Month: October 2019

Julian Nagelsmann still has big boots to fill. The thirty-two-year-old prodigy sealed the deal to make the move from TSG Hoffenheim to RB Leipzig before last season. When he arrived he had to follow an impressive season’s end led by Ralf Ragnick, the manager-come-sporting-direct-come-manager, for Leipzig in the 2018-19 season. Whilst the German coach has not come to reinvent Leipzig the wheel, he is in an environment which now suits him to the ground. His preferred free-flowing, intense, press-reliant approach fits like glove in hand when it comes to Leipzig. Up until their 3-1 home defeat to Schalke, Leipzig had only dropped two points all season – those coming at home to the reigning Champions, no less. And despite the fact that RB Leipzig have now gone four Bundesliga matches in a row without a win, their performances so far have been dazzling, showcasing not only an adaptation to each and every one of his opponents but also to the Leipzig team itself, when you compare its current approach to the one implemented by Nagelsmann at Hoffenheim. If they continue to perform like this, the points will come. So, without further ado, here is the first part of my detailed look at how the side from Saxony is adjusting to life under their new coach.

How they attack

Buildup play

So far this season, Nagelsmann has mostly set out his side in a back-three – though this has largely been opposition dependent. What has been more consistent, irrespective of back-fours or back-threes has been the double pivot, outside of the two games where they fielded 3-5-1-1 shapes – neither of those two performances were standouts, unsurprisingly. Just as important as how Leipzig attack higher up is that they ensure they can keep the ball when recycling it across the back, and they do so with certain trigger movements. When recycling it back from a wide area, the central centre-back will often step up into the number six position to move against the grain and create an alternative angle, which is also intending to drag deep the centre-forward but can instead open up the option to play inside if not.

It's not only about accessing the third man between the lines, who can then step onto the ball goal-facing, but also recycling the ball between the midfield and defence to evade pressure. This was especially well used in their 3-2 victory over Borussia Mönchengladbach.

The ways they build to the next phase of play

In Naglesmann's very first league game in charge (a 4-0 win away versus Union Berlin), there were already clear mechanisms in place to try and bypass the first lines of pressure. Most of these involved the far-sided holding midfielder being positioned diagonally ahead from his partner, establishing better angles for stronger connections from the centre backs, and facilitating quick positional rotations, as well as the manipulation of opposition’s midfield.

This kind of positional awareness and interchangeability, as seen above, is what is at the core of every Leipzig attack. And there are so many other ways in which Leipzig try to tackle the first phase, a lot of which I can’t even begin to fit into this analysis. One result is a relentless focus on the defenders moving the ball relentlessly into midfield via short high percentage passes. Here we see all the passes from centre backs in their own defensive third to midfielders. They're overwhelmingly short passes aimed at both keeping possession and setting the scene for moving the ball up the field The side primarily uses the up-back-and-through strategy, which sees a forward player receive with their back to goal, only to lay it off to the goal-facing player deep of them, who will then launch it further forwards to a runner beyond the initial receiver. In their games against Union and Lyon, in particular, Leipzig attempted to do this by having the centre backs play it into Marcel Sabitzer’s feet, where the near-sided holding midfielder would – and in the case of the Union game, shift his position wider to be in line with the Austrian – receive goal-facing before they could then feed Lukas Klostermann’s runs beyond them.

Creases to iron out

However, what needs to be worked on is the pass selection. Since Leipzig are so heavily ball-sided, there is a risk that comes with playing into the underloaded side. There have been times when a far-sided fullback/wing-back or an attacker receives a pass at a time when there is no support accessible to them. There have also been instances of playing into the isolated fullback/wing-back, which has led to easy dispossessions.

Given that (as well as attackers general inclination towards being a higher turnover position), it's unsurprising that Werner, Sabitzer and Yussuf Poulsen lead Leipzig in turning the ball over. Where Leipzig have struggled altogether in buildup has been in the two aforementioned games, against Frankfurt and Werder Bremen, where they fielded 3-5-1-1 setups in attack. The offensive shape is often a consequence of how Nagelsmann wishes to defend against opponents, which is, particularly at this early stage, potentially limiting given how unfamiliar the attackers are playing in certain systems. In the former, the main tactic was to have the near-sided wide forward move out to the wing to receive free of pressure, but when they did, they had no option to play into next. Here, Sabitzer drops wide, free of any marker, but has no options once he receives the ball there.

It’s the lacking combination plays and positional congestions which are the most telling factors. In comparison to their linkups in other matches, they were scarce, as was the amount of movement from attackers to stretch the space between the lines. What is vital to counteract this is that the fundamentals of possession exchanges improve, which they clearly have, despite the Werder match being a fairly recent one.

Strong combinative play in tight spaces

In reference to those lacking mechanisms, it has been their play between the lines in other games which have illustrated some of their most impressive stuff. Either with a front three or four, usually consisting of Poulsen, Werner, Sabitzer and/or Forsberg, the way they, and the double pivot, position themselves around the ball creates a sort of rondo which consistently manages to create space for teammates when there appears to be none.

As can be seen in the examples against Bayern and Schalke below, the staggering of the forwards means they always have the attackers triangulating around the ball, so within one attack, you’ll see a 2-1 shape shift to a 1-2 – and it could be around the flank, or it could be more towards the centre, in conjunction with the movements of other teammates to exploit or open up further space. There’ll always be one or two attackers making runs into depth, where another attacker will then drop against the grain into the opened-up space. What this does is create small networks that overload areas in and around the opposition’s defence, which pull open defensive channels and can be exploited by runs in behind.

Structuring to prepare for turnovers In line with this are the positions of the double pivot. The holding midfielders are asked to squeeze up very close to play. Their presence allows for an easy layoff for when the forwards receive with their back to goal but don’t know where to play it next. Equally, these positions enable them to, if not receive the ball, be first to pressure it, should the pass not come off.

Secondly, they can be an overloading presence in attack, especially in support of wide attackers, where the far-sided midfielder can often be seen pushing onto the edge of the box, from the blind-side, to link play into the middle undetected. The vertical split by the double pivot can also result in a stronger collective shape that cuts off access to the far-side upon turnovers.

Leipzig’s incredibly narrow shape also aims to contribute to this. The far-sided fullback/wing-back is often deep, narrow and tight to an opponent already to prevent the opportunity for long balls out of pressure. It, overall, makes for very impressive viewing. There are a couple of small things that have raised slight concerns – like, on a small number of occasions, players have stepped out whilst leaving their opponent accessible via wall passes – but it seems harsh to criticise something so frequently successful.

Second balls

To begin with, it didn’t seem all too prominent but from the Bayern game onwards – where they used it to great effect to escape the unrelenting pressure and turn the game around for themselves – it has come into play far more often, and for the better. Even in matches where Poulsen hasn’t been available, it’s been core to their play simply because of how they can setup around the ball. Here we can see al the successful high passes to Poulsen this season (crosses and throw-ins excluded). Typically, you’ll see Werner occupy positions either wide of or inside the near-sided fullback since these aerial balls are directed towards either halfspace, with his position pinning open space for Poulsen to challenge in. Deep of Werner are Sabitzer and/or Forsberg either side of the Dane, with the holding midfielder(s) pushed up to form a diamond around him, meaning that any balls coming back can be played forward into runners first-time.

Counterattacks

When looking at the kinds of chances Leipzig create, it can be hard to pin a defined route, at least in settled possessions. They frequently look to get to the byline for cutbacks and drilled crosses to the back-post. Here are all the low crosses, and passes on the ground they've played into the box this season. Clearly, though, their best chances, as you’d expect, come through quick transitions. The main way in which they’ve looked to escape pressure and set off attacks is based around the same up-back-and-through strategy they used in settled possession. This frequently involves Poulsen being readily available to receive the ball just ahead of the midfield line, where he can then lay it off to the various runners joining the attack, or simply back to the teammate who played it his way, as they will undoubtedly have more space to operate in after the exchange. Then, further ahead, you have Werner, particularly down the left side, moving as wide as possible to be both a short option and to be an attacker who can run from out-to-in.

The priority is to create those spaces for goal-facing attackers. Against Leverkusen, they didn’t have Poulsen to bounce passes off, but they did still make use of square passes to play out of pressure and tee it up for goal-facing attackers to play it in behind.

That match contained a slightly different approach, as the ball was often instantly cleared up to Matheus Cunha and Werner, who looked to exploit the opposition’s very high line, and it worked to a tee, seeing them create a handful of big chances (all of which were squandered).

Conclusion

It’s hard not to get excited about the variety and fluency of these attacking mechanisms, that are as productive in sustaining pressure and creating chances as they are entertaining to watch. And, believe me, the features mentioned only scratch the surface of a team filled with so many other impressive tactical tidbits that help them breakdown opponents, even when they’re not at their resounding best. As alluded to, the only thing that has pegged them back in recent games has been their poor finishing. The extent of which can be seen through Timo Werner, who netted seven in Leipzig’s first five games, has cooled off remarkably, and missed a number of big chances, more or less balancing out the opening month of the season where he just couldn't miss. However, when you’re looking ahead and debating whether the current profiles can do enough to last the whole season, the one qualm might be the depth offered by Matheus Cunha, who pales in comparison to the balance Poulsen offer, but, statistically at least, you have four central attackers who are so experienced with this club and all have outstanding output so far, both in terms of creating and getting on the end of chances. When looking ahead, the sky really is the limit for this side, especially under the most talented young coach in the World, whose ceiling is yet to be established. ~ Stay tuned for part two, which will look at Leipzig’s pressing and defending.

A version of this article can also be found in Italian at l'Ultimo Uomo Three games, three defeats, two goals scored, 11 conceded: Atalanta's debut in the Champions League could not have been worse.  Gian Piero Gasperini's team had already jeopardized its chances of entering the round of 16 with the disastrous 4-0 suffered at the hands of Dinamo Zagreb. That was followed by a last minute1-2 home defeat against Shakhtar Donetsk, a result which does not entirely do justice to what was a good performance from the Nerazzurri. Tuesday’s 5-1 debacle at Etihad Stadium could be the final blow for a team that was considered to be the second strongest in the group, behind Guardiola's Manchester City. It's disappointing for last season's third-place finishers in Serie A. Despite the offers for their many high-quality players, however, Atalanta's roster was not raided during the summer. The Bergamo club is not a one-season-wonder: the management established a consolidated growth strategy with manager Gasperini at its center and the team was even reinforced during the transfer campaign, especially with the arrivals of Ruslan Malinovskyi and Luis Muriel. Things are going reasonably well in the Serie A and Atalanta are third in the standings ahead of Napoli, thanks to the best attack in the league (21 goals so far). Looking at their numbers in more detail they look even stronger: the “Goddess” is by far the team with the most expected goals generated (2.11 xG per match), ironically a figure lower only than that of Manchester City in all Europe.  In fact, only Manchester City, Paris Saint-Germain and Bayern Munich have a greater xG difference in the big 5 than the Nerazzurri (+1.04 xG per game). Atalanta is a real offensive force and their games are the most exciting in the league. There are matches in which Papu Gomez and his teammates seem to be able to bend the resistance of any defense and get into the box with a snap of their fingers.  The problem is, as Guardiola reminded us, that the team that was annihilated by Sergio Agüero and Raheem Sterling is the same team one that, on Saturday after the first half, were winning 3-0 at the Stadio Olimpico against Lazio and then conceded a disputed 3-3 comeback from the Biancocelesti. In the Champions League, the team led by Gasperini has simply not been as dominant. Luck and variance surely played their part: they've scored just one open play goals so far out of 4.09 xG. At the same time, they conceded 10 non-penalty goals from 6.97 xG. The side's average xG generated per game is down to 1.31, better than Napoli (1.28 xG) and Inter (1.08 xG), but not up to the level of their domestic league standards. That is still a competitive number, but the amount of xG they've allowed is terrible. Atalanta is the fourth-worst team in the competition with 2.25 xG conceded per match. A figure more than twice the amount allowed in the Serie A, where they are much better than the average at 1.07 xG conceded per game. But how do you explain such an important drop in performance between Italian and European games? Is it the Champions League anthem that makes the legs of Atalanta players shake? Or is there such a difference in level between Serie A and the Champions League that the third strongest force in Italy can only be the sacrificial lamb of the group? Indeed, there is a significant gap between Juventus and the other Italian teams and the European experience of Gasperini's men is limited. But the last time Atalanta made landfall in England before the Etihad’s match, they won 5-1 at Goodison Park against Everton in the Europa League 2017-18. In Italy, much has been written about how Atalanta has not managed to maintain the same intensity as in Serie A games, simply because they played teams able to compete with them in this respect. But this is far from being confirmed by the data. Indeed, the Nerazzurri have the lowest PPDA in the CL (6.26), recorded 30 more pressures on average than in their Serie matches and they also defended slightly further from their goal. They also have the third-best aggression coefficient of the tournament at 0.31, a metric that measure what proportion of an opponent's passes are aggressively pressed. There are surely multiple concurrent factors, but there is a clear tactical motive at the root of Atalanta's struggles. Dribbles. Anyone who watches Serie A games, even if distractedly, knows that Gasperini uses man-to-man marking, especially during the pressing phase. Man marking creates a series of individual duels along the entire field. If an opponent manages to get free on an individual level, that can be the basis to unbalance Atalanta’s whole structure. By adopting a flexible marking system, the Nerazzurri can still adapt switching off players from one another. But every time a defender is dribbled the situation has the potential to become catastrophic. And in the Champions League, the Nerazzurri have been dribbled a ton of times. You don’t need to be a tactical genius like Pep is to analyze Tuesday’s game like he did “When we could get in the last third, it is man to man and if you win a duel you have an opportunity”. League rivals have understood that dribbling is a key weapon against Atalanta, which is the team with the highest opposition dribbles attempted in the Serie A (22.88 per game). Dinamo Zagreb, Shakhtar Donetsk, and Manchester City have adopted the same strategy by trying even more dribbles (31.67 on average, naturally the most in the tournament). Atalanta manages to contain the opposing dribblers in the league where they have the second-best opposition dribble percentage (55%), but in the Champions League they have been posed against top-class dribblers and the percentage has inevitably risen to 69%, for 27th in the tournament. With a higher volume of attempts completed at a higher rate, the number of successful dribbles inevitably rises from 12.5 opposition successful dribbles per game in the Serie A, to almost twice the amount in the Champions League (22.0). Obviously, Atalanta is the worst team in the tournament in this statistic. In just three games, nine players have completed at least three dribbles against Atalanta. Bruno Petkovic (10! dribbles), Dani Olmo (9!) and Arijan Ademi (4) for Dinamo Zagreb, Marlos (6) and Junior Moraes (3) for Shakhtar, Kevin De Bruyne (5), Raheem Sterling (5), Phil Foden (3) and Kyle Walker (3) for Man City. You can see a chart of all the dribbles allowed by the Italians, highlighting how a high number of dribbles have happened in highly valuable zones, where a lost individual duel could pose an enormous pressure on the defense. Even reviewing the 11 goals conceded by Atalanta, goals that often came from inside the 6-yard box, one often notices how opponents avoid man-marking or dribble an opponent in the build-up for the shot.  One of Gasperini's team strengths has been exposed to the point of becoming their main weakness. Not all clubs can deploy multiple high-level dribblers, but it is not to be excluded that we will see more and more teams use dribbling, even in an exaggerated fashion, against Atalanta which will have to find effective counter moves as soon as possible if they want to consolidate their status in high-level European football.

Yes, of course. Even with the frantic, delightfully-messy start to the Bundesliga, with a mere two points separating the first nine teams in the league table, Bayern München remain heavy favorites to win their eighth domestic title in a row.

Yes, of course. Even with a shaky Champions League performance at Olympiakos Piraeus on Tuesday, Bayern have essentially qualified for the knock-out stages of the world’s biggest club tournament despite having played just three group games.

Yes, of course. Robert Lewandowski might, at age 31, be the world’s most prolific out-and-out central striker, and seems well on his way to have a career year, with 18 goals scored in his first 13 official outings in the 2019/20 season.

Yes, of course. It is impressive that Bayern have basically groomed the two ideal replacements for the succession of the famed Robbéry duo in-house, with the awesome development of Serge Gnabry and Kingsley Coman.

Yes, of course. Thiago Alcántara, when healthy, can be counted amongst the footballing world’s very elite central midfielders. The same can be said for the fullback duo of Joshua Kimmich and David Alaba.

Sure, Bayern do some things right. No, scratch that. They do a lot of things right. This type of consistent dominance does just, like poof, ‘happen’.  But - I know you were sensing there was going to be a ‘but’ - Bayern also seem to be a little bit of trouble. Maybe even a lot, I dare say. 

Injuries are the devil, also in Munich

After conceding two goals in each of their last three games - against Paderborn (3-2 win), Hoffenheim (1-2 loss) and Augsburg (2-2); by no definition a murderer’s row of potent offenses, if we’re being honest - Bayern have now conceded 42 goals against in their first 42 Bundesliga games under the guidance of Niko Kovac.

In the six title-winning seasons before last year, Bayern on average conceded 21 goals per league season - in other words, they get scored on once every 90 minutes in the Kovac-era, while they lasted about 146 minutes between conceded goals on average in the title-winning years between 2013 and 2018. The defense just hasn’t been up to Bayern’s own lofty standards, this past year-plus. Nor has Manuel Neuer,  who has conceded more than seven goals more than an average keeper might be expected to given the shots he’s faced.

So it’s an especially bad time for a double whammy of very-bad-news, with Niklas Süle, the only fully-proven centre back that Kovac seems to always trust, set to miss the remainder of the entire season with a devastating ACL injury, and record signing Lucas Hernández being out until at least January 2020 with a nasty-looking ankle injury.

A ‘pressing’ situation

The season before Kovac arrived, Bayern were a pressing machine under Jupp Heynckes, now not so much. The defensive regression that Der Rekordmeister has been going through under Kovac, cannot be simply fully ascribed to (former) backline standouts like Jérôme Boateng, Mats Hummels, Javi Martínez and Manuel Neuer becoming older and more vulnerable.

The press, and Gegenpressing, of the frontlines is just not getting home like it used to. Which is odd, seeing that Bayern basically traded in two wingers in their mid-30s in Arjen Robben and Franck Ribéry for two in their early-to-mid-20s in Gnabry and Coman. 

Kovac’s frequent exclusion of Raumdeuter extraordinaire Thomas Müller seems to play a role in Bayern’s issue with a declining high-press. Philippe Coutinho has looked decisively better in Munich as a 10 than he ever did in a Barça kit in Camp Nou, but ever since the Brazilian’s left the guidance of Jürgen Klopp at Liverpool, he is nowhere near the defensive contributor that Müller is. If we look at them on the midfielder radar (so we can compare their defensive work even though neither of them are really pure midfielders) it is clear that while Coutinho does much more creative work with the ball, it's Müller that puts in the hard defensive yards.

It seems weird to talk about the defensive value of the central attacking midfielders at Bayern. Because, y’know, Bayern typically have the ball, like, a lot of the time. But with Lewandowski up top, two rapidly-developing but still somewhat young and excitable wingers in Gnabry and Coman, and a pass-first maestro in Thiago at one of the two deeper-lying spots in midfield, a weird amount of defensive responsibility comes down to this attacking position in the lineup.

But when it comes to defensive responsibility, no one has more right to complain about a tough workload than the third central midfielder. Kimmich seems to be the perfect player for this tactics-heavy, high-intensity role, but given the injuries in the backline, it seems likely he’ll be stuck at fullback for the foreseeable future. And, since he views Leon Goretzka as more of an attacking option, that boils Kovac’s choices down to two: Javi Martínez and Corentin Tolisso. An interesting conundrum, seeing that the two Sechser (‘6s’) deploy very different styles from one another.

Javi Martínez’ style is that of a seasoned veteran. The 31-year old Basque is a veteran now, but to be fair, his age has just recently caught up to his preferred style. Martínez has never been a speedster, and has to rely on intelligent positioning and pure physical strength to be of value to Bayern as a ball-winner and defensive counterweight in midfield.

Tolisso is much more of the roving type in this midfield role. It’s hard to know what his best position is, he was pretty awesome in a much more attacking role as a youngster at Olympique Lyon, but in one of the healthier spells of his recent career, the Frenchman has looked good at times in Bayern’s midfield this season. But the fact that Kovac’s squad had conceded six goals in 430 minutes wherein Tolisso and Thiago shared defensive duties this year, doesn’t bolster all that much confidence.

Running out of dudes in the backline

So let’s check in on Bayern’s depth chart for the positions in the back four, now that Süle and Hernández are out for sustained periods of time. We have an aging Boateng, Kimmich - who’s future as a world-conquering central mid is being held hostage by his dominance as a right-back - a sometimes-off-looking Alaba, summer signing Benjamin Pavard, and… And, yeah, that’s about it. Academy talent Lars Lukas Mai (19) is on his way back from injury, and if Kovac really wants to roll the dice, he can try out Martínez as a centre back - which is a bigger gamble than it used to be, with the Basque losing whatever speed he had in the past few years. 

This is not ideal, in many ways. First off, when a team has ambitions of winning the Champions League, four legitimate options for defensive spots is… yikes. Secondly, two former superstars from this foursome just aren’t up to their absurdly-high levels of years past. Boateng’s vulnerability to counter-attacks was on display on multiple occasions last year, with the former best centre back in the world lacking some of his otherworldly athleticism and reaction speed that he used to combined with his (still awesome) passing skills.

But while Boateng’s (and Hummels’) regression to human form was fully under the microscope, left-back David Alaba also has been going through an extended dip in form (though it's a testament to what a high level he's consistently played at over the years, that an Alaba dip still looks better than most mere mortal's best form), which could have something to do with the fact that the 27-year old Austrian has already appeared in 461 senior matches for club and country in his career.

The absence of Süle and Hernández throws a wrench in Bayern’s project of ‘going young’ with the squad.

In the nine league games remaining until the winter break, Bayern still have to face six of the eight teams that are surrounding them in this weird bunch between first and ninth place. Against the two ‘legit’ teams Bayern have faced in the league, they looked really solid in one outing (0-3 win at Schalke 04) and mixed a great half of football with a worrisome one in the other (1-1 at RB Leipzig). With the defensive rotation stretched extremely thin, there is a realistic chance that Bayern are not atop the league standings come winter break. Which makes it very interesting to see what will happen then, in regards to potential new signings, but also the job security of Kovac.