the Coppa Italia final and the first Champions League qualification in their history. Iličić’s influence went far beyond his 12 goals and 7 assists, and in my opinion, he was the bona fide MVP of Serie A in 2018–19.

At 31 years old, his tenth season in Italy seemed to be his career season, the one that would definitively consecrate him in the history of the competition as well as in the hearts of Atalanta fans, who in a recent poll named him the best player in the history of the Dea with almost 80% of the votes. A place he already deserved unquestionably: The Slovenian is one of three players who scored at least one goal and served up at least one assist in each of the last ten Serie A championships, and the league's 9th top goal-scorer of the decade with 79 goals, an enviable haul considering he is not a pure striker.

It seemed unimaginable that the Slovenian fantasy player would raise the level of his game even higher, offering performances unparalleled in Europe. In StatsBomb's database, Iličić's 2018–19 season had a statistical output comparable only to that of Lionel Messi and Neymar, but in the 967 minutes he has played this season he has — incredibly — managed to make another leap forward (Iličić plays a hybrid role between a striker and a trequartista, but I chose the attacking midfielder radial template because I believe it is more explicative)

To put into context what Iličić is doing this season, let’s start with shots. He averages 5.03 shots per 90 minutes, more than anyone else in Serie A this season, Cristiano Ronaldo excluded (the Juventus striker averages 5.44 shots per 90) and a 26% increase in comparison with last season.

It is extremely rare for a player to average so may shots. Over the last couple seasons (2019–20 included), only two players have averaged at least 5 shots per 90. They are, unsurprisingly, Ronaldo and Messi (Harry Kane did so in 2017–18) Apart from sheer volume, what is interesting is that Iličić has increased his shot volume without compromising the overall quality of his attempts — quite the opposite. The Slovenian’s current open play xG per shot average is 0.126, an increase of 31% compared to last season’s 0.096. Don't get me wrong; 0.126 xG per shot is not an extraordinary average, but it represents a significant improvement for a player that was and still is a trigger-happy shooter who attempts 2.8 shots from outside the box every 90 minutes. 

He can still refine his selection, but an average of 0.55 is enough to lead Serie A in xG per 90 among players with at least 900 minutes played. He is one of just 11 players in the top 5 European leagues to reach that value this season. Iličić has already scored nine goals, three goals shy of his career-best last season.

That’s a little more than three more goals than expected, not a huge overperformance, especially given the historical rhythm at which Atalanta’s offense, which is on pace for a 100+ goals season, is performing. The side have scored 48 goals so far, the highest total achieved by any team at this stage of the season since Fiorentina in 1958–59. He has also almost doubled his touches into the box (from 7.00 to 12.57) and therefore his reputation as a goal-scoring threat.

An analysis of Iličić's creativity reveals the stellar results don't change. The former Palermo and Fiorentina player leads the league in xG assisted per 90, too. And widening the perspective to the European level, only 8 other players in the big 5 equal or exceed Iličić’s output of 0.35 xG assisted. Considering he averages “just” 0.28 assist per 90, he has recorded fewer assists than expected so far.

The Slovenian is top of the league in open play key passes, creating at least 0.54 more chances on average than any other player in Serie A (his teammate Papu Goméz is second with 2.25). Thomas Müller is the only player in Europe to average more open play key passes (3.04 per 90) than Iličić. 

His passing happens where it matters, and it does so at an exceptional rate. Iličić leads the league in passes inside the box (and is one of just 8 players in the big 5 averaging at least 1 pass inside the box per 90) and his 2.42 open play passes into the box per 90 are good enough to make the top 15 across European leagues.

Iličić’s stats surely benefit from playing for a crazily good offensive team, but on the other hand, Gasperini’s scoring machine’s performances are also dependent on him. Atalanta average a league-best 1.76 xG per 90, while Iličić’s contribution, measured in terms of xG chain (the xG of possessions a player is involved in starting from open play) is 1.55. This alone accounts for how important the attacker is for his team’s offensive developments.

Successful dribbles are basically the only statistic where “Grandma” Josip didn’t improve in comparison to last season. He has always been a high-risk, high-reward decision-maker, a trait reflected by a success rate of 59%. Still, he completes 3.35 dribbles, which is enough for third-best in the league. 

Combine his high volume of shots with his high volume of dribbles, and you get a very exclusive group. Messi is the only other player to top five shots and three dribbles.  This list summarizes how Iličić is playing by presenting the main per 90 underlying stats and revealing his rank in the 2019–20 season.

• 1.12 Scoring contribution (1st)
• 5.03 Shots (2nd)
• 0.84 Non-penalty Goals (1st)
• 0.55 Non-penalty xG (1st)
• 0.28 Assist (14th)
• 2.79 Open-play key passes (1st)
• 0.35 xA 1st (1st) 
• 1.01 Passes inside the box (1st)
• 2.42 Passes into the box (5th)
• 1.09 xG Build up (2nd)
• 1.55 xG Chain (1st)
• 8.38 Deep progressions (10th)
• 54.36 Carries (10th)

Do I need to write that Josip Iličić is currently the best player in Serie A? Well, if that's not enough, here's a nice little bonus. According to his data biography Messi has never finished a season averaging 5 shots, 3 successful dribbles and 2.5 open play key passes. Iličić is currently averaging 5.03 shots, 3.35 successful dribbles and 2.79 open play key passes. Not too shabby.

With Bayern München having a true rollercoaster of a season, RB Leipzig stepping up to the very top and Borussia Mönchengladbach surprising friend and foe, several haven't even noticed that Borussia Dortmund is having a pretty rough season. Lucien Favre’s squad has accrued 30 points, 12 fewer than the half-season total they put up prior to last season's winter break. So what’s going on with Die Borussen?

The attack is still solid

A true and reliable striker would be a welcomed improvement for Dortmund. There’s a reason BVB are in the high-profile mix for the winter signing of Red Bull Salzburg’s teen sensation Erling Braut Haaland. Paco Alcácer is the only out-and-out striker in the squad, and the Spaniard does not seem like a permanent solution given his injury woes and unstable form. But even without a genuine striker, and with a manager like Favre with a reputation of being ‘conservative’, Dortmund’s numbers on the attacking side of the ball remain solid. Captain Marco Reus has stepped in as the team’s false nine in recent weeks and provided significant help to the attack. In contrast to the technically gifted, but physically iffy, Mario Götze, Reus combines this important link-up role up top in possession with a scoring threat. The 30-year-old superstar is still so, so good when healthy. Unfortunately, Reus is dealing with a muscle injury during the winter break, and it’s still not entirely clear if he’ll recover in time for the second half of the season.  Dortmund’s other offensive star had a rough start to the season. Favre benched Jadon Sancho for disciplinary reasons less than two months ago. But the 19-year-old phenom responded in a major way. In a five-game stretch that started with the November home game against Paderborn (3–3), the English teen scored six and assisted four. Sancho is overperforming in expected goals, but the young winger’s dominance is not dependant on his hot shooting. He is simply the real deal. Dortmund’s short-term future as a legitimate title candidate is linked closely to Sancho’s decision to either stay in Germany or return to an elite Premier League club.  The same can be said for Achraf Hakimi. His two-year loan spell from Real Madrid ends next summer, and it’ll be interesting to see how far Dortmund are willing to go to keep their gifted fullback in-house. With central midfielders Axel Witsel and Thomas Delaney out injured, Favre switched formations to compensate. Due to their lack of defensive midfield options for Favre's favored 4-2-3-1, Dortmund fielded a 3-4-3 formation over the last five games. This elevated Hakimi to the most important player in Dortmund’s build-up, a slippery and creative outlet on the right flank. 

Defensive woes

If we add the last 7 games of Dortmund’s 2018–19 Bundesliga campaign to the numbers they've put up at the midseason mark, Favre’s squad have conceded a whopping total of 40 goals in their last 24 league games.  Dortmund made an effort to address that issue this summer with the return of Mats Hummels and the acquisition of Hoffenheim left-back Nico Schulz. And even though the duo has been playing quite well this season, the defense is still slipping. The defensive radars help illustrate Dortmund’s defensive struggles that created the worrisome xG trendline above. Favre’s squad are extremely susceptible to the counter-attack this year, and gave up a bunch more high-quality chances in comparison to last season. Player-wise, Dortmund’s backline lost Abdou Diallo to PSG and gained Hummels and Schulz this season. But form-wise, things have shifted dramatically. Manuel Akanji often looked like a world-class centerback-to-be in his first season and a half at Dortmund, but has become increasingly vulnerable when defending open space this year. The search for an ideal partner for Witsel in defensive midfield has been rocky as well. Before his injury, Delaney was still as good of a ball-winner as last season, but his limitations on the ball hindered Dortmund’s play in possession. Julian Weigl is better as a central midfield hub in the build-up, but starting the 24-year-old in midfield weakens Dortmund’s ability to limit the opposition's counter-attacking opportunities.  Dortmund’s defensive activity maps from last year (above) and this season (below) show the press has died down a bit and Dortmund are defending more in midfield. Be it at Mönchengladbach or at Nice, Favre has been most successful with teams that are able to drop back and deal a killer blow to the opponent with a swift and precise transition play. But the type of attacking talent (and defensive vulnerabilities) in Dortmund’s squad suggests a high-octane pressing style is a more logical fit. And herein lies the key question for Dortmund. A slight shift in their playing style is needed to lift them up the table. But in which way? Should the squad play more ‘Favresque’, drop a little deeper more often and gamble on the individual prowess of their fast attackers to punish the positional risks the opposition take? Or should Dortmund push harder on the gas pedal and try to outgun the opposition? Even if the Thor Amongst Young Strikers, aka Haaland, signs with Dortmund, Die Borussen have plenty of other issues to solve. 

Lazio, having already beaten Juventus 3–1 in Serie A this season, just lifted the Italian Supercoppa, overcoming the Old Lady once more, by the same scoreline. Their eight consecutive wins have them sitting third in the table, just six points off Inter with a game in hand. In other words, this is a side that's worthy of being discussed when talking about the Scudetto. At this time last season, Lazio were fourth, but with 11 fewer points and a +3 goal difference, excited few. They were 10 points off Napoli in second place already, and soon it would get even worse. At the midpoint of the season, Lazio dropped off dramatically, focusing on the Coppa Italia rather than the league.  Objectively speaking, Simone Inzaghi's project seemed to have reached a stalemate when they limped to an eighth-place finish last season and it seemed all that could make them better was a marquee signing or two. Yet Lazio's Coppa Italia victory convinced the club to bet again on the former Primavera team, who added only Manuel Lazzari to last year's starting XI. Now, headed into the winter break, not only are Lazio in serious contention for the title, but their attack has improved dramatically: they have the best goal difference in the league, their steady defence contributing, but their 38 goals (second only to Atalanta's 43) making a distinct impression. Lazio have bascially maintained their shooting volume from 2018–19 (from 16.11 to 16.00 shots per game), but has increased the average quality of their attempts by almost 19%, from 0.085 to 0.101 expected goals per shot, which is fourth in the league. At the same time, they've improved their finishing at the team level, so much so that they scored 31 goals while generating 25.93 xG. They have also benefited from a league-best nine penalties, of which they converted seven, thanks to their high volume of play in the opponent's penalty area, where they complete the most passes inside the box, 3.69 per match. Inzaghi continues playing his typical 3-5-2, flanking Joaquín Correa and Ciro Immobile, but it's now even more direct and fast, making Lazio is second with .89 (trailing only Bologna) in the directness index, a ratio of the distance toward goal from the start of a possession that ended in a shot, divided by the total distance traveled in buildup to the shot. This figure higher than last season’s, just as the Biancocelesti's pace towards goal is also slightly higher, increasing from 2.68 to 2.70 meters per second. As much as their tactical improvement appears undeniable, the team's stronger performances might be down to greater understanding amongst the squad and to the awareness of their coach. Lazio's offensive explosion is due to the improved performance of its best players, namely Sergej Milinković-Savić, Luis Alberto, Immobile—and of course Correa, who joined last season. If it is undeniable that a player's performance cannot be evaluated solely by goals and assists, then the regression of Lazio's Big Three from 2017–18 to 2018–19 is emblematic. The Serbian, a target of major European teams in the summer of 2018, had declined worryingly, dropping from 12 to 5 goals. And after 11 goals and 14 assists in his first season as a starter, Luis Alberto had contributed only 5 goals and as many assists. Immobile, on the other hand, almost exactly halved his seasonal scoring haul, declining from 29 goals, for which he shared the Capocannoniere with Mauro Icardi, to "just" 15 goals. In just one season, the three dropped from 52 to 25 goals and 26 to 14 assists; while they had suffered a drop in their overall playing time, it was not decisive. Even the inclusion of Correa and Felipe Caicedo in the rotation last season was not enough, and the club lost 33 goals and 5 positions in the standings. Now, just a few days out from 2020, the three are having perhaps the best season of their careers.  Milinković-Savić is better in practically every way, and has realized that his body helps him make a huge contribution to the defence. He is also more involved in the penalty area, where he averages two more touches in the box (from 5.17 to 7.13 per 90). Above all, he has improved his shooting choices, increasing his xG per shot in open play from 0.061 to 0.102. All this and he remains Lazio’s target man when they want to advance quickly, judging by the 3.39 aerial duels he wins every game, a 58% success rate. Luis Alberto leads the league with 9 assists, he improved his already stellar xG assisted average from 0.26 to 0.30 per 90, and even if he's decreased his contribution to the pressing game, he's practically doubled his number of successful dribbles. He now manages the ball with much more lucidity, so much so that he has reduced his number of turnovers by 20% and improved the percentage of passes completed by 6%, making its contribution much more decisive even when he does not directly create opportunities (+0.24 in xG build-up). Finally, he has reached elite-level production in deep progressions with a league-best 13.37 per 90. It may seem almost impossible that Ciro could score more goals than 29 in a season, yet this year everything seems attainable given he's already scored 17 and Serie A just completed its 17th round. It’s not the first time he's scored at an above-average rate, but this season he's sank 11 goals during open play from just 6.47 xG. To do so he has further increased his shooting volume and has practically doubled his number of touches into the box.  But his contribution to his teammates should not be overlooked, providing them 5 assists, one less than last season's total. In short, he's been involved in 60% of Lazio's goals—truly the side's golden boy. Finally, Correa is now a full-fledged central striker. His offensive output has increased as a result, so much so that he is at 0.49 xG per 90, fourth-best Serie A. He has also improved his shot selection, averaging 0.14 xG per shot and increased his volume to reach the same level as Immobile, 3.44 per 90. He may have scored just 6 goals, but the ratio between goals scored and his xG is still less than 1 (0.83), much better than last season when he scored 5 goals total and averaged 0.73.  To challenge for the title, Lazio need Correa to improve his finishing, as it's unlikely that Immobile will maintain a scoring efficiency of 1.70 in the side's 22 remaining Serie A matches. Maintaining their offensive production and finishing at this level is probably the only way they can continue to challenge for the title unless there is a considerable improvement in defence. The squad currently have a mid-table defence with 1.17 xG conceded, but the trend is worsening. With the side already eliminated from the Europa League, leaving them to focus solely on Coppa Italia and the league, it's still hard to argue that they can actually win the Scudetto. But what's certain is that any coach would like to have four offensive players of this level of quality.

It seems weird to discuss this midway through December, but it’s time to check in on a team where the dust kicked up in the summer has only just settled.

Where have they come from?

Alright, a bit of dust being kicked up is an understatement. Bolton Wanderers very nearly ceased to exist. Years of declining performance on and off the field and failure by those in charge to get the house in order caught up with them. It took a takeover completed at the eleventh hour to keep them operating as a business. It truly was the eleventh hour. The season had already kicked off with Bolton having not signed a single player, forced into fielding a team largely made up of players from the development and U18 squads just to field a squad whilst the takeover went through. They played five fixtures under these conditions, losing four by an aggregate score of 0–17, but somehow clinging onto a 0–0 draw against Coventry to claim a point in their second match of the season, under highly unlikely circumstances. All this and . . .  Bolton started the season with a 12-point deduction for going into administration whilst the takeover was in process. That unexpected draw with Coventry took them to -11 points, and begun the long road toward a positive tally. It helped that on August 28th the takeover finally went through and they could sign a few senior professionals for the season. Five games in, but better late than never. Meanwhile, manager Phil Parkinson resigned, understandably exhausted by months of constant pressure and uncertainty around the club's future, whist seldom receiving his salary on time (if at all) for his troubles.

Where are they now?

With Bolton's season effectively starting from scratch five fixtures in, fighting a points deduction and a terrible goal difference, new manager Keith Hill set about leading a squad newly assembled and without a proper pre-season behind them on their quest to achieve the improbable. Scriptwriters everywhere were incredulous as they took the lead four minutes into the squad's first ‘proper’ fixture away at Rotherham. Bolton scored their first goal of the campaign, but on this occasion that was as good as it got. A bit of a downpour on the parade, but Hill was magnanimous, “It will take time but this is just a step on a journey. One thing I do know is that Bolton Wanderers will be great again.” It took just three days to climb another step. A 0–0 draw at home to Oxford the following Tuesday set the tone. Another point chalked off towards a positive points tally. That Saturday saw them move yet closer. Another 0–0 draw, this one at home to Sunderland. Progress slowed slightly as fixtures against Portsmouth, Blackpool and Rochdale yielded just a solitary point. But then… The scenes in the away end as the final whistle went were described as ‘thunderous’. Seven months since their last league win. Three months since they’d nearly ceased to exist. 22nd October. Bristol Rovers 0–2 Bolton Wanderers. The wheels on the great escape were well and truly in motion. Points tally: -5. That first win lit the touch paper. The remaining deficit was wiped out within the next two matches as victories over Fleetwood and Milton Keynes saw them hit the milestone that had been objective number one since Hill had taken charge. Clearly the footballing gods decided this was all becoming a bit too much of a fairytale. We all know and love (what do you mean you don’t?) the sacred cliché, 'goals change games'. We all know that red cards change games too. As Bolton went 1–0 up away at Accrington on the back of their three-game winning streak, the omnipotent soccer powers above us decided that a penalty to Accrington and a red card to defender Josh Earl for the offending incident were just recourse to keep fans' feet planted firmly on the ground. They might’ve gone a bit far with the resultant 7–1 hammering, mind. The 95th-minute equaliser at home to AFC Wimbledon restored spirit and belief to keep Bolton’s unlikely mission on track before they became the latest victim to succumb to Peterborough and Ivan Toney last weekend.

Where do they need to go?

Bolton find themselves still bottom of the table, 15 points from safety and just 27 league games remaining. Keith Hill has undeniably done a sterling job just laying the foundation on which Bolton could possibly survive, and has shown that Bolton are far from the worst side in the division. Were this a normal season with a level playing field from the start, it’s highly unlikely they’d even be involved in the relegation picture. Looking at what this all might mean for the future, a benchmark of their current standard can be seen upon reviewing their performance trendlines since the start of the season. The blue marker shows both when Keith Hill was appointed and when Bolton started fielding senior players. Their league record since that moment is W3 D4 L5 from 12 games, a rate of 1.08 points per game. There are always caveats, but a simplistic projection of that rate over the remainder of the season would leave Bolton on 31 points, well short of the required total to survive. Now to colour it with the necessary context. Bolton have essentially and necessarily been running a pre-season regime during this period, playing against opposition with the privilege of correctly implemented strength and conditioning programmes, able to not only fully recover game-to-game but also play at the peak of their powers. There’s scope to suggest that Bolton should get better as the season wears on and their fitness levels match those of their opponents. It's likely there'll be another minor reshuffling of the pack and the arrival of new faces in January to further mould the side in Hill’s image. This should leave Bolton more competitive and able to pick up points at a higher rate. The major issue remains the mountain that they have to scale. For all the good work that’s been done to get them to a competitive level, that height might be too much. Essentially starting the season from scratch with just two points, they have to pick up more points in a half-season than their relegation rivals will in the full season. The clever clogs at the spread firms suggest the points total needed to survive could end up being as high as 50. That leaves Bolton needing to pick up points at the rate of a play-off standard team for the remainder of the season, which would require yet another large leap forward in their levels of performance. To put it one way, Bolton could win their next eight matches on the spin and would still need to pick up points from then onwards at around the same 1.08ppg rate they’ve managed so far under Hill. To focus in too closely on that would be to lose sight of the bigger picture. No matter what division the club competes in next season, the slate will be wiped clean, the team will start the season with a neutral points tally, hell, they’ll even get a proper pre-season under their belts. There’ll be no fretting over whether or not the season tickets fans purchased will actually manifest into a team to watch on the pitch. This season should’ve been a complete write-off, yet while Bolton’s great escape still isn’t probable, it’s certainly not impossible. And that's an unlikely victory on its own.

Barcelona and Real Madrid dominated European football throughout most of the 2010s by surrounding their historic stars—Lionel Messi and Cristiano Ronaldo—with defenders and central midfielders who were outstanding playmakers: Gerard Piqué, Sergio Ramos, Marcelo, Dani Alves, Sergio Busquets, Xavi, Toni Kroos, Andrés Iniesta, Luka Modrić. Inspired by these teams and players, elite European football demanded defensive players to do more and more with the ball. Sweeper keepers and attacking fullbacks stopped being just a curiosity of South American football while deep midfield playmakers replaced the number ten role. 

As the decade moved on, however, football developed a response to this era of possession football in the form of increasingly aggressive and complex pressing systems, from the positional pressing systems of Pep Guardiola or Thomas Tuchel to the zonal pressing schools of Jürgen Klopp or the Red Bull clubs. A rising tide of teams want to dominate European football not so much by what they do on the ball, but how intense and organized they behave off it. Pressing has been a key element in allowing Manchester City and Liverpool to rack up 90+ points in the Premier League, and it's a commonality shared by three of last season’s Champions League semifinalists, Liverpool, Tottenham, and Ajax.  In this new era of pressing, modern midfielders and forwards need different skill sets to defeat opponents. Midfielders cannot be just outstanding passers, but more complete ball movers who are able to dribble past opponents from deeper midfield zones. Forwards must make longer runs to beat the higher defensive lines, so speed and dribbles in open spaces are once again considered as relevant as close control and dribbling in tight spaces. And forwards, now more than ever, must be the first line of defense. Real Madrid and Barcelona forwards seem to be lagging behind in several of these key skills, so we decided to dig into the data to find more. 

Defense and Pressing

Let’s begin by using the 2019–20 season data to compare the defensive activity of Real Madrid and Barça to two of the most mature, consistent, and high-profile pressing systems in European football: Manchester City and Liverpool.  Counting only the players with more than 600 league minutes under their belt, we see the midfielders in all four teams do similar amounts of pressing work: a midfielder at City and Liverpool averages 17 and 19 pressure events per game, respectively, while a midfielder at Real Madrid and Barça averages 18 and 15 pressures per game.  The big difference between the defenses of the English and Spanish giants pops out when looking at the pressure data of their forwards. In both English clubs, the forwards lead the way of the press, averaging slightly more pressure events than their midfielders. A forward at City and Liverpool averages 18 and 20 pressures per game, respectively, almost twice the rates of his counterparts at Real Madrid and Barcelona, who average 9 and 11 pressures.  Such a difference in the defensive work rate of the forwards is reflected in the collective pressing effort. While Liverpool and City cover the entire final third with a blanket of above-average pressure. . . . . . Real Madrid and Barça exhibit a patchier defensive activity coverage, leaving more openings for the opposition to progress through the midfield areas.  Since midfielders at the Spanish giants must compensate for the pressing work their forwards don’t do, they are forced to push up higher and higher into opposition territory to harass their rivals, leaving bigger gaps behind their backs that can be exploited. A recent example is evident in last weekend’s game between Real Sociedad and Barça. Busquets — still the most active presser in his squad despite being 31 years old — constantly moved right behind Messi and Luis Suárez to pester his opponents during the buildup. Meanwhile, also-31-year-old Ivan Rakitić often drifted wide to the right wing to press the opposition left-back to compensate for the defensive work Messi doesn’t do. Both defensive actions left big gaps behind the veteran midfielders, and neither has the legs to recover on time when overpassed by the opposition. And with Real Sociedad having a skillful midfield trio of Ander Guevara, Mikel Merino, and Martin Ødegaard, they beat the Barça press often, allowing their forward trio of Alexander Isak, Mikel Oyárzabal, and Cristian Portu to thrive in the spaces behind the Blaugrana pressing line. Real Sociedad outshot their rivals by 19 shots to 9. Barcelona managed to draw this game because Gerard Piqué put forth a titanic performance defending his own box, while Antoine Griezmann, Suárez and Messi packed a bigger goal-scoring punch than their opponents and took better advantage of their fewer chances. Moving over to Madrid, Los Blancos have avoided these defensive issues through (a) a less aggressive defensive block and (b) the excellent defensive efforts of Fede Valverde — the team’s most active presser — and Casemiro. Both midfielders have the speed burst that Barcelona’s veteran midfielders lack, so even if they are bypassed or make a mistake when marking opponents, they can recover more easily. This year, both Real Madrid and Barça appear to have acknowledged and adapted to the defensive deficits of their forward lines. As the defensive radars below show, both teams have actually improved on last season’s open play expected goals conceded by using less aggressive defensive behaviors, as measured by StatsBomb’s aggression metric. Both teams are now more selective about when they send their midfielders up to press. Given the improvement in their defensive underlying numbers, why are we so hung up on their pressing numbers? Pressing high or defending deep, isn’t that just a stylistic choice? Up to this point in the season, Real Madrid has conceded fewer goals and expected goals than Liverpool and Manchester City. If the less aggressive defense works for them, is there really a problem with forwards not doing defensive work? Funnily enough, the problems of the less aggressive approach used by Real Madrid and Barça might be reflected in the attack rather than defense.  Teams that recover the ball deeper into their own territory need faster, trickier, and more dynamic forwards who can threaten the opposition goal from longer distances. These players must make fast 30-, 40-, 50-meter runs and still have the lungs and brains to maneuver into good shooting positions and finish clinically. In their prime, Messi, Suárez, Karim Benzema, and Gareth Bale were all part of historic counterattacking trios that destroyed high-profile opponents through a devastating mix of speed and technical precision. If you’re a fan of FC Bayern, you probably remember what I’m talking about (sorry, Bayern fans). Half a decade after those events, none of these forwards retain such explosiveness in their veteran legs. Messi can still single-handedly dribble past defensive systems from time to time, but these moments are becoming rarer and rarer.

Barça’s Attack and the Deficit of Explosiveness

Barça tried to compensate for an aging Messi and the departure of Neymar by signing Ousmane Dembelé, but he has struggled to live up to his potential over his two injury-plagued years at the club. This past summer, instead of using the transfer war chest to sign another speedy trickster and goal-scorer who could play off Messi, they went for Griezmann, a striker known for his technical precision, finishing, and game intelligence rather than his speed and dribbling. And to boot, his ideal role and zones of influence are similar to Messi’s. This leads to a forward trio of Messi, Suárez, and Griezmann who accumulate plenty of goal-scoring punch, but not enough explosiveness to threaten defenses. It should thus come as no surprise that the Blaugrana team received a breath of fresh air with the surprise appearance of 17-year-old Anssumane “Ansu” Fati, the newest hot prospect from La Masía who is now the youngest player ever to score in a Champions League game. He has barely played 327 minutes in La Liga, but despite the small sample size at hand, it’s not outlandish to argue that his speed and dribbling make him a better fit for Barcelona’s left winger role than Griezmann. As seen in the passing visualization below, Griezmann’s preferred way of playing the left winger role is . . . to not play as a left winger. He’s not a dribbler, so he compensates by smartly moving across the pitch, slipping into the gaps left by the opposition defense. This is how he can end up stepping on Messi's areas of influence and becoming redundant.  Fati’s dribbling ability, on the other hand, allows him to stick to the left wing and avoid interfering with Messi and Suárez while still managing to get into the box and produce shots. 

Real Madrid’s Attack and Their Goal-Scoring Deficit 

Real Madrid not only ignored the decreasing speed and dribbling skill of their forward line for a couple of years, but in the summer of 2018, they also ignored a gargantuan goal-scoring deficit by letting go of Ronaldo without replacing him with another world-class goal scorer. This past summer they tried to make amends in these areas by signing top striker prospect Luka Jović and a superstar dribbler in Eden Hazard, but this still doesn’t solve all their attacking problems. Zidane wants to build the team around his best dribbler — Hazard — and his best striker — a Benzema who is undergoing a late renaissance — but often uses a 4-3-3 setup that relegates Jović to a substitute role, since the Serbian doesn’t have the speed to act as a goal-scoring winger beside Benzema. With Zidane barely using the forward who should be his second-best goal-scorer, an overworked Benzema must carry the team’s goal production. 45% of Real Madrid’s expected goal output (and 52% of their actual goals) in the league has been shot or assisted by Benzema. With a slow and injury-ridden start to the 19/20 season, Hazard has suffered his lowest goal-assist productivity since his 2015–16 annus horribilis, with a meager 0.27 non-penalty expected goals + expected assists per 90. Bale is doing better, with a rate of 0.47 non-penalty xG + xG assisted per 90, but his performance has once again been affected by injuries and the mistrust of a fanbase who questions his commitment to the team. With every passing year, the 30-year-old Bale seems slower and less able to get into ideal shooting positions. Given the lackluster performance of the senior forwards, Real Madrid’s hopes have shifted to their U-20 players: 19-year-old Vinícius Jr. and 18-year-old Rodrygo Goes. After his breakout 18–19 season, Vinícius continues to be one of La Liga’s elite dribblers, but he must master the art of goalscoring. While Hazard is too reluctant to shoot, Vinícius is too eager, which often leads him to shoot from subpar locations. His open play shot quality of 0.08 xG per shot ranks below league average, by far the lowest among Real Madrid forwards.  That being said, Vinícius does offer things that none of his senior teammates do. As the passing graphic below shows, Hazard will often receive the ball in his own half, aiming to dribble or combine with his teammates to help progress through midfield zones.  Vinícius performs some of these progressive runs and passes, too, but his efforts are more concentrated in the opposition half. Not only does he want to run at defenders, but he’s often willing to run behind them too. Bale, Benzema, and Hazard don’t make these runs into space frequently.  On the right wing, Rodrygo is competing against Bale for the starting role in the lineup. He’s not an elite dribbler like Vinícius, but he tries to compensate by being more cerebral and precise. Rodrygo does not shoot often but is more careful about his shot locations, averaging the highest xG per shot this season among Real Madrid forwards. While Bale seems increasingly comfortable staying on the wing and whipping a cross into the box, Rodrygo seems more willing to attack the box, which is ultimately reflected in his higher rate of touches in the box and xG. A great example of Rodrygo’s precision and composure in finishing is his debut goal against Osasuna, where he easily controlled a 40-meter pass from Casemiro, ran into the box, and waited for the correct moment to cut inside with his right foot and score. The irony in this story of Vinícius and Rodrygo is that one youngster seems to have what the other lacks, and vice versa.

Conclusions

Real Madrid and Barcelona have incredibly talented squads, but their players don’t necessarily complement each other, which leads to many of the tactical problems mentioned. This happens when clubs buy talent for the sake of buying talent, without a specific philosophy or game plan in mind. That represents the big difference over the last three years between the two Spanish giants and the two English giants: the latter first defined — through their management and coaching teams — an idea of how they wanted to play, and then bought players who fit their needs and the rest of the squad. By building these strong collective structures, Liverpool and Manchester City created teams who could rack up 90+ points in their domestic league or win the Champions League without needing a Messi or a Ronaldo. I’m willing to bet that the forwards in Real Madrid and Barcelona who are not doing much defensive work now would significantly increase their defensive work rates if they played at Manchester City or Liverpool instead. Real Madrid and Barça can keep buying players as much as they want, but they will keep running into problems of squad coherence until they learn to first settle on an identity, and then buy the talent that fits. At least Real Madrid can say they’ve never followed that approach, but Barça have long prided themselves in being a philosophy club, yet their current first-team squad building doesn’t seem to follow a coherent game plan.

Diego Simeone spoke of the inevitable “anxiety” that accompanies a lack of goals after Atlético Madrid again failed to score against Villarreal on Friday night in La Liga. Missing chances begets missing even bigger chances, and on and on it goes. Atlético Madrid have learned very quickly the problems that stem from missing these chances can grow exponentially if not quickly reversed. Heading into their key Champions League clash on Wednesday night against Lokomotiv Moscow, they hadn’t scored in five hours, weren’t sure where the next goal was going to come from and were forced to endure whispers of a crisis before Christmas.

As you can see by the trajectory of their expected goals, they haven’t been playing poorly, but their distinct lack of an effective plan in the penalty area is frustrating. They remain defensively resolute (even more so, in fact) but their purpose now, to take the lead and hold onto it, is proving difficult.

 

Last season, after losing to Juventus in the Round of 16 without as much as landing a glove on their opponents in Turin, and flopping out of the La Liga title race before Luis Suárez had shaken off the annual summer rust, Simeone knew it would be a summer of change at the Wanda Metropolitano; to an extent, he welcomed it. And when Atlético Madrid beat Real Madrid 7–3 in New Jersey this summer, fans hoped this year would be different.

In a long-overdue overhaul of their defence, they waved adios to Diego Godín, Juanfran and Felipe Luis. Barcelona pried Antoine Griezmann from their grip while Marcos Llorente and Héctor Herrera arrived to shore up the midfield. There was talk of progressive football, a futuristic 4-3-3, which they have implemented at times, but their execution as the protagonists in games has been poor.

Simeone said this is a year of transition, but their new status as an elite football club does not permit the use of such vocabulary, much less as an excuse. The anxiety Simeone mentioned after the Villarreal is palpable and was evident again on Wednesday night against Lokomotiv Moscow. However, this time they turned that anxiety into urgency from the very start. Maybe that’s what’s missing? Atlético Madrid might have the talent and remain sharp in knockout tournaments, but a certain weariness has set in during run-of-the-mill La Liga games this year, which they don’t seem to know how to shake off.

What are their problems?

Their sluggish campaign thus far can be put down to the integration of new players, a change of mentality or just plain old poor luck. Then there's the loss of their talisman, and need to wait for his teenage replacement to settle. When you throw all of these ingredients together, that aroma you smell is indeed anxiety wafting from the crockpot.

Diego Simeone says he would prefer a game to finish 1–0 because a 4–3 scoreline indicates a number of mistakes were made. So, while new talent necessitated a certain shift in mentality, and prompted Atléti to play different, more attacking formations and dominate games with possession, Simeone has not turned into a risk-taking manager overnight.

Atlético are transitioning into a more ball-dominant team. Given how teams set up against them, they've had little choice. This is part of their problem.

They don’t press high enough to win the ball back in awkward positions for the opposition. In fact, they have the second-fewest pressures in La Liga and are dead last when it comes to pressure regains. They are being asked to break down set defences which has not been and never was their style.

 

They are below league average when it comes to dribbling past players and their pace to goal is closer to Real Valladolid, who are last in the league, than to Granada, who sit ahead of Barcelona and Real Madrid. They are adapting to a new way of thinking, playing and executing in attack but it is slow, reveals evident confusion, and often feels ultimately futile.

If Simeone was to trust his defence, allowing João Félix, Morata, Álvaro Morata, Thomas Lemar and Saúl to press with impunity, the opposition may become more susceptible, leading to more favourable chances for Atlético. The xG conceded might increase, but given the players at his disposal — their age profile and the energy that brings — Simone must overcome his caution to get the most from this squad. That's easier said than done. They have new players in all three lines of the field, leading to issues of integration and trust.

A brand new defence

Kieran Trippier and Renan Lodi have injected much-needed energy on the flanks for Atlético after Juanfran and Filipe Luis departed in the summer. Trippier, in particular, is perfect for Simeone. He is in his late 20s, has experience in Europe and possesses a perfect blend of energy, experience, willingness to be coached and a desire to prove himself in new circumstances. He has quickly transformed himself into another version of Koke, not tactically, but as a player whose development is all about encouragement and willingness to do what he’s told. Despite playing at right-back, at times this season he's functioned as the creative hub, and his delivery into the box has been exquisite. 

Lodi, on the left, is similar but younger and has missed a few games. With no natural replacement, Saul has had to play there at times, causing him to lose his own rhythm and sense of place in the team.

Simeone has been forced to play Felipe and Mario Hermoso at the back given José Giménez and Stefan Savić’s injury problems, but they are the real deal. Their non-penalty xG conceded is ludicrously low, even for a Diego Simeone-coached side.

Midfield woes

The revamp of Atlético's midfield brought in Héctor Herrera, Marcos Llorente and saw Gabi’s torch passed to Thomas Partey. The Ghanian is having a season that should surely interest the best teams in Europe. A midfield of Koke, Saul and Partey seems it has everything a midfield needs — work-rate, incisive passing and running, athleticism to get into the box and to get back too. However, their creativity has waned and Saúl has regressed, currently mired in his worst form since emerging onto the scene under Simeone. Getting him back to his best could be the key. His involvement in expected goals is just above league average but he’s struggling in every other aspect.

 

 

His driving runs and threats from deep could change Atlético’s fortunes overnight, as they're exactly what the team are missing. Their 4.56 deep completions is third in the league but they can’t seem to dribble the ball into dangerous areas to save their lives. Take a look at the comparison between current Saúl and Saúl from two years ago to see how his pressures and dribbles have dropped, and almost every other stat has fallen. He is a shell of the player he once was.

 

Attacking problems

Dare I say it? There is no problem with Atlético’s attack. They’re just not being helped by their midfield and have missed some chances, leading to talk of a crisis.  Félix, Morata, Diego Costa and Ángel Correa lead the way with shots per game. Thomas Partey is next but after that, Lodi and Felipe, then Koke and Saúl way down the list. The midfield needs to produce more of an attacking threat in a hurry. But the major goal-scoring issue is that they simply aren't finding the back of the net as much as their xG suggests they should. That's the kind of problem that eventually corrects itself.

On an individual level, the team has plenty of talent and room to grow. Correa could be the answer to their creativity problems. On his day, Correa can be electric. The problem is, it’s very rarely his day. His mazy dribbles often confuse even his teammates and there is very little consistency in his game. He has Simeone’s trust now, though, and is playing more regularly. Time will tell if the 24-year-old can develop a level of consistency that will see him play a role in Simeone’s side going forward.

In every game, Félix shows glimpses of his brilliance. His feathery touches are a joy to watch, his agility and speed when running at opponents have even the most cynical of football fans salivating. Yet these flashes are not enough for him to truly dominate a game. While his €126 million price tag might suggest Atlético brought in a ready-made superstar, the club always knew they would have to wait for the real João Félix to emerge. He is shooting plenty but needs to be more involved in building play from central areas. That might be helped by getting him the ball in transition so he can take advantage of back-pedalling defenders.

The good news is that Atlético Madrid should be fine. The bad news is that Atlético Madrid should be fine. Their xG is up there with the best in the league, but Simeone’s side don’t appear to have reached the level where they might challenge for a title. They have lost ground in La Liga’s top four race but are through to the last 16 of the Champions League, where they will be eyeing another charge at the trophy that eludes them. However, they'll need to start scoring goals.

Simeone might have to embrace the mayhem of counter-pressing and winning in transition if his team continue to struggle in front of goal. Getting Saúl and Koke playing their best, most effective football is vital to a successful season. The problem is that by the time he does embrace some form of chaos, Atlético Madrid might have nothing to lose. In other words, they might have nothing to win.

There’s no denying that Dinamo Zagreb have the ability to surprise. Manchester United fans may remember when Dinamo came to town to face the defending European Champions, only to hold the Red Devils to a goalless draw in the first round of the 1999–2000 Champions League. Arsenal went to Zagreb for their opening game in the 2015–2016 Champions League, only to see Olivier Giroud sent off after 40 minutes, and their team lose to a side that hadn’t won a UCL match in their last 15 attempts. And this season, the unexpected high-fliers from Italy, a quick and ruthless Atalanta, were destroyed by Dinamo in Zagreb, 4–0. The Croatian champions even held Shakhtar Donetsk to back-to-back draws, ensuring they remain in third—and even in contention for second and a spot in the Round of 16—should they secure a shock victory while Atalanta come away with a win in Ukraine.  This could finally be the year that, for the first time in history, Dinamo advance to the knockout stages.. Their only significant European achievement is having won the Inter-Cities Fair Cup in 1966–67, a tournament so complicated to explain that it’s best just to say that UEFA does not even consider clubs’ honors to be part of their European record. The club certainly have enough domestic honors to brag about, with 20 Croatian League titles and 15 Cup wins, as well as 9 Yugoslav titles and 8 Yugoslav Cup trophies, though it must be said that most of those came during the time of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia rather than the post-World War II federation, in which the clubs from Belgrade dominated. Considering this history, and assuming Shakhtar won’t manage to beat Atalanta, a win for Dinamo against Manchester City would be a massive triumph for the club on the international stage. And City have nothing to play for. Shakhtar can’t reach first in Group C, no matter how hard they try. Meanwhile, Atalanta could still grab second with a win in Ukraine, while their opponents want to hold their place, which might lead to a boring draw and the chance for Dinamo to sneak into second. The question is, even if City don’t field their best side, is there any chance the hosts can take all three points? Only if Dinamo have one more surprise left in them. The first surprise came in that first round against Atalanta, when they played a 3-5-2 for the first time since Nenad Bjelica took over at the start of the 2018–19 season, and they executed it perfectly. The side Bjelica fielded ensured Atalanta could not gain the numerical advantage in the midfield, something the Goddesses must do to play their own brand of attacking football. Instead, Dinamo were the aggressors, surprising everyone with the way they dominated the match.  Bjelica’s stroke of brilliance was playing  Mislav Oršić as a second striker rather than his usual place out wide. His constant runs behind the defense created many problems for Gian Piero Gasperini's side. Surprisingly, Oršić didn’t actually touch the ball much, and when he did, nothing particularly magical occurred. He executed very few passes, dribbles, or even duels. Everything he did, he did without the ball—except for scoring three goals from six shots that is.  Dani Olmo, on the other hand, not only didn't score or provide an assist, he only had a single shot. Yet he was absolutely dominant otherwise. He attempted 14 dribbles, succeeding on nine of them—more than Slavia Praha, Valencia and Zenit St. Petersburg average per match—creating a numerical advantage for his team in dangerous areas. Atalanta couldn't deal with him at all, which showed in the fact they chose to foul him more than any other Dinamo player. The first match against Atalanta aside, Dinamo’s primary problem is similar to that of other teams from smaller leagues trying to advance in the Champions League (or even secure a place in the next Europa League round). Dinamo dominate their domestic league, nine points clear at the top of the table and although they’ve not managed to beat Hajduk Split, their rivals and the team currently in second, they do have double the expected goal difference. This highlights the problem. Dinamo dominate bad teams but when they face more difficult opposition, the side retreats into a defensive formation, sitting deep and attempting to adapt to their opponents in order to counter specific threats. Although they usually begin in the same 3-5-2 formation used against Atalanta, attempting to overload the midfield, this plan is no longer a surprise, and hasn’t worked as well in their other four matches. In the fifth and most recent game, Atalanta certainly knew what Bjelica was going to throw at them, and Gasperini was ready: he turned Dinamo’s approach in the first leg against them, suffocating their midfield, a task made easier by holding midfielder Nikola Moro being unable to play due to a red card suspension. Dinamo’s determination to nullify other teams’ midfields, stems in part from the fact that it is their own central midfield that is the weakest part of the squad. Luka Ivanušec, only 21 years old, hasn’t managed to establish himself domestically in the few Croatian League games he’s played, so it’s really no surprise that he could not hold off the Italian side. Even if Moro had been present, neither have the needed characteristics of a defensive midfielder, which leaves the team vulnerable when playing against superior opposition, at least opposition properly prepared for what they’re about to face.  And yet. And yet. There are those two games against Shakhtar where Dinamo came away with a point from each, and played well to boot. They could have, and possibly should have, come away from a win from at least one of those games. In Ukraine they had the better of the chances., while at home they led a close match for well over 90 minutes before giving up two stoppage time goals in what was a truly wild finish. Given how those matches played out though, they don’t exactly inspire confidence. Blowing late leads (and in both matches conceding buckets of xG in the last 20 minutes) will give supporters the willies no matter what the final xG tally says. No wonder the fans have more questions than answers, which means they’re likely to keep the paper bags handy when City come to town. Those questions primarily boil down to whether Olmo and Oršić step up. While both lack certain aspects that would make them a complete player on the world stage—hence why they’re living in Zagreb—they both manage to do their job perfectly. Olmo, who recently earned his first call-up to the Spanish national team, plays between the lines, forcing Dinamo’s opponents to focus on him. When he does his job right, his teammates can seize the opportunity to threaten the goal. Meanwhile, as he was against Atalanta, Oršić is the main counterattacking threat, although he is obviously more easily subdued by better opposition. Finally, when Moro is having a good game (as was the case at Shakhtar), the holding midfielder can provide the team with an engine, dropping back and starting almost every attack and sending up long passes to both wings. Again, though, this is something that superior teams can adapt to after facing—or just watching—this side in action. When Shakhtar came to Zagreb, they simply avoided the central part of the pitch, focusing mostly on the wings where they had a 2 v 1 advantage. This also managed to shut down Moro’s ability to send his own players the passes they needed. Bjelica adapted, changing the formation during the game and gaining back some measure of control. It seemed like Dinamo would win, making a Europa League appearance, at the very least, almost certain. However, Shakhtar’s two goals in stoppage time complicated that narrative. Was it just one of those things, a fluke to write off and move on from, or did the match take a physical toll, leaving Dinamo unable to hang with their opponents deep in added time? Or, most worrisome of all did it simply show that the side doesn’t have the necessary maturity to to close the deal in Europe’s most important competition? While it’s possible that maturity—something the youngsters have yet to gain, and that Oršić has yet to refine, given that this is his first season in Champions League—is what stops Dinamo from beating City. But it’ll more likely come down to something that’s easily revealed by facts and figures. In the first tie, Bjelica quickly realized he needed to shift the formation into extreme-defense mode, taking on a 5-3-2 and bunkering down. No surprise, then, that Manchester City absolutely dominated possession and had 20 shots. Still, despite the ugly looking shot chart,it took more than an hour for Raheem Sterling to get his team on the board, and it was only in the last minute that City put the game to bed. Perhaps, then, the surprise will be that City don’t give a rat’s tushie about actually scoring, and will be content to pass the ball around while Dinamo hunker down, allowing the hosts a point. Or maybe Bjelica will provide the surprise, realizing that his team needs to do more than capture a point to continue playing in Europe, given Shakhtar have the advantage due to their three goals at Zagreb. If that’s the case, his side will likely approach this game like they did Atalanta, and if so, Manchester City are likely to fight back, if for no reason but the sake of their pride, and the game could turn into an unexpected thriller. That surprise, of seeing this Dinamo team actually opening up, of going full throttle in attack because they know they’ve got nothing left to lose, would be the best surprise of all.   Header image courtesy of the Press Association

Bayern Munich have undergone a conspicuous change since Hansi Flick took charge. The team are quite a bit more stable and has seized back a bit of the dominance lost under Niko Kovač. This is in large part down to Bayern's pressing, which is far less hesitant than under the previous manager, pressing on the first build-up line and consistently pushing up.

Comparing matches under Kovač and Flick, it is immediately apparent that the level of aggression increased. The match against Leverkusen, on the other hand, showed how a talented counter-attacking side can break through against this Bayern side with long balls and quick passing moves from within their own half.

Joshua Kimmich recently spoke of this aggression after a solid win over Borussia Dortmund. He mentioned how Bayern had "marked comprehensively across the pitch" and thus allowed pushing up high into the midfield. The consistent coverage also forced the likes of Mats Hummels and Co. into hastily made decisions. The defenders were ran at and could not find open receiving options ahead of them. Dortmund's midfielders particularly failed to ward off the attacks from Bayern players once they had received the ball. The pressing scheme, however, is fairly simplistic.

The opponent's build up is attacked early from the customary 4-3-3 formation. Usually an attacking midfielder moves toward the second centre-back, the one Robert Lewandowski is not already occupying. From the flanks, the wingers add to the pressure on the opponent's ball-carrier with short arching runs, thus making use of their cover shadows. In midfield, the rest of the Bayern team orientates itself toward the opponent's defensive midfielders, in theory leaving open an opposing central player, who, however, would be hard to reach with a lobbed pass given their distance to the ball, the short amount of time left for the ball-carrier and the partially blocked line of sight.

This is the structure from which Bayern usually pressed in the Dortmund match.

The pressing itself is anything but revolutionary. The individual quality in pressing was always present, as evidenced by a few early season matches. On the wings in particular, players such as Kimmich or Serge Gnabry were able to press and force defensive actions, not least because they had the added help of the touchline, creating more compactness around their opponent, which would not have been possible in the centre because of structural deficiencies.

This map shows zones of above-average and below-average defensive actions in a league-wide comparison. Bayern shine on the right side, although this is not necessarily due to a structured plan, but rather the individual talent on the right. (There are exceptions – especially when Lewandowski ran at defenders from the half-left space and led the opposition's build-up to the right side.)

The Gegenpressing

Another component of the Bavarians' defensive style is of far more interest. In a lot of matches, they do not have the opportunity to consistently run at an opponent's open build-up play from an orderly pressing formation, as they were able to do against Dortmund. Instead, they are in possession themselves and have to react to possible losses of the ball. They have rethought the gegenpressing as well.

Previously, Bayern often attempted to win the ball back immediately, one to three seconds after losing it, and otherwise dissolved the gegenpressing and assumed a more compact defensive formation. Now the team remains in the gegenpressing moment and keeps up the pursuit in case the opponent plays a successful first pass and thus renders the first gegenpressing action a failed one. The implementation causes the two players closest to the ball move into gegenpressing immediately when the ball is lost in the left or right attacking half-space after a pass toward Lewandowski. Together with the Polish striker, they create a triangle around the new ball-carrier.

An exemplary view of the gegenpressing in the Düsseldorf match

The comparison spells out the different focus and efficiency in the gegenpressing. In the first half against FC Augsburg, Bayern had a number of gegenpressing moments on the wings. In the second half against Fortuna Düsseldorf under Flick, on the other hand, the attacking half-spaces — where Lewandowski would typically receive the ball — turned out to be the spaces for gegenpressing.

This style of gegenpressing naturally only is an option because, under Flick, the two more attacking midfielders drift toward the wings less frequently, rather positioning themselves more centrally on the ball, allowing them quick access to the opposing ball-carrier in case a pass to Lewandowski or one of the wing attackers is not completed.

The structure in possession still remains the prerequisite for a functioning gegenpressing and thus a more general dominance. However, the forward-pushing movements of attacking midfielders would have to create a void in the central network of Bayern, should the attempt to win the ball back immediately, not come off — especially since Bayern have shown a tendency to keep trying the recover the ball immediately.

At times, players who are a considerable distance from the action decide to move toward the ball and join the gegenpressing attempt while compromising other spaces. Kimmich has proven, though, to have a knack for identifying the most likely next receiving option of the opponent and shortening his own travelling path toward the potential passing lane quite cleverly, so he can proactively prevent a counter-attacking move by winning the ball or applying pressure immediately after an opposing player has received the ball.

Kimmich's defensive actions over the course of the campaign again show he is quite active as a central midfielder especially in the zone before the half-way line. There, he either provides cover for the gegenpressing or functions as a coverage player in regular pressing.  

Alternatively, Kimmich drops back into the back line and makes it stronger, in order to defend potential passes from the opponent out of the gegenpressing zone more effectively. Kimmich is, therefore, the safeguard for the still somewhat wild gegenpressing of his teammates in front of him.

Summary

Bayern have made drastic changes in their focus on working off the ball. It is no longer about minimising both damage and risk; rather, it's about proactive defending. This style of pressing and gegenpressing can only function when translatory movements are followed quickly and when an automatic conception of the following movements has developed for the moment after losing possession.

Naturally, questions remain whether Bayern can follow this plan against every opponent. Leverkusen have, to some extent, already showed how quick long balls to attacking players skilled in laying the ball off can be a means to an end, if the other attacking players push into the spaces created by the central defenders staying close to the striker accordingly.

Looking at the big picture of the coaching change at the German record champions, though, the true realisation is how quickly a major strategic sea change can function as long as the procedures remain simple and rest on something that is already well-known.

A version of this article can be found in German at https://spielverlagerung.de/2019/12/06/bayerns-pressing-unter-flick/