Month: August 2018

It's been a strange summer for the elite teams in Spanish football. The teams at the top have focused on the long-term renovation of their sides instead of breaking transfer records on some of the best players in the world. That's not to say they haven't spent money - they have, plenty -, there was simply a shift in who they targeted.  

Barcelona

Barcelona added Clement Lenglet, Arthur and Malcom. The first was a brilliant centre-back for Sevilla and will occupy the slot that forced Vermaelen into playing over a thousand La Liga minutes last campaign. Lenglet is 23 and he was an unambiguously good buy. Malcom had a great season in France, but there are still questions on whether he’ll step up as a Barcelona-level talent – particularly in a season where Ousmane Dembélé is back to full fitness and ready to put in a large shift. That said, there are a lot of minutes to be played and manager Ernesto Valverde lined up with Lionel Messi, Luis Suarez, Dembélé and Philippe Coutinho against Valladolid this past weekend. If that is the way forward, Malcom becomes the number one attacking option from the bench (especially after the club moved Paco Alcacer to Borussia Dortmund). In midfield, Arthur is the best player to come out of the Brasileirão in recent years and will be an awesome ball-progressor to look out for. Between his passing and ball-carrying capacities, he'll be most impactful disrupting deep defensive blocks. The fact that he has quite a different profile to all other midfielders in the club also increases his chances of him claiming a fairly high spot in the pecking order. Finally, Arturo Vidal arrived as pretty much a direct replacement for Paulinho. Giving a three-year deal to a 31-year-old Vidal after a series of injuries last campaign is incredibly risky, but his more physical midfield profile is certainly useful if he can stay healthy and at his previous elite level. The way Barça managed to sell-on unimpressive players at a profit this summer, while also keeping a deep squad, was impressive but its worth mentioning that with Lucas Digne’s exit to Everton, Jordi Alba – who is going to turn 30 during the season and played a ton of minutes over the last few years – is the only left-back in the squad. That opens the door for Marc Cucurella or Juan Miranda to jump from the B side and get some minutes with the big boys this season.  

Real Madrid

While Barcelona balanced thinking of the future with the ability to contribute in the present, Real Madrid’s buys were more of the former and less of the latter. Vinicius Junior has started the season with Castilla, while keeper Andriy Lunin was unsurprisingly loaned out. Alvaro Odriozola, the 22 year old rightback acquired from Real Sociedad, will take some pressure off Carvajal who has played over 2000 minutes in four of the last five seasons, but that’s about it. Courtois will add competition in goal but when it comes to outfielders, particularly up front, the options are thin. Or that was the case until the last-minute arrival of Mariano Diaz, who will be the team’s Ronaldo replacement. They may not be in the same quality tier, but Mariano fills the amazing-shooter role, who creates more for himself than for others and is dangerous both as a finisher and from outside the box. Diaz developed at Madrid before moving to Lyon last season. At 25, he's older than the typical player with barely a year's senior level experience under their belt. At 3.44 shots per 90 minutes Mariano's volume is good but not exceptional, and the same is true for his 0.14 expected goals per shot. It's also at least a slight concern that his goal total from last year, 17 from open play, outpaced his xG of 13.78. That said, he's also shown an ability to get into good spots in the center of the penalty area, and he's moving to one of the most talented sides in the world. The best case scenario is that the raft of elite passers Madrid have can elevate Mariano as he adds some of the shooting boots that the team is lacking heading into the post Ronaldo period.

Atletico Madrid

To finish up the trio, Atletico is perhaps the team that improved the most while also rejuvenating. With Gabi leaving to Qatar, Rodri – twelve years younger than the former captain – has taken his spot after showing off as a great high volume deep passer in Villarreal’s midfield last season. Thomas Lemar divides people (including me) through his heavy price-tag, but the Frenchman is undoubtedly a great player and will only turn 23 in November. The World Cup winner dropped back to a more plausible scoring rate last campaign, but retained his ball-carrying and creative numbers that could thrive in an Atleti system in which he arguably fits in better than he would have at other teams he was linked to, like Liverpool. After finishing last season on a high note, Angel Correa becomes a bench option much like Gelson Martins who was signed from Sporting. As someone that has watched Gelson’s every senior match, I very much doubt the possibility of him turning into an elite winger but if he is to make the step up, Atleti is the ideal spot. He’s still missing a lot of things when it comes to end product and decision making in the final third, but he thrives on the counter and puts in plenty of defensive work without possession. His move seems to capitalize on his strengths and is difficult to argue against if it really ends up really happening without a transfer fee. Santiago Arias has been one of the most consistent right-backs in Europe for the past couple of seasons and finally got his move out of the Eredivisie. He’s 26 already but was a no-brainer at €11 million and, at the very least, will not be a downgrade on Sime Vrsaljko who left for Inter Milan. Nikola Kalinic was brought in to cover the usual strikers and, while he isn’t the most exciting of the bunch and most would’ve preferred someone else, it’ll be at least interesting to see what can do in a better team set-up than he’s ever had to work in before. He finished 2^nd and then 7^th in the league for xG in his two Fiorentina campaigns while pretty much only having Borja Valero as a provider. Simeone has one of the deepest squads he’s had since arriving in Madrid and will be a legitimate candidate both in Spain and in Europe.  

Everybody Else

Below the trio, all the usual European-candidates did plenty of business this summer. After a very successful season in which they finished just three points away from third and six away from second, Valencia invested just as much as the big teams – most of it by doubling down on players who brought them success last campaign. They purchased Kondogbia and Gonçalo Guedes who were key for manager Marcelino during loan spells last season. Out of the true newcomers, Michy Batshuayi is the one we’re all hoping to see thrive after his explosive stint in Dortmund. I see him as an improvement to the departing Simone Zaza, in a squad full of quality options up top. Villarreal had to search for a Rodri replacement and they seem to have found him in Santiago Cáseres, who has been the biggest surprise of the first two league games for me so far. He’s only 21 and is fitting in perfectly into the high-volume passer, defensive-midfielder role that was essential for the Yellow Submarine last season – showing up well with and without possession. They also got themselves a new striker duo for a combined €38 million fee, with Gerard Moreno coming from Espanyol and Toko Ekambi from Angers. They're two forwards that excelled in their shot locations for sides without a lesser creative structure behind them. Under Quique Setién, Betis got a Europa League spot and the admiration of many for their style of play but managed to keep most of their squad together so didn’t have to add much. Fabian Ruiz was the single major out as he moved to Napoli for €30 million but has cleverly been replaced by Sergio Canales on a free. The club made sure to exploit expiring contracts as Pau Lopez and Takashi Inui also signed with no compensation for their previous clubs. The Japan international will be a tougher fit into the system, but the 23-year-old former Tottenham goalkeeper has already shown to be one of the best goalkeepers in the league and here will have the chance to shine with the ball at his feet as well. The biggest investment came in the form of William Carvalho, who became the second most expensive ever at the club. He divides opinions but should, at the very least, fit well within the team’s possession-based scheme. The other Seville team took advantage of Lenglet, Steven Nzonzi and Correa’s exits to profit off this transfer window while shifting their side to Pablo Machin’s preferred 3-4-3. The talent pool for it was mostly there already, so much so that the most expensive additions – Joris Gnagnon and Ibrahim Amadou – are starting the season as rotation options. André Silva seems the single most interesting newcomer and not just because he scored more goals on his debut than he did in the entirety of his Serie A stint. Machin will want his striker to provide plenty for the other forwards with his back towards goal, as well as being able to win duels and press, as well as someone who will take advantage of the plenty of chances this side will be able to create. Silva’s ability as a complete striker – who works off the ball, can connect well to set-up team-mates while remaining a threat himself – fits the bill. As a last minute newcomer, Quincy Promes will be a lovely addition to the inside forward options in Machin’s squad after three seasons in a row with more than 20 combined goals and assists in Russia. Options like Franco Vazquez and Pablo Sarabia are all more on the creative side, so the Dutchman will offer a different capacity to penetrate the box and get on the end of chances, that is required in the new system. Elsewhere, Real Sociedad only really invested by hitting Mikel Merino’s release clause of €12 million - a smart addition if he is to get anywhere close to the form he hit upon arrival in England. Theo Hernandez’s loan from Real Madrid could prove very useful as well: it's tough be Marcelo’s number two, but his attacking numbers back in 2016/17 with Alavés showed a lot of promise. Celta had such a good summer we have an entire article on their moves. Further down the table, newly promoted duo of Rayo and Huesca took some intriguing steps into the transfer market. Huesca got themselves one of the league’s most consistent full-backs on a free deal (Luisinho) and still had time to take a punt in goal scoring Turkish winger Serdar Gurler for only €2.5 million. The Turkish league isn’t exactly the safest market to buy from but he was one of its top scorers for two seasons running while playing for less than great teams and at this price is relatively low risk. Rayo have been just as smart with their investments. Jordi Amat played over 2000 minutes for Betis last season and arrived for just €1 million while Manchester City youth product Pozo didn’t cost much more than that after a season in the second Spanish tier. Michel’s side still managed to add their top scorer from last season (De Tomás) and one of the best full-backs at the World Cup (Advincula) both on loan – it doesn’t get much better than this for a newly promoted side. We obviously can’t much everyone but, to finish up, here’s a couple more names to follow for one reason or the other. Patrick Roberts at Girona, for stepping out of his British comfort zone. The battle between four above average strikersat Alavés: Borja Bastón, Guidetti, Calleri and Sobrino. And finally, Yuri Berchiche’s move to Bilbao after a season in Paris that was solid, despite perhaps not being too flashy. He’ll be a key part of the eleven in a transition season at Athletic.

Losing Cristiano Ronaldo is like a new signing.

At least, that’s the kind of thing you have to tell yourself to be convinced that Real Madrid have a strong chance of winning La Liga this season. It’s a stretch, but it’s not entirely without reason. Since Real Madrid’s style under manager Zinedine Zidane for the past three seasons was so heavily built around leveraging the strengths and mitigating the weaknesses of the Portuguese forward.

Madrid Under Zidane - Ronaldo FC

Managers like to build their football teams in their own image. Pep Guardiola’s sides are meticulous perfectionists. Jurgen Klopp wants his football to be full of emotion and energy. Jose Mourinho’s teams will do anything to win, and don’t care if they make a few enemies along the way. Zidane’s Madrid, however, did not particularly resemble him, or the wonderful technician he showed himself to be as a player. It was a team in the style of Ronaldo. The side’s primary mode of attack was, as Ronaldo likes to, to bury the opposition in a wave of shots. Some of these would be from distance, but enough would end up at close range that it produced dividends. Real’s 18.58 shots per game last season was well ahead of any other La Liga side, even if the 2.07 expected goals per game was the smallest of margins below Barcelona’s. Ronaldo was unsurprisingly the key figure in this. His 180 shots were more than double the volume of any other player, and he managed that despite serving a five game suspension to start the season. It’s clear from the shot distribution chart just how much volume Real get across the board, and how much of it comes from Ronaldo.

The career arc of Ronaldo is fairly well known by now. As his body has aged, he has gradually become more and more of a pure striker, stripping away the parts of his game that took place outside the box. A full 7% of Ronaldo’s touches last season were shots, a figure that puts him far ahead of any other Real Madrid player, and more than double that of his eternal rival Lionel Messi’s 3%. And yet, despite this, he still ended up with the highest xGBuildup of any Real player. While Ronaldo didn’t take a lot of touches that were not shots, the ones he did take were extremely effective.

In terms of his work off the ball, it probably won’t shock anyone to learn that Ronaldo was not a defensive workhorse last year. Of everyone at the club who played at least 1200 minutes last season, nobody pressed less than Ronaldo.

With Ronaldo setting a somewhat lethargic tone off the ball in attack, the modern tactic of pressing high and defending from the front was not workable for Zidane’s Real Madrid. As such, the midfield would potentially have more defensive work than is typically required of a top side, requiring a purely defensive minded midfielder to start in the form of Casemiro. The Brazilian was a black hole in possession, managing less than half as many deep progressions per 90 as his midfield team mates Luka Modric and Toni Kroos, but this was a tradeoff they had to make in order to allow Ronaldo to do his thing without getting exposed. Perhaps Zidane’s biggest reason for success at Madrid was understanding that a side built around such a singular superstar would have to make sacrifices elsewhere, and finding the right balance (and persuading boss man Florentino Perez to accept that balance) was key. This also might be why he was so reluctant to integrate new players into the starting eleven, as he’d built a finely balanced side that could easily be tipped too far in one direction with only minor tweaks.

What Now?

In case you’ve been under a rock, Ronaldo has moved to Juventus. Zidane, having achieved everything he wanted to do at the Bernabeu, has resigned, and was succeeded by former Spain manager Julen Lopetegui. As of writing this, the only senior outfield signing has been second choice right back Álvaro Odriozola. If Madrid are to weather the storm of losing Ronaldo, it will be about getting more out of the players already at the club.

Save for an early start at Rayo Vallecano and an uninspiring season and a half at Porto, Lopetegui’s coaching career has been spent within the Spain national team setup, working at various youth levels before getting the big job in 2016. Spain are one of the only national sides in the world to play a genuine distinctive style, so the way he’s used to working is clear: a strong focus on possession and short passing combined with an aggressive high press. This is often seen as emulating the style of Pep Guardiola, but in truth there is a much greater focus on possession and “passing for the sake of passing”: genuine tiki taka, rather than the positional play of Guardiola’s Manchester City side. When it goes right, you get Spain’s World Cup win in 2010. When it goes wrong, you get the nation’s exit to Russia this summer (in a side prepared by Lopetegui, if not managed by him at the tournament itself). Or as I call it, the game that did this to the StatsBomb pass map:

That was a lot of passing in defence and midfield for 0.97 expected goals in normal time.

The good news is that this Real Madrid squad is perhaps more suited to a more possession focused approach than ever before. Ronaldo’s two biggest drawbacks were a lack of involvement in open play and pressure from the front, and he is no longer around to set the tone for the side. In the UEFA Super Cup loss to Atletico Madrid and the first two La Liga fixtures against Getafe and Girona, Lopetegui opted for a front three of Gareth Bale, Marco Asensio and Karim Benzema. All three averaged more passes and more pressures last season than Ronaldo, even if none can do what he does in front of goal. In midfield, Casemiro started against Atletico and Girona but missed the Getafe game, implying that the better defensive work in front of him will mean he no longer necessarily features at home to weaker sides (though he occasionally missed games previously, this was more down to a rotation policy than a tactical choice). Toni Kroos moved to a deeper lying role in his place with Isco and Dani Ceballos in front, creating a midfield three that now offers serious ball progression from all three of its members, especially as former number ten Isco now seems to be a permanent midfielder. This all combines to create a side that is much more front foot in its work without possession, and more comfortable retaining the ball when it is won back. Madrid are now stylistically much closer to what one would expect to see from a top tier European side, with an extra focus on possession giving them an extra Spanish touch.

As for what we’ve seen on the pitch so far, it’s fair to say things have been mixed. Real ran Atletico close in the Super Cup, dominating in terms of possession and shot volume but allowing their neighbours a few high quality shots that they were able to convert. A solid work in progress nonetheless. Things were slightly less promising in the La Liga game against Getafe, a match they won but really without anything like the shot domination we’re used to seeing from Real.

Madrid were in near total control of the ball for the vast majority of this game and generated a total of 0.7 expected goals. Granted, this was enough, but for a side that averaged 18.58 shots per game last year, starting off the new league season with just 10 in a home game is concerning. Making matters worse, the xG per shot of 0.07 was significantly down from last season’s average of 0.11, too. Comparatively speaking, Madrid created nothing against Getafe. The theoretically better ball retention and progression in midfield did absolutely zero to help the team create better chances. It was hard to view this kind of performance as anything other than last season’s Madrid minus Ronaldo.

Optimism was perhaps restored in this weekend’s 4-1 victory at Girona, as the side came back from conceding an early goal to totally dominate the game. The performance matched the scoreline, too, with Madrid having no issues generating chances this time.

Girona were fairly aggressive in their pressing against Madrid, which probably suited the away side. This was still a much more balanced performance, with the tiki taka notch turned down a touch compared to the Getafe win. Casemiro returned to the starting lineup and was unsurprisingly not involved in possession, providing only two deep progressions. This arguably helped Real, though, giving the team a more direct feel rather than moving the ball slowly through midfield. While it is obvious that Lopetegui has his own ideas, at times in the early going it might not be the worst idea for him to stick with elements of the tried and trusted style from the Zidane era.

If any one player seemed like he would be a beneficiary of Ronaldo’s departure, it was Gareth Bale. The Welshman who always seemed like he was cannibalising his own game for Ronaldo’s finally has the stage to himself, and boy is he shining on it. Interchanging in the wide roles of the 4-3-3 with Asensio, Bale has been inarguably Madrid’s key player so far, generating both the most xG in the squad for himself and assisting the most for others.

His fellow wide player Asensio hasn’t quite yet found his rhythm in the new side. Lopetegui’s system is asking for a direct wide forward who can cause problems running in behind, which is perfect for Bale, but it still isn’t clear whether Asensio’s best role is in this position or as more of a playmaker. The 22 year old remains a huge talent, but in order to become more than potential Lopetegui will have to figure out what his specific role in this side is.

Overall, it’s fair to call the post-Ronaldo Real Madrid a work in progress. Lopetegui is clearly looking to move away from Zidane’s finely balanced star studded side in favour of something more cohesive and possession based. Whether he will succeed in implementing this new style depends a lot on his ability as a coach, which is surprisingly still unclear for someone in such a high profile job. Just on pure player quality, though, it’s difficult to imagine the loss of Ronaldo not negatively affecting the team. Even if everything goes right for the new Madrid this year, second place might be something they have to accept.

Harry Kane scored a goal against Fulham last Saturday. It wasn’t a remarkable goal. Erik Lamela did most of the work driving through Fulham’s defense before freeing Kane on the left side of the penalty box. The Spurs striker cut back onto his right foot, shaking a defender to create enough space to finish precisely across the keeper, tucking the ball inside the right post. Fairly standard Kane type stuff. What makes that goal important is that for months Kane hasn’t been doing the standard stuff that turned him into a superstar. In March of last year Harry Kane suffered an ankle injury in a match against Bournemouth. The injury didn’t keep him out very long. He only missed two matches. But the differences between his performances before he had his ankle stepped on and after were striking. Up until the match Kane was averaging 5.75 shots per 90 minutes and 0.77 xg per 90. Those are astronomical numbers, arguably best striker in the world type numbers. After the injury, his shots per 90 dropped substantially, falling to 3.06. And his xG came down with it, dropping to 0.44. Those are still fine numbers, but they’re the numbers of a good striker, not the numbers of the one who’s at the top of world football. Often times, of course, injuries take time to heal, and players aren’t quite at full fitness when they return to the lineup. It’s perfectly natural that Kane might take a while to get to get the fire back into his full fire breathing dragon form. But, and this is an incredible sentence to write, despite winning the Golden Boot at the World Cup, Harry Kane’s finishing still didn’t return to form this summer. His shot chart is pretty barren. Strip out the penalties and all that’s left is three goals on 11 shots in six games, and an even less impressive xG of 1.52. There are reasons beyond just himself that Kane struggled of course. England played a sound, but ultimately unimaginative, style, and Kane spent much of his time dropping into midfield to help progress the ball while Raheem Sterling or Marcus Rashford tried to run in behind opposing defenses. With relatively little extended possession in the final third, England didn’t work effectively to create chances for Kane, even as Kane seemed unable to create them for himself. So, Kane watch continued, and the concern grew. Football is chock full of players whose careers have been permanently slowed by injury. The obvious and recent example of course is Fernando Torres (even ignoring a slight late career renaissance with Atletico Madrid). It’s an inexact comparison because Torres’s game with Liverpool was built on top of his speed. He played in a side specifically constructed to squeeze him in behind defenses and let him outrun them. When Torres’s hamstrings decided they’d had enough, it took away the foundation of what he did so well. Kane, on the other hand, does not have a game built from speed. He gets in great goal scoring positions not by fastest to them in a sprint but by being first to them in more congested areas. That’s not to say he’s not a prodigious athlete. He is. It's just that the interplay between entirely healthy legs and his ability to score goals is more complicated than how the speedy Torres works. It's certainly possible that Kane's ankle injury could permanently hamper him, but the story would have to be more complicated. Which brings us back to Kane’s goal. The process of scoring that goal involves tons of tiny decisions, even as Lamela did most of the creating. Here’s how the shot ended up. In order to get into that position Kane first decides to stay outside Calum Chambers as Lamela drives forward. It’s a smart and simple decision, although sometimes a striker in that position will make a run from out to in, trying to split the two defenders and either receive a pass or drag the defenders with him and create space for the ball carrier. Kane holds his position and Lamela plays him in. Chambers is in a relatively strong defensive position when Kane gets the ball, and again the Spurs striker has multiple options. The simplest thing to do would be to let the ball run to his weaker left foot, and rather than try and confront the defender, simply blast the ball on net from a tighter angle. Kane declines that option, and instead opts to do something harder. He takes a touch to cut the ball back to his right. There’s a cost benefit analysis there. On the one hand it gives Chambers a chance to make a play, sacrificing a sure shot on goal. On the other, successfully shifting the ball back to his right opens up the goal and creates a better scoring opportunity. To put it nerdily, Kane’s decision decreased the chances of getting a shot but increased the xG of the shot he’d ultimately end up taking. The theoretically correct decision depends on whether the increase in xG makes up for the times that he's dispossessed, you could make an equation out of it and everything. Part of Kane’s skill as a striker is that he’s excellent at making those decisions instinctively. There are a million little moments in a game that players have to confront, and strikers and defenders alike are constantly evaluating those moments and making choices, taking into account factors that most of us mere mortals can’t even dream of. And the margins are tiny. If Kane’s assessment is wrong, and Chambers had just a split second more time to react than Kane expected, then the defender would have disrupted the play, Kane wouldn’t have gotten the shot off, and we’d still be worrying about his performance. As it was, he walks away from the game with four shots, and a goal, and everything seems fine. The challenge of analyzing these specific tiny moments is just how many different things are at play. Imagine a world where Kane cuts back and Chambers sticks his foot in and disrupts the play. One possible reason for that is that Kane’s ankle is still not quite right, and the Spurs star is making decisions based on the way his body used to react, as opposed to how it’s reacting now. That’s scary. That way lies Torres. But, there are plenty of other things that can go wrong as well. Maybe the ball took a tiny unexpected bobble, maybe Chambers is simply slightly better than Kane anticipated, or the turf is slightly looser, or maybe the Spurs forward just got his calculations wrong. Life is complex. And, to further complicate things, even an unhealthy Kane will execute that move successfully some percentage of the time. That's why we use aggregates. Looking at any one decision and definitively attributing it to lingering ankle woes for Kane (or anything else) is likely a fool’s errand. But, looking at the results of lots of decisions he made before he was hurt, and lots of decisions that he made after the incident, and seeing that on average the outcomes are worse, that’s powerful. We know that Kane’s results were worse after his injury. Were still waiting for them to bounce back. Last weekend Kane played well. He had a goal and four shots. That’s the kind of performance you’d expect from a healthy star forward against relatively weak opposition. A close examination of the goal shows just how fine those margins can be though. The trick is to both recognize the match for what it was, a good sign that Kane might be back to his usual self, while not discounting that if Chambers was just a fraction of a second quicker, Kane’s results would look a whole lot different. Overall, a healthy Kane will get those decisions right over the course of time. It’s encouraging that the did so last weekend. Now the question is, will he continue to?

I was mucking around with an analysis for a customer this week when I ran across something I hadn't looked at in a really long time - the set piece table for Danish Superliga 14-15. That was the season FC Midtjylland (FCM) won their first ever Danish title, largely on the back of scoring tons of set piece goals. Brian Priske was the set piece and defensive coach that season and he and the players probably deserve 99% of the credit for those goals, but a tiny portion of what's left should probably be apportioned to Matthew Benham for the idea that this phase of the game was exploitable, and to my own work in designing the set piece program.

Anyway, the reason why I mention it is not to break my arm patting myself on the back, but because after this nostalgic instance of stumbling across the 14-15 stats, I wondered what the 17-18 set piece table looked like.

That's when things got weird...

Background

When FCM first started having success on set pieces, we discussed how to talk about this in a few internal meetings, especially with regard to questions from the press. I distinctly remember the message we landed on being one of happily crediting player skill and a bit of luck, but under no circumstances should anyone say that we worked on these more than normal.

Set piece goals to outsiders would hopefully be written off as things that magically happened, which was just fine by me.

(This splash image is from Daniel Taylor's scathing piece on Championship owners.)

That's why I thought it was weird when pieces like Sean Ingle's one from February 2015 started appearing in the press. Why was this thing that we knew was hugely important to us and driving a lot of our success, suddenly public knowledge? I still don't actually know, to be honest. My guess was that it provided a counterpoint of positivity to the ongoing Warburton mess at Brentford, but even acknowledging the edge existed - and one that would likely be sustainable long term - seemed incredibly dumb.

One of the big rules of conducting sports analytics inside a team is that when you find an edge, you exploit the hell out of it.

And you never talk about it in public.

Why not? Because professional sport is competitive and you don't want to make your competition any smarter. Plenty of them will ignore the information or not be able figure out how to successfully exploit your edge directly, but even one team copying an edge for free is too many.

In many cases, the edge only exists because people don't know it's there to begin with. That's why many coaches and general managers/directors of football will outright lie when reporters start asking questions in these areas.

The Fallout

In a way, the public discussion created a fascinating economics question. How do actors in competitive economies adapt behaviour to new information over time? Or to put this in more obvious sports terms, what happens when a comparative league minnow wins a title on the back of scoring a lot of set piece goals, and then tells the entire world what they did?

Welcome to Denmark!

That is a lot of set piece goals. Like... a LOT. And from a whole bunch of non-Midtjylland teams. Brian Priske would later spend some time helping giants FC Kopenhagn crush the league (partly also via dominating from set pieces), and his expertise may have dispersed into greater Denmark a bit, but this whole "we too can score lots of set piece goals" idea has clearly caught on up North.

In 14-15, FCM were the only team in the league to crush this particular phase of the game, scoring 25 goals, while three other teams barely cracked 10. Three years later, eleven of fourteen teams were in double digits.

I Now Have SO MANY QUESTIONS

One of the things I used to argue about with my long-time collaborator Marek Kwiatkowski was whether working on set pieces more in training forces trade-offs in other areas. I was firmly in the "you can score more goals, period" camp (Marek is a natural uber-skeptic), but it was mostly just theory. However, now we get a chance to look at exactly that.

Are the total goal outputs largely fixed and you just shuffle between open play and set pieces, or can you just plain score more goals by adding set piece expertise? To put it another way, can you create a bigger pie or are you just carving out different sized pieces?

Set piece goals per game, 14-15: .55
Set piece goals per game, 17-18: .75
Total goals per game, 14-15: 2.41
Total goals per game, 17-18: 2.91

Set piece goals per game have gone up by .20, while overall scoring is up half a goal a game. This lends weight to the bigger pie hypothesis, and not merely different sized pieces.

Note: The Danish league changed structure between 14-15 and 17-18 by adding additional teams and the world's most complicated playoff structure, so it's not as clean as an analysis as it might otherwise be. Professional sports...

But wait, you say... some of that increase can be explained by competitive reasons, right? By increasing the league size, they probably brought in some weaker teams that were more likely to get blown out.

A fair point. Going to the first year of the 14-team league, we see... .63 goals from set pieces and 2.65 goals a game. Again, more set piece goals and more goals overall.

Shouldn't there be an equilibrium, though? Teams are scoring more set pieces, and they presumably know how to defend better against them as well, right? So why are we seeing so many more goals?

This is where we get to a bit of theory. Back when I was at FCM, someone asked our striker Duncan about defending set pieces, and his reply was that if the timing and delivery were right, the goals were basically unstoppable.

Now part of this comes back to creating complexity in your delivery and route patterns, and who you are targeting on all your different set pieces. You can't just do what England did in the World Cup and run the same play over and over again and succeed. You might be able to get away with that for a few games, but you'll struggle mightily through a league season. Defenses will adjust to that type of basic plan. However, if you are smart about your planning... well, maybe the goals actually are unstoppable.

Given the fact that the fewest set pieces goals conceded in the entire league was nine (and three seasons earlier, it was just four), either everyone in Denmark suddenly became really bad at defending set pieces or everyone became much better at executing them in ways that were difficult to stop.

I lean toward the latter.

The analysis above isn't scientific or conclusive. There are confounding factors, and football is an inherently complex game that often defies simple explanations anyway. However, I find the dramatic increase in set piece goals across the entire league here fascinating, and if we were building a case that you can increase set piece goal production at the cost of basically nothing else, we now have some evidence that perspective may be correct.

My Own Work

One of the things I am happiest about regarding set pieces is that what we built at Midtjylland was sustainable, despite the fact the coach initially responsible for the success was poached by a bigger club. Well done to Mads Buttgeireit for continuing to innovate in this area, and well done to FCM for listening when I said, "You HAVE to get Priske a fucking set piece assistant or you'll lose tens of millions of euros in value if he ever leaves."

Listening is underrated.

We also know for a fact that data analysis has dramatically changed the way that both baseball and basketball are played now. It's not just about finding better players, it's often about finding fundamentally superior styles of play before your competition and then beating them with it over and over again until they adopt your style.

In light of the above, I still find it amusing that this summer, no one on the club side came and talked to us about set pieces. The World Cup of Set Pieces was great. I broke down a lot of things, both on the site and on Twitter. Still, zero interaction.

¯\_(ツ)_/¯

In a way, this was really good, because I honestly did not have the bandwidth to spare while also launching StatsBomb Data. (I probably still don't, but football is a siren's call.) In another way, it's just continuing evidence that football is glacial when it comes to adopting new ideas from outsiders. Lest you think things are progressing behind the scenes in England, the Premier League scored 214 set piece goals in 2017-18... and 216 in 14-15. Fair dos to Bournemouth and Eddie Howe/Tom Webber for leading the league in this area last year though.

Our price for consulting on this is not cheap. We don't need to be. We still get you goals at a huge discount vs what you pay at the player or manager level without cannibalising anything else. And we teach your club personnel how to sustain this edge. The value you get at the club level is stupidly large.

And like I said above, it's not like teams were put off by the price... no one even had the conversation. *

One thing I do want to note is that if you are a national team and want help with set pieces for the Women's World Cup, definitely get in touch because like with our data, we will offer a deep discount to support the women's side of the game.

Conclusion

I will always be a nerd at heart, so finding data on how the Danish Superliga ecosystem changed after we shocked it in 2014-15 was super exciting to me and I had to write about it. While it doesn't offer conclusive proof of anything, it certainly allows you to ask interesting questions about what would happen if the rest of the football world starts to adopt advice on better ways to play the game that were reached largely via data and analytics.

Thank you for listening!

Ted Knutson
CEO, Founder StatsBomb
ted@statsbomb.com
@mixedknuts

*And I also know that plenty of you are in clubs already and listening, and you'll take what you learn from us and do it on your own and probably succeed at least somewhat, because you are smart and it's not that hard to do better than what you have now. It's probably pretty hard to score 25 every season like FCM though.

Other Writing

Changing How the World Thinks About Set Pieces Set Pieces and Market Inefficiency.

Historic data used in this piece was licensed from Opta

There were very few positives to come from Manchester United’s 2013–14 season. David Moyes inherited an old squad that was pushed to their limits the previous season as they won the Premier League to give Sir Alex Ferguson a fitting send off. The calamity that ensued took years to undo. One of the few glimmers of hope during such a dour season was that as a teenager, Adnan Januzaj was a positive contributor and showed promise, performing like a live wire act at his best. You weren’t quite sure just how good of a prospect Januzaj was, but the fact that he held his own against grown men in a top league was encouraging, similar to what happened with Marcus Rashford a few seasons later.

The next three years eliminated all of the goodwill built up from that debut season. Januzaj couldn’t reclaim his starting spot at United after the managerial switch to Louis Van Gaal, his loan stint at Dortmund went horribly, and he wasted away at Sunderland during their relegation season. No longer was he viewed as a bright young talent that United could bank on playing 2000+ minutes per season, but rather a player in his early 20’s who was trying to reclaim his former glory. And that’s why last season at Real Sociedad was such a breath of fresh air for Januzaj’s career. On the surface, producing a non penalty goals + assists per 90 rate of 0.44 was decent, but peek behind the curtains and his overall statistical resume showed that he performed like one of the best attackers in La Liga.

Januzaj found a home in Spain, especially playing at a club like Real Sociedad that prioritized projecting a sense of calmness during possession regardless of the pressure by the opponent. This started all the way at the back where Real Sociedad loved to play from the goalkeeper. Either Gerónimo Rulli or Miguel Ángel Moyá, whenever they were given the chance to do so, played the ball short. If the opposition brought men forward so it wasn’t a viable option to play a short pass to one of the wide CBs or the players coming infield to support the keeper in possession, then, and only then, would they go long to bypass the first line of defense and find openings higher up the pitch.

Real Sociedad used their ability to keep calm position to create combination plays, keeping a compact shape which would help in creating passing outlets near the ball carrier and create openings for players to receive the ball and create forward momentum. In Willian Jose, Real Sociedad had a striker who could act as a focal point whenever they wanted to move the ball further forward quickly. Their fullbacks, particularly with Álvaro Odriozola on the right side, were important and turned Real Sociedad's wing play and spells of possession into dangerous crosses into the box. They were above league average in regards to penalty box entries that came from crosses. All of this, along with midfield players like Asier Illarramendi and David Zurutuza, helped the team function as a possession based side without it turning towards sterile. At their best, they played attacking football that could tear opponents to shreds.

The value that Januzaj brought wasn’t necessarily as a wide player who could advance the ball by himself from deeper areas. He wasn't Malcom or Hazard, though he could fill that role in a pinch. Instead, he played as a spark plug, a player that could amplify the structure behind him and create chances for himself or others during spells in possession. He was the type of player who you could give the ball in an isolated duel on the wing and feel good about him doing something positive. If there was an opening when on the right wing, he could get back infield onto his left foot and shoot. Otherwise, he was able to create just enough separation off the dribble that he can go to near the touchline and deliver a cutback to an open teammate in the box. He was that dash of spontaneity to amplify the disciplined possession behind him.

Januzaj was also able to operate off-ball to get on the end of passes and turn them into dangerous shooting opportunities, which was why his xG/shot of 0.10 was solid for a wide player. Between Sergio Canales, Xabi Prieto and others on the squad, Real Sociedad had a number of capable playmakers which meant that Januzaj could lurk into the center and take advantage. Whether it was finding gaps between the defensive line or just arriving at the penalty box at the right time, Januzaj was given the freedom to operate off-ball and not just have to settle for low efficiency shots after cutting inside off the dribble.

It wasn’t totally seamless for Januzaj, as he turned the ball over quite a bit and his heavy shot usage meant he was prone to taking some questionable shots, but the good definitely outweighed the bad. Januzaj was a high impact player in the minutes he played, even though his minutes weren’t sky high because of a string of niggling injuries. If his goal scoring contribution matched up with his expected output, his season would’ve been held in a better light than it perhaps was. What’s interesting is trying to figure just how much stock we can put into his 2017–18 performance moving forward. On the surface an attacking player, especially a wide player like Januzaj, making a leap in his early 20’s is totally reasonable because that’s usually when those type of players move into the next stage of their career. His numbers were legit so there's nothing necessarily to worry about from that department, and yet it's hard to ignore that there were basically three dead seasons between his promising debut season in 2013-14 and what he produced last season 2017-18 campaign.

But it wouldn’t be impossible to explain a lot of what happened in those three years. The Louis Van Gaal era at Manchester United was so weird and chaotic from a roster standpoint that Januzaj didn't have much room for error as a teenager to maintain a consistent spot. His short loan spell at Dortmund was bad with maturity issues being a sticking point at the time, and perhaps two years of added experience means a greater sense of maturity compared to what was shown in Germany. As for his Sunderland tenure in 2016–17, it would be harsh to use that as a relevant data point against him considering Sunderland been relegated in back to back seasons and now reside in League One. It could very well be that Januzaj getting minutes in a decent but not necessarily great team like Real Sociedad was just what the doctor ordered for a career reboot.

To some extent, Januzaj's career resembles what's gone on with Florian Thauvin. Thauvin was a hot prospect in France a few years ago during his days at Bastia, but his career stalled out during his first stint at Marseille and those disastrous few months at Newcastle. It's been the last two seasons back in France where Thauvin has become the caliber of player that many saw in him. Januzaj is following a similar trajectory and it shows the volatility that can come with prospect development. While more young talents than not follow a more traditional pattern, some take a different path to their final destination for a bevy of reasons.

There are numerous stories within La Liga that should make the 2018–19 season an exciting one. Real Madrid and Barcelona will continue to operate in their own space, with the former trying to navigate their squad without having Cristiano Ronaldo to suck up a lot of shots, and the latter trying to cobble together one last great side during Lionel Messi’s latter years. Perhaps Atletico Madrid have enough fire power to put a scare into the two La liga giants, with the acquisition of Thomas Lemar and Gelson Martins injecting some new talent into the squad. Go further down the table and you’ll find clubs like Real Betis trying to replicate the high octane football they displayed last season and Valencia building on a successful 4th place finish under manager Marcelino.

Somewhere in the list of La Liga story lines is Adnan Januzaj, and his encore to what was a vibrant first season in Spain. No one really knows just how good Januzaj's second season at Real Sociedad will be, and whether what we saw in year one wasn't necessarily an accurate representation of his true talent level or the beginnings of a new stage in his career as a top player. The 2018-19 season will help in figuring out whether it's the former or the latter.