Month: March 2016

Swansea did not deserve to finish 8th last season in the sense that, in most timelines, they wouldn't have. As the conclusion from my piece for StatsBomb last year puts it:

"Are Swansea crap? Err. Umm.  Completely objectively, they’re probably lucky to be 8th, especially given they’re the 6^th worst team both in terms of ExpG for and against. Through separating and cross examining attack and defence, we’ve seen that the factors that probably pushed their ExpG overperformance to allow them to finish so high are also unlikely to be repeated.  This isn’t great news for a Swansea fan."

(That piece can be found here.) This in itself isn't a problem, being lucky is fine if you are aware of it and can make actionable improvements. And, at the beginning of the season, this seemed the case. Public rumblings from Monk gave the impression that he was aware of the difficulty in repeating the feats of the year before, a conclusion that was easy to arrive at even without analytics: last year, Swansea poached 12 points from doubles over Arsenal and Manchester United; had they gotten 3 points instead, they would have finished in the bottom half. The season started brightly, solidifying my optimism in Monk registering that there were defects within the team and doing something about it. At Chelsea on the opening day of the season, I watched Swansea register 10 shots on target as they drew 2-2. Ten. Newcastle were swiftly despatched to follow, with their rivals Sunderland luckily earning a draw in the next match. In all of these games, Swansea had higher expected goals than their opponent, and had legitimately looked good in repeatable footballing terms. (For anyone new to 'expected goals', they are a method of quantifying chance quality based on historical trends, mainly the location of a shot, and correlate better with goals than mere shot numbers.) Next, they beat Manchester United at home, albeit luckily. At the beginning of September, you could forgive even the most sceptical fan for believing that another good season may be on the horizon. Yet here we are, in March, and everything is a mess - had you been on holiday from September until now, it would look like the footballing equivalent of The Hangover, except instead of a live tiger, there is a dead panther. Monk has been sacked, Swansea have been yoyo-ing in and out of the genuine relegation race, Alan Curtis has been appointed, un-appointed in place of Francesco Guidolin, and then reappointed as caretaker while the Italian was ill. A guilty whiff of schadenfreude has emanated from the Liberty Stadium all season, sucked up by bitter competition, the analytics community, and the same media that mere months ago were lauding the club as a role model and Monk as England's next big thing. What happened? The In-Between At the beginning of September, Swansea had managed higher expected goals than their opponents in 3 games. Until their game against Aston Villa in mid-October, they didn't manage this in a match again. It wasn't until they had marginally more chances than West Ham in late December that they took their tally of games where they had the greater chances to 6; by this point, they had played 17 games, were in the relegation zone, and Monk was gone.   In November, Monk had attempted to halt the slump in form by changing his team selection, dropping Federico Fernandez, Gylfi Sigurdsson, and Bafetimbi Gomis for Kyle Bartley, Leon Britton and Eder against Bournemouth. At this point, it was obvious that the manager was concerned in his team, and that these line-up decisions were an attempt to change things. These changes didn't, in the end, have a marked effect on performances in terms of chance creation, but preceded a huge divergence in goal difference from expected goal difference, at the worst point of which Monk was sacked. It may be that Monk had affected team finishing to a point where he drove this under-performance, but it is unlikely - as we saw from Swansea last year, most of the time divergence from expected goals can be explained in terms of unrepeatable streaks in finishing or saving. It is in this period of under-performance, from Monk being sacked to just after Guidolin was appointed, that the narrative of Swansea's season took a drastic turn for the worse, from "they're too good to go down, they'll be fine" to "oh sh*t". Where Monk was lucky last year and had seemingly built the foundations of a long-term career on the hype he gained, a short-term inversion in the same dynamics had lost him his job. This 'unlucky' slump continued after Monk's exit (strengthening the idea that he wasn't to blame for it), with Curtis' team improving performances but not picking up the points that they deserved. This lead to the panicked appointment of Francesco Guidolin, after which Swansea's luck completely changed: fortuitous wins against Watford and Everton kick-started a miraculous run since the turn of the year, and one that has saved Swansea from the threat of relegation. https://twitter.com/SimonGleave/status/711912259237355527 Swansea have been lucky in the sense that they have had few injuries, though with the tinkering of the team the consistency of a starting XI like Leicester have was lost anyway. For the whole season, Swansea had under-performed their expected goal difference, and it had caused them serious issues, yet eventually they were saved by a reversal of these fortunes. This is no small irony, especially in the greater context. https://twitter.com/MC_of_A/status/691280240052674560 Big Picture I do feel sorry for Garry Monk. The commitment that the club made to him was seemingly one of longevity, and yet they got rid of him at the first sign of downturn. Despite riding his luck last season, the team genuinely improved at the beginning of this one, though the why is ever confusing and it was short-lived; bar that brief stint, the team hadn't improved at all. Because of this, as a fan of Swansea City, I'm not hugely disappointed he's gone. Overall, the club have played markedly better than last year, but are still consistently performing like a lower-midtable club. The standard deviation in Swansea's single-match xGDs is fairly low - only 6 teams have less variation in their performances - and this is despite the beginning of the season. Recently, Ben Torvaney has advocated the conceptualisation of a team's expected goal difference in matches as a distribution, and ranking by median. This helps show what type of performances a team is tending to throw up. Swansea's median performance is the 5th worst in the league. Overall, Swansea's aggregated expected goal difference is also the 5th worst in the league. Their defence is fairly average at 12th in the league, but their attack is diabolical - only Aston Villa are worse. This passes my eye test with flying colours. Watching Swansea attack at the moment is incredibly frustrating, but the defending looks better than last year and has done all season. Gylfi has scored a lot recently, overperforming his expected goals and covering up a lot of the offensive staleness. It's difficult to say what Swansea need to do in the future. It would be useful to get a manager who can genuinely innovate. Swansea still play idiosyncratically for a team of their size, with an average possession per match of 52.1%, the 7th highest in the league. Bournemouth play similarly, have a far lower budget, and a team of players I think it's pretty fair to say are objectively worse, yet have played better than Swansea this year - their expected goal difference is 11th best in the league. My own instinct would be that Swansea will do everything they can to get Brendan Rodgers back in the summer, an idea I can easily get on board with. Beyond that, as any midtable club, I would be thinking about spending big on managers. Relative to the cost of players, it is probably worth it; lest we forget that Rafa Benitez is at Newcastle on a wage reportedly just under £40k per week, much less than Andros Townsend, who also cost £12m for the right to pay in the first place. We stumble here onto an ongoing debate in analytics - do managers do anything? Soccernomics and The Numbers Game introduce the idea that wage spending correlates with performance so well that there is little room for manager effects. The problem with this is that wages and performance are like smiling and happiness: are you smiling because you are happy, or because you want to be happy? They aren't quite the same thing. And the same things that wages could be a proxy for - mainly player quality - probably includes managers. If all the wage-performance correlation is showing us is that bigger clubs have better players that play and are paid better, the better managers will be there too. A problem Swansea have had recently is that as a club without a wealthy owner, one where the fans own 21.3% of the club and the majority of the board invested when it pretty much went bankrupt, it has been difficult to invest into the future. Where Bournemouth can say 'hey, if we stay in this here thing, we'll get an increase of £40m in the new TV deal, let's spend now to try and do that', Swansea can't get a sweet interest free loan, while posting 'annual profits in the last few years [that] are among the lowest in the Premier League'. The club is in an awkward transition phase where they had to sell Jonjo Shelvey, probably their most important player in the first few months of this season but one of questionable consistency, to a relegation rival to finance signing Alberto Paloschi for £8m. On top of that, the Supporters Trust that own just over a fifth of the club recently pointed out how difficult long-term financial planning can be given the demands of players joining relegation candidates. The club are looking for investment, and may be able to spend more in the summer now that they are safe and the new deal is coming in. Were I the club, I would appoint a 'Director of Football', hugely expand my scouting and recruitment network, and get a head coach in who is gonna work with that, though this may run into trouble with good ol' Brendan. A clear mandate would be established on the sort of system that these players should be able to play in, a task that would be relatively easy with the established style at Swansea. Huw Jenkins, the club's chairman, has done a brilliant job of recruiting up to this point, but the truth is there is serious room for more intelligent recruitment in the Premier League's midtable. Wilfried Bony, an easy £12m buy after an obscene season with Vitesse, was flipped for £25-28m, and big clubs have an unusual necessity for 'Premier League experience'. There is a market in being that stepping stone, one Portuguese clubs thrive on being between South Americans and Europe. Oh, and I'd hire some analytics folk.  

There are many aspects of this Premier League season that have been hard to understand and few, if any, will leave having had their prediction skills validated.  I am going to have to live with the fact that I stated that the rise of the middle classes was a usual blip that would quickly revert, there has been no pay off for my continual writing off of the chances of Leicester City (there is a tweet in existence in which I comically suggest Ranieri will be gone by November) and after their blistering start, I laughed at ludicrous predictions that Manchester City would come fifth. Ahem. This being football, a ton of things can happen to make you look foolish, others can make you look smart, and that's why in the main, peeling back the numbers and taking a more detailed look at matters can reveal the truth. Simple stuff can leap off the page.  Chelsea allowing Swansea to create ten shots on target in their very first match was a huge red flag and with subsequent matches improving this starkly poor rate only slightly, it was possible to see even in a handful of games that Chelsea were in trouble. The rot set in and changes came later, but there was evidence from a long way out that although Chelsea had won the title, they had not been performing at league leading standards for a good deal of late 2014-15. It's important to temper this though, nobody could have predicted how far they eventually fell before Mourinho's departure, or that so many players would concurrently underperform, or that they would also find themselves on the bad end of a negative skew. But all that came to pass and probably weeks late, he departed. Elsewhere Norwich's problems this season were visible from a good way out. On the surface it looked like they were making a reasonable fist of their return to the league but after an early flurry, their shooting numbers were significantly poor, they have continued to struggle and are now close to the trap door. Tottenham's slow start points-wise disguised extremely solid shooting numbers and quickly identified problems solved in defence. While the traditional media happily worried abut the flash-in-the-pan nature of Harry Kane, it was straightforward enough to rebut this even though his goalscoring had temporarily vanished. All other aspects of his shooting game remained, it was clearly a matter of time, and so it proved. Informative analysis can be simple and understanding your team's performance metrics goes a long way towards describing performances in the past and projecting likely events in the future. There are lots of tools for this around. The big sites carry loads of statistics, expected goals models are there to inform and everyone can get smarter for betting, their office fantasy football team or even just to win the pub argument. You can even write about what you find out and there are plenty of people who will find it interesting and latch on. Here's a few other stories that have unfolded more recently. Arsenal and Manchester City After twenty weeks of this season, we hosted a post on this site in which a variety of modellers gave their predictions for teams to win the title. Every single entrant bar one had the likelihood of anyone other than Manchester City or Arsenal winning the title at under 20% (I believe Constantinos Chappas was the outlier). Over in the Twittersphere, another prominent predictor was confident enough in Arsenal's chances to declare in mid January that they would have been "over the line" model-wise with a victory (they drew). None of this is to suggest that everyone was "wrong", merely to note that the small probability outcomes are looking as if they will come to pass: the twenty percent looks likely to be heading towards the winning line. So what has happened to the two early season giants? The late winner against Leicester was the spark that was supposed to ignite Arsenal's season, yet they've had to wait til this weekend to find another win, the far more routine Arsenal-style "get two ahead and sit" kind that they last pulled off at Bournemouth. This has left them teetering precariously on the very edge of the title race and looking far more likely to end up in, lo and behold, third or fourth. Plus, this week, we've had the annual "should we get rid of Wenger" discussion which is interesting, because from an analytics perspective we have a slight divergence; expected goals loves this team and will fully expect them to cruise home the rest of this year and possibly kick upwards next. Even within this analysis they are only projecting as the best team in the league this season, not in any season, for this one is compressed.  Simple shot analysis is more content to christen this team " a typical Arsenal team", good but not tearing the roof off the league and it is worth looking at how they've trended more recently. Since the halfway point, there has been a negative swing of four shots and two shots on target in their figures; the latter a negative swing larger than any in the league. This goes alongside entirely flat conversion rates across both periods, league average on the attack end and advantageous on the defensive end (save percentage continues to be super high). What this means is that without any increase in the fluctuating skews that affect any team, Arsenal have distinctly declined since the turn of the year. They have no room to dig up extra luck, they have simply been worse and their results have suffered because of this. It would be pertinent to note the injuries they suffered in particular during the early part of this period but–despite the continued absence of Cazorla, who as each week passes appears more fundamentally tied to their effectiveness–more recently they have had a larger squad to pick from, yet haven't really picked up. Then Ramsey goes down, Iwobi appears and we're none the wiser as to who or what Arsenal really are. Sacking the manager would be a bad idea. One year, maybe they stay fit and they do challenge late and long and... well, we'll see. Pep Guardiola may have steamrollered the league after a sixteen player transfer splurge at City by then. Regarding Manchester City, only Watford's goal volumes have decreased by a greater amount, and that's the top line "where have the results gone? indicator but the real issue surrounds their accuracy. While their shot volumes have broadly held up (minus 0.6 shots for per game), their on target rates have fallen by a huge amount from over 6.5 per game to a frankly average four. So from being a team that had shot volume and accuracy, and projected very well because of it, they are now finding it hard to break through.  They're still taking two shots for every one from their opposition but the on target rate is more like 4:3 (literally), they are converting their shots at 8% and the opposition 13%. The conversion part should shake out in time but it's all a lot nearer par than you might expect from a team of such clear talent.  Like Arsenal they have been hampered by repeated injuries and the physical cost of being unable to rest an ageing squad but the 26 shot, three on target effort against Manchester United felt all too familiar and one wonders how motivated the troops are, knowing that a tough drill instructor has been recruited for their future. Sunderland and Newcastle There are clear similarities in the shooting numbers of the North East relegation rivals. Both produced abysmal totals throughout the first half of the season and both have improved since then. However, the nuance from there differs. Things have actually started going right for Sunderland but from a very low base.  They have produced a swing of 3.6 shots and 1.7 shots on target per game, which is enough to have raised their numbers to just sub-par levels. All their shot conversions have moved with them too, Sam Allardyce has found some efficiency, at least for now and they are turning a high 39% of their on target shots into goals since week twenty. This creates the discussion of whether Allardyce's methods are adept at squeezing the maximum return from typically minimal inputs and the timescale is too short to have any confidence there, but he has realistically improved the output of the team. Whether it will be enough to save them is another story, they still aren't good and the seats on the Premier League 2016-17 bus have filled quickly. And of course, there are long held problems surrounding squad building and team quality that still need resolving, something that can only be realistically done if they stay in the league: no easy task. Newcastle have improved by a far greater margin than Sunderland. Since the turn they have enjoyed a plus 8.6 shot swing and plus 3.6 shots on target. Nice job Steve McClaren! Post Christmas, his team has been performing with a shot on target ratio ahead of Manchester City and Chelsea, way ahead of Arsenal and just a shade behind Leicester and Liverpool. Isn't it great when things work out for someone? Oh hey, look at Tottenham... Anyway, the volumes are the good side of Newcastle and over time, you would presume that they might turn into goals and points but sadly for Steve and his P45, it has come all too late. During this period of reasonably solid and improved underlying shooting numbers, the conversions have been thoroughly and entirely in the bin. Newcastle have been converting 7% of their shots (low) and conceding 15% of the opposition's (high). Of the on target efforts, they have been converting 19% (very low) and have a save percentage of 49% (utterly miserable).  All that has contributed to them scoring ten, conceding 21 and winning two from eleven games, despite promising and much improved shooting rates. They too have suffered with injury, though mainly in the autumn and if this improvement continues and Rafa Benitez grabs a bounce they could find themselves fixed and quickly. Either that or they are going to find themselves as unlucky to go down, much as Hull City were last year, as they ran out of time. Quick bits

• Everything Watford shaped has taken a big hit in the second half. They had enough on board to cushion them but both in results and metrics they have struggled through 2016 and may need to do more than take stock in the summer.
• Swansea haven't improved but they have got a few more breaks
• Leicester's metrics are insane. As their attack dried up around the halfway point, their defence has gone supernova. While they are effectively limiting on target efforts, which is to be applauded, the opposition is currently converting all of its shots at under 4%: a rate far below any realistic long term expectation. There is no strategy in the world that can cause the opposition to score at such a low rate long term, so we are left with "they are lucky" or "they have solved football". I lean towards the former. In season they are now a sub-50% shots team, which would normally as you might expect, peg them as a par team for the league. Again shot on target or expected goals paint a rosier picture, one of the fringes of European qualification, but nope, they are five points clear and seemingly striding without trouble towards the title. It is quite remarkable.
• The Palace collapse has two factors, firstly a large negative swing in their ability to get and prevent shots on target and then a total collapse in the conversion rates to almost Newcastle levels. These latter factors are largely out of a team's control and given that they skewed very positively in the first half of the season, this opposite effect appears to be creating a reflection of their true ability: not so great.
• Liverpool games have become more high event. Goals and shots are up on both ends and I joked recently about them seemingly being plugged into a random results generator. The Southampton game, and to lose in such a manner despite strong shot volume, endorses this silly idea.
• Bournemouth and Chelsea have similar profiles. Neither has particularly improved their shooting numbers, but each has started to enjoy the benefit of a positive rate of shot conversion, the exact opposite of what came before. Bournemouth's pre Christmas goal concession was so severely bad as to be clearly beyond a level that would sustain, and so it proved. They have produced very solid defensive volume numbers almost throughout.

So, there's a few aspects that have driven results since the turn of the year. Plenty of other stories exist within the league and plenty of tactical and personnel inputs will drive aspects of play too, but in taking a look at the numbers we can understand what aspects of a team are performing well or badly and which aspects are likely to cool off or heat up given time.  Even in a year as surprising as this these truths remain. ______________ Thanks for reading! Long pieces on Tottenham and Manchester United by me. @MoeSquare on Marseille @Fla_Futbol on Sampdoria and Genoa

Four defeats in 29 games, second place behind er.. Leicester, fewest goals conceded and second highest scorers, we reach early March with the health of Tottenham's season looking undeniably perky. Regardless of the failings of others, to reach this point and be having non-comedic conversations about the potential of this team to win the title is unusual, so much so that it has almost been forgotten how far the team has risen and that a top four slot was a high ambition back in August.

So what the hell happened? Last season Ryan Mason and Nabil Bentaleb habitually formed a guard of honour in central midfield and made life far too easy for the opposition. They have now been largely relegated to the fringes and replaced by the deceptively child-like visage of converted centre-back Eric Dier and whomever sits alongside. Chances are far less simple to find for visitors down at the Lane, or indeed anywhere else this team rolls up. Work ethic, shots–a lot of them–and dominance are the order of the day. So what is the limit for this side? Is this the start of a golden era or are we just looking at yet another strange feature of this odd season, a Tottenham that no longer crumbles at the first sign of pressure?

What came before

Last season was, in the world of performance metrics, pretty grim. At no point did Tottenham project to be anything much more than an upper mid-table side, various expected goal models pegged them around eighth or ninth, as did general shot analysis. Not good, yet somehow, in a signal of things to come, other teams failed to translate performance into points and the team ended up fifth with a slightly bemused fan base not sure whether to credit the finishing position or bemoan the grim method. Summer transfer dealings were necessary and early moves saw defensive selections. Eventually, Toby Alderweireld, Heung-Min Son, Kevin Wimmer, Kieren Trippier and N'Jie Clinton were purchased alongside the delayed arrival of some kid from the lower leagues, Dele Alli. Primary complaints involved the lack of a Harry Kane alternative for the front line and expectation was muted. Of those signed, Clinton apart, each has had a role to play and unusually none can be considered to have had an unsuccessful year.

Meanwhile, leaving with passports in hand were an array of presumably shirking types, out of love with the barracks mentality of Pochettino and off to continue their footballing lives in Guangzhou, Naples, Sunderland and "unattached".

Zero wins in the first four games including an unfortunate defeat at Old Trafford and a dismal wobble to allow Stoke to draw made it appear that little had changed. However, a couple of 1-0s and the eyecatching 4-1 demolition of Manchester City showed there was a little more going on; maybe this team was quite good?

Embers are glowing

In a warm but cautious appraisal of a promising start back in November, it was starting to look clear that pre-season hopes of "something a bit better" were undershooting reality. Lots of early draws kept wider recognition away and  at that point, with Chelsea's season already resembling a fire in a park bin, Tottenham looked like they had a reasonable shot at the top four: the top end of the more pragmatic of predictions. And as time has moved on, they have found themselves ensconced towards the top end of the table, with a cushion to teams beneath. If we take a look at the shot metrics, there's a good argument that they have actually underperformed.

All the shots, all the time

What can we take from this and the numbers that form it?

• In 2014-15, goal difference and shot numbers oscillated around zero, at times better, at times worse, generally quite average.
• Points were more consistent, Tottenham went 14-7-7 in games decided by a maximum of one goal, which meant they were turning a moderate goal difference into points at an extremely solid rate
• In 2015-16, goal difference is a step above (+0.13 per game 2014-15 to +0.93 per game 2015-16) and the shot volumes have taken off. So much so that over the last 10-12 games, Tottenham are averaging around +10 shots  and +5 shots on target per game against their opposition.
• Their all shot and on target volumes lead the league as does their rate of preventing the opposition getting shots on target.
• Put into perspective Tottenham's season long shot on target superiority (+3.7 per game) is greater than eight Premier League 2015-16 teams' entire shots on target volume. It is also a clear second of 140 teams in the Enlightened Era (2009-10 to date), a massive~0.6 shots on target per game ahead of three Manchester City teams–including two title winners– from 2011-12 onwards.
• Tottenham are forcing opposition keepers to make over five saves per game, more than any team in this same logged era.

So when we look at charts and numbers like these and reflect on the exalted company this team appears to be in, it begs the question: why isn't this team crushing the league? Firstly and simply, the close games in which Tottenham had such a good record in last season haven't broken as kindly: they are running at 6-10-4. The volume of time spent as a clearly superior team drawing in games likely feeds somewhat into the enhanced shot volumes and more than once, it has been noticeable that Tottenham have changed their strategy once securing a lead and turned quickly to defend. In fact, the derby against Arsenal is a microcosm of the entire season; Tottenham took 26 shots and found the target 11 times compared to Arsenal's ten and four. Clear shooting superiority yet a close, and ultimately drawn game.

That Handsome Man

The elephant in the room here is a team that sits in among those Manchester City teams referred to in that previous paragraph. It also offers a clue to the disconnect between this season's shot volumes and success. Tottenham's 2012-13 side, managed by Andre Villas Boas, was even more shot heavy yet in a stronger league and powered by Gareth Bale could only finish 5th. However, parallels are far from ridiculous:

Check out the points!

So as far as alienating comparisons go, this one is pretty big but maybe history should be kinder towards Villas-Boas' ability to organise a disparate rabble of players around Gareth Bale and be this good.  They lost three of their last 26 games too, their middle and end of season was as strong as this season's start and middle. No capable team in recent history took shots from outside the box like that Villas Boas team, ignoring location and encouraging volume appeared to be part of his method and it's hard to definitively state that in that season it did not work. Sadly, Bale departed and 2013-14 saw a complete breakdown of method and belief.

Expected goals, accuracy and locations

So what has this to do with Pochettino's team? If we look at an all shot expected goals model, we find Tottenham rate around 3rd best in the league, which reflects that while they have volume, they have found it harder to create shots in closer locations. A large part of Tottenham's shot volume in comparison to other strong shooting teams is coming from outside the box. Think Christian Eriksen firing a free kick on target from literally anywhere in the final third of the pitch, or Harry Kane attempting a shot (not against Arsenal) from 25 yards.  These are regular but low expectation opportunities and Tottenham take a hell of a lot of them.  Here we can see Eriksen from range in particular:

(create your own charts for your own favourite players HERE)

The rate in which shots have been landing on target is extremely high–40%: the highest rate in the league, and so high that it would be perfectly reasonable to expect this to reduce over time. Harry Kane is the highest volume shooter in the league this year with 116 shots taken at a rate of 4.1 per game. Of these shots, 47% have landed on target; up from 40% in his hot breakthrough season. Eriksen had bad accuracy last year (27% on target) but has leaped forward this season, he also leads the league in out of box attempts (53, 2.2 per game) and has an all shot accuracy of 48%, higher even than Kane and despite a huge volume from range. A classic example of a metric that can fluctuate over relatively small samples. With these two taking nearly 40% of Tottenham's total shots, the influence of their accurate shooting on team rates is clear.

Reflections of location can also be found in the conversions. This team converts all shots at no more than a league average rate and for on target efforts is actually notably under par. There is room for a positive skew here and this being a frequent hallmark of a championship challengers, it should come as no surprise that Leicester are the only contending team to be significantly ahead of average here.

Goal contributions- assists and goals- are spread around the core of attackers. A fluid interchangeable front four has been largely populated by five players: Eriksen is running at 0.55/90, Kane is at 0.46/90, Alli 0.60/90, Lamela 0.42/90 and Son 0.31/90. Even Chadli, largely used as back up is at 0.52/90. Since the injury to Clinton, there have been fewer options but everyone has contributed.

Defence

The one unarguable difference between this team and any iteration of Andre Villas Boas' Spurs or Pochettino's first season is in defence. The signing of Toby Alderweireld seems to have been key and his partnership with first Jan Vertonghen and more recently Kevin Wimmer can be toasted by the best defensive record in the league, only 24 goals conceded. But perhaps equally important was the deployment of Eric Dier into a screening midfield role, a position that was inhabited during 2014-15 by a vapour trail.

Tottenham's opposition have secured only 3.1 shots on target per game, which is the lowest and best in the league and this is an area where expected goals agrees: Tottenham have conceded the fewest goals both in reality and in expectation. As well, no team has secured more than four shots on target in a game against them since Manchester City in their 4-1 defeat on the 26th September, a sterling and impressive run and a strong indicator of defensive consistency. People may also be aware that the team has not been two goals behind in a fixture all season, where all other Premier League teams have spent time at least three behind. Defeats have been rare, narrow and on occasion unfortunate.

Team ethic and methodology

For so many years Tottenham have appeared as a non-coherent team, with talented individuals but without an effective group ethic. Often there have been players banished from the squad, fighting to secure transfers away and generally spoiling the ambiance. It seems that under Pochettino this is- at least for now- a thing of the past. Team and methodology are everything.  There is a core squad of at least 16 players that can start a game on merit without a noticeable reduction in quality and a handful of others slightly further down the pecking order.

Evidence of the press employed can be seen in the opposition pass success rates: the lowest in the league (70.7%) and more advanced methods endorse the same. Tactical fouling appears to be part of the style too, Tottenham have made the third most fouls and received the second most yellow cards but are yet to have a man sent off.

Sustainability

The increase in Tottenham's performance levels from last season to this are so extreme that there is a solid argument that Pochettino has improved Tottenham to a greater degree than Claudio Ranieri has improved Leicester. Aspects of Leicester's success have been built from a remarkable sequence of beneficial skews: first scoring at an extremely high and unsustainable rate then following it up with a rate of goal prevention at a similarly high and unsustainable rate. Their underlying performance metrics peg them as a Europa League challenger and reversion to that level, if not lower, seems almost certain for next season. That is not a slight on their achievements but the context is there.  In contrast, Tottenham have built their challenge differently; by enhancing both their attack and defence and moving both their outputs and methods from the lowly levels of 2014-15 to genuine league challenging levels.  In any season this Tottenham side would likely be residing in the top four, whereas it seems that Leicester have found a perfect storm only in this season, their chance to repeat is slim.

One aspect that is less likely to sustain is success from set pieces. With fifteen goals for and only five against, a +10 goal difference in this area leads the league. Of their top four rivals, only Arsenal have a positive goal difference here (+3) and rates of set piece conversion are well renowned for being non-reliable and unlikely to intrinsically repeat. While Eriksen is a quality contributor here and again we can see his importance, it is unwise to presume that such an advantage can be maintained moving forward into further seasons.

Prospects

The leap in performance is huge but prospects are likely good. The team is young and developing, it needs little remedial work in the summer and while Eriksen and Kane are the current jewels, that players like Lamela and Alli and a rejuvenated Dembele have taken their share of responsibility mean that this isn't the one man team of 2012-13.  Champions League qualification and a successful project are each huge carrots to dangle for the prospective retention of both coach and star players and Pochettino seems genuinely invested in his project; it would be surprising to see him tempted away. Maybe only Eriksen is vulnerable to outside bids? There is talk that he has a contract offer and his worth has gone slightly under the radar. His reputation isn't quite as high as that of Luka Modric prior to his move away, for all that he is equally key.

With nine games to try and overhaul Leicester's five point lead and some tricky fixtures, it's possible that the title may be beyond them. Concerns about the sheer physicality of Pochettino's style causing late season tiredness remain, though it would be a harsh assessment to note the defeat at West Ham and late concession to ten-man Arsenal as indicative of this. Borussia Dortmund will offer a unique test in the forthcoming Europa League tie and the squad depth will be well tested.

Expectation should be tempered against a wider perspective. When measured against shooting metrics and the likelihood of a team improving year-on-year, this team has come from further away than Liverpool's 2013-14 team to bid for glory and has done so with a steady defence and high attacking shot volumes. That's an enormous achievement in itself and projects positively going forward. Liverpool lost Suarez and had huge room to revert, much like Leicester now, but Tottenham's potential is perceptibly different, their rise has been built on stronger foundations and even a drop back should see them continuing to challenge for Champions League places in years to come. Manchester United and Liverpool continue to be in flux, Chelsea are in repair and while a Guardiola fuelled Manchester City look likely to contend well, the top four is more fluid than it has been at any point this century. Spurs are well placed to capitalise and in advance of their stadium move, consolidate.  It should be remembered that for 2015-16, top four is a success, second or third even moreso and whether they manage to win the title or not, they have managed to put together a genuinely high quality season, with a strong likelihood of more to come.

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