Nate Silver Day 3: Iceland or Bust!

Nate has seen his bankroll drop to $528,337. He'll be looking to get some of that back, with 20.2% of his bankroll on France +0.5. After that, Iceland holding Argentina to a draw would be great, and a viking miracle would be even better. Denmark could do some helpful work with a win, as could Nigeria with a win or a draw. Also, I should note that Ronaldo is very good at futbol.

Team Wager Risked To Win Result
Saudi Arabia -0.5 7694 63555 -7694
Uruguay-Egypt Draw 18369 53452 -18369
Egypt -0.5 30141 195315 -30141
Morocco-Iran Draw 2682 5526 -2682
Iran -0.5 8821 25317 25317
Portugal -0.5 9631 31011 -9631
France 0.5 106724 10262 0
Argentina-Iceland Draw 36161 160192 0
Iceland -0.5 34297 342627 0
Denmark -0.5 16240 24198 0
Nigeria-Croatia Draw 14285 38569 0
Nigeria -0.5 8502 36984 0

 

Opta: Fear? That's the other guy's problem + Nate Silver Day 2

Opta has some fairly strong opinions on the World Cup and they are either going to get rich or die trying. Much respect! ($10,000 bankroll with unlimited credit). However, we'll get to those in a second. Nate Silver is back for day two of the World Cup:

 

Team Wager Risked To Win Result
Saudi Arabia -0.5 7694 63555 -7694
Uruguay-Egypt Draw 18369 53452 0
Egypt -0.5 30141 195315 0
Morocco-Iran Draw 2682 5526 0
Iran -0.5 8821 25317 0
Portugal -0.5 9631 31011 0

 

Saudi Arabia was a bit of a let-down (5-0!), but things get more exciting today. Egypt could deliver a great day with a win, but a draw there would be just fine. Portugal upsetting Spain in the first elite matchup of the tournament would be nice too. Now, back to Opta, who have some thoughts:

 

Team Advance Y/N Risked To Win Result
Uruguay Eliminated 2699 11472 0
Egypt Advance 1549 2168 0
Russia Eliminated 2480 4489 0
Saudi Arabia Advance 3685 31325 0
Spain Eliminated 1654 12932 0
Portugal Eliminated 2600 7800 0
Iran Advance 3140 18840 0
Morocco Advance 509 1486 0
France Eliminated 1567 14100 0
Denmark Eliminated 2653 3050 0
Peru Advance 382 565 0
Australia Advance 2757 10889 0
Argentina Eliminated 836 3972 0
Croatia Eliminated 2969 5344 0
Iceland Advance 1992 6593 0
Nigeria Advance 1684 4210 0
Brazil Eliminated 1327 15290 0
Switzerland Eliminated 1616 1511 0
Serbia Pass 0 0 0
Costa Rica Advance 2107 8533 0
Germany Eliminated 1556 13835 0
Mexico Eliminated 980 933 0
Sweden Advance 252 340 0
Korea Republic Advance 2158 9494 0
Belgium Eliminated 2532 18762 0
England Eliminated 3473 16461 0
Tunisia Advance 2768 12042 0
Panama Advance 3272 31250 0
Colombia Eliminated 1893 3995 0
Poland Eliminated 1120 1568 0
Senegal Advance 58 65 0
Japan Advance 2384 5960 0

 

Their point of view is that every team has a chance, which means the longshots may yet be crowned king:

 

Team Champ Y/N Risked To Win Result
Uruguay Pass 0 0 0
Egypt Champ 111 28028 0
Russia Champ 12 689 0
Saudi Arabia Champ 116 84441 0
Spain Not Champ 2302 301 0
Portugal Pass 0 0 0
Iran Champ 117 49640 0
Morocco Champ 35 14208 0
France Not Champ 496 58 0
Denmark Champ 51 6444 0
Peru Champ 72 8989 0
Australia Champ 136 54466 0
Argentina Champ 99 979 0
Croatia Pass 0 0 0
Iceland Champ 97 29454 0
Nigeria Champ 111 28028 0
Brazil Not Champ 2740 609 0
Switzerland Champ 76 10025 0
Serbia Champ 115 17309 0
Costa Rica Champ 85 34382 0
Germany Not Champ 2296 370 0
Mexico Champ 106 14029 0
Sweden Champ 151 37918 0
Korea Republic Champ 94 58910 0
Belgium Not Champ 2620 150 0
England Not Champ 3259 105 0
Tunisia Champ 76 55385 0
Panama Champ 66 48115 0
Colombia Champ 59 2870 0
Poland Champ 58 4650 0
Senegal Champ 102 20900 0
Japan Champ 201 105825 0

 

Best of luck to OptaJoe and the rest of the crew over there.

World Cup Weekend: A Tactical Guide

The first weekend of the World Cup brings seven games in rapid fire. Here’s a specific tactical point to watch for in each game to get a sense of the teams involved and what their success rests on.  

France vs Australia

Will France’s fun lineup lead to more attacking football? France will likely start a front three of Antoine Griezmann, Kylian Mbappe and Ousmane Dembele as well as elect to go with Corentin Tolisso over Blaise Matuidi. This is certainly a more creative attacking lineup than what manager Didier Deschamps has tended to use in the past. Olivier Giroud’s head isn’t there to cross the ball to, and Matuidi’s movement has been swapped out for Tolisso’s creative passing. That doesn’t necessarily mean that France will be more fun though. The major criticism of Deschamps has been that he shackles his talented players. That problem won’t necessarily be solved simply by putting better and more creative dudes on the field. No matter how they play, France are probably talented enough to put Australia away barring some ridiculous curse from the variance gods, but the thing to watch is how they do it. If they score because Griezmann sneaks to the back post and finishes a couple of long range crosses, that’s not a great sign. If they’re interchanging through the middle of the field, trying to play defense splitting passes and have Dembele and Mbappe running rampant? Look out world.  

Argentina vs Iceland

Iceland are a particularly tricky side for a team that wants to press, but might not be particularly good at it. Which is unfortunate for Argentina, who are a side that want to press, but aren't particularly good at it. Pressing a team that doesn’t want possession is a good way to use a lot of energy while they just kick the ball over your head and try to beat you down field. Iceland will be perfectly comfortable playing low percentage long balls and defending deep in their own zone, while hoping to convert a set piece or perfectly executed counterattack. They’re a disciplined and well drilled side that doesn't take chances. It’s a good early test for the awkward fit of Argentina’s talent and Jorge Sampaoli’s tactics. A great pressing performance might force Iceland into some mistakes, but most of the time pressers will just take themselves out of position for dealing with the outlet ball that is almost certainly coming from Iceland. So, what’s a team to do? Does Sampaoli put the brakes on ever so slightly? Or, does Argentina go crashing into an Iceland deep block that isn’t going anywhere anyway? Argentina will likely walk away winners, because Lionel Messi is still a person that exists, but the match will hopefully display some clues about exactly how committed they’re going to be to a tactical strategy that may not suit them.  

Peru vs Denmark

This is a crucial battle between two teams likely battling for a likely second place finish behind France in Group C. The major question here is what pace the game will be played at. Peru likes to get up and down the pitch. They don’t want to counterattack particularly, or play a slow possession game.Tthey want a sustained end to end match where there is disorganization and chaos for them to take advantage of. Denmark would rather that not happen. Obviously Denmark are built around Christian Eriksen playing as a typical creative attacking midfielder. He either scores the goals or sets them up. Against Peru he’ll have a slightly different task. A good Denmark performance means that Eriksen will bring order to the match for the Danes, slow everything down and orchestrate a more sustained attack. Peru are not a robust defensive side when forced to spend time in their own third, and that’s a matchup Denmark can win. Erisken, because he’s a super star, might do the scoring and assisting anyway, but for Denmark to win, he’s going to have to first keep the pace manageable and assert control over possession of the ball.  

Croatia vs Nigeria

Croatia are a team that’s just good enough that they have to be able to keep possession and beat lesser opponents, and just weak enough that they have to be able to play without the ball and counterattack against better teams. Nigeria slots solidly in the first category and will be a real test of Croatia’s creative abilities. The Super Eagles are a very disciplined side that likes to play compact and then counterattack through the wings while Jon Obi Mikel runs the show from midfield. Despite all the playmakers in Croatia’s midfield, their attack often ends up running out through the wings, as Ivan Perišić plays cross after cross aimed at striker Andrej Kramarić and pseudo-striker Mario Mandžukić. That will suit Nigeria just fine. They’re happy to play as a block, forces the ball wide and defend the crosses. Croatia, although they are less talented, face the same challenges and questions as France. Will they be able to play through Nigeria, or will they resort to crossing the ball in and hoping for the best. France are insulated by the sheer amount of talent they have, but if Croatia aren’t able to leverage their midfielder’s abilities in order to create great chances for their strikers, they might find themselves having a surprisingly short tournament.  

Costa Rica vs Serbia

Sure, whatever. Costa Rica play an exceedingly conservative brand of football, and Serbia despite having some intriguing talent and an honest to god budding superstar in Sergej Milinković-Savić don’t exactly play mouthwatering stuff. It’s the early game on Sunday. Sleep in, go to brunch, do whatever else is time zone appropriate. Look at your loved ones. Just glance at them for a second. Say hello. They’ll appreciate it.  

Germany vs Mexico

The biggest questions for Germany will come when teams try to out physical them in midfield. Mexico doesn’t fit that description. There’s probably not much to find out about here when it comes to one of the tournament’s favorites. Mexico, on the other hand, have tons of unanswered questions. Manager Juan Carlos Osorio really wants his team to play possession based soccer. They press, although often not that well, and try and do all the things that good teams do. They aspire to interchange positionally, and move the ball both back to front and side to side. Whether they can pull it off, however, remains an exceedingly open question. In their three pre-tournament friendlies El Tri started twelve different players in their front four. The idea is that they were preparing specifically customized approaches for each of their group stage opponents. While beating Germany is probably a bridge too far, an effectively executed game plan, which leads to spells of effective possession will be a good sign for Osorio’s team, and suggest that they’re well on their way to their preordained round-of-sixteen exit, just like each of the last six World Cups.  

Brazil vs Switzerland

Switzerland are a capable pressing team. If Brazil have a weakness it’s a midfield that’s a little light on creative passing. The trio of Paulinho, Fernandinho, and Casemiro do a lot of things really well, but bringing the ball from midfield into attack isn’t really a part of their collective skillset. Brazil work around that by having one of their wingers, either Neymar or whichever of Willian, Coutinho and Douglas Costa starts, drop deeper take the ball off the midfielders quickly, and run transition. It works because those wingers are all great, and because the transition happens before defenses get set, and then Brazil’s awesome attackers get to go do awesome attacker things. If Brazil struggle to create against Switzerland that should be a warning sign for later in the tournament. If Switzerland manage to exploit the lack of natural passing in Brazil’s midfield and force the favorites to adapt and either bring in more passing oriented midfielders or take off a midfielder all together, it suggests that perhaps Brazil’s preferred tactical plan won’t stand the test of time. At this early stage of the game, it’s suggestions like this, rather than big shocking results that are helpful in terms of mapping out the tournament. Brazil are almost certainly not going to be bothered for a few matches, it’s just a matter of figuring out if they shouldn’t be the overall favorites.   (Header image courtesy of the Press Association)

The Return of the King

At the last World Cup Nate Silver turned 100K into $571,538. It was an amazing run and we'll see what he can do with that bankroll soon enough. https://statsbomb.com/2014/07/germany-must-make-a-tough-decision-nate-silver-day-24/ He'll be starting off with Saudi Arabia:

Team Wager Risked To Win Result
Saudi Arabia -0.5 7694 63555 0

I also calculated all of his futures, although I only gave him a 10k bankroll there (with unlimited credit). Eliminated means the team does not make it past the group stage. Teams are listed by group and then alphabetical. Best of luck to Nate on what I'm sure will be another memorable run.

Team Future Risked To Win Result
Egypt Eliminated 725 439 0
Russia Advance 1225 544 0
Russia Win Group 1063 2285 0
Saudi Arabia Advance 612 5200 0
Saudi Arabia Win Group 130 4604 0
Uruguay Eliminated 612 2600 0
Uruguay Not Win Group 1993 2432 0
Iran Advance 317 1900 0
Iran Semifinalist 102 10264 0
Iran Win Group 63 1800 0
Morocco Advance 334 976 0
Morocco Finalist 135 20200 0
Morocco Quarterfinalist 472 4378 0
Morocco Semifinalist 103 2455 0
Morocco Win Group 81 1040 0
Portugal Champion 182 4100 0
Portugal Eliminated 933 2800 0
Portugal Finalist 480 5876 0
Portugal Not Win Group 60 24 0
Portugal Quarterfinalist 414 534 0
Portugal Semifinalist 739 3150 0
Spain Champion 529 3410 0
Spain Eliminated 187 1466 0
Spain Finalist 525 1571 0
Spain Quarterfinalist 633 284 0
Spain Semifinalist 673 848 0
Spain Win Group 55 35 0
Denmark Champion 19 2350 0
Denmark Quarterfinalist 686 3271 0
Denmark Semifinalist 38 404 0
Denmark Win Group 471 2285 0
France Eliminated 444 4000 0
France Not Champ 2320 270 0
France Not Finalist 2000 500 0
France Not Semifinalist 2498 1759 0
France Not Win Group 910 1856 0
Peru Advance 114 168 0
Peru Quarterfinalist 379 3188 0
Peru Semifinalist 71 1560 0
Peru Win Group 358 2950 0
Argentina Eliminated 679 3225 0
Argentina Not Champ 130 10 0
Argentina Not Semifinalist 442 174 0
Argentina Not Win Group 1771 2480 0
Croatia Champion 3 92 0
Croatia Eliminated 44 80 0
Croatia Finalist 50 717 0
Croatia Quarterfinalist 184 360 0
Croatia Win Group 402 976 0
Iceland Advance 755 2499 0
Iceland Finalist 1 100 0
Iceland Quarterfinalist 273 3380 0
Iceland Win Group 300 3850 0
Nigeria Advance 200 500 0
Nigeria Quarterfinalist 329 3794 0
Nigeria Win Group 219 2520 0
Brazil Eliminated 327 3772 0
Brazil Not Semifinalist 432 400 0
Brazil Not Win Group 822 2352 0
Costa Rica Not Win Group 598 20 0
Serbia Eliminated 160 114 0
Serbia Finalist 4 200 0
Serbia Win Group 225 2036 0
Switzerland Advance 600 600 0
Switzerland Champion 126 16700 0
Switzerland Finalist 134 3465 0
Switzerland Quarterfinalist 744 3685 0
Switzerland Semifinalist 257 2716 0
Switzerland Win Group 629 4875 0
Germany Not Champ 640 103 0
Germany Not Finalist 880 314 0
Germany Not Semifinalist 1160 959 0
Germany Not Win Group 691 1872 0
Korea Republic Semifinalist 1 131 0
Mexico Eliminated 570 543 0
Mexico Win Group 105 696 0
Sweden Advance 1296 1750 0
Sweden Finalist 58 2300 0
Sweden Quarterfinalist 469 3158 0
Sweden Win Group 351 2600 0
Belgium Eliminated 126 933 0
Belgium Not Win Group 690 800 0
Belgium Semifinalist 415 163 0
England Champion 156 2656 0
England Finalist 265 2012 0
England Quarterfinalist 298 227 0
England Semifinalist 322 989 0
England Win Group 158 208 0
Panama Advance 279 2660 0
Japan Advance 2020 5050 0
Japan Finalist 1 100 0
Japan Quarterfinalist 746 9809 0
Japan Semifinalist 157 6208 0
Japan Win Group 820 6150 0
Poland Eliminated 571 800 0
Poland Not Win Group 1264 596 0
Senegal Eliminated 2410 1854 0
Senegal Not Win Group 900 150 0

   

World Cup Scouting: David Silva

The first marquee match of the 2018 World Cup is Spain against Portugal. The match had enough drama to stand on its own merits, one of the favorites to win the tournament playing against the current champions of Europe, and that was before a chaotic 48 hour whirlwind laid waste to Spain’s camp. In the space of two days Spain’s manager Julen Lopetegui was hired to manage Real Madrid, announced the news suddenly before it leaked, and then was fired over how it all went down. The chaos stands in stark contrast to what has been a very stable Spain team over the last two years. Lopetegui built his team around Spanish midfielders, and in particular made a seemingly curious but successful decision to play David Silva on the right wing. Silva’s role seems strange at first, but break down his season and it begins to make sense.

Silva at Manchester City

The idea of the “free eight” is a new one. It’s basically a midfielder with the traditional playmaking duties and positional freedom of the classic ten, but one who takes up a slightly deeper midfield position. David Silva occupies that roll to a tee for Manchester City. He’s a defensive pressure machine on the left side of the midfield. He also routinely feeds balls into the attacking penalty area. He and Kevin de Bruyne excelled at getting the ball in space, turning and sliding players into the attacking Penalty area. Of Premier League players with over 900 minutes, Silva was fifth with 2.99 open play passes into the penalty area per game. Only Alexis Sanchez (of the Arsenal variety), De Bruyne, Philippe “no longer appearing in this league” Coutinho, and Mesut Ozil had more. It’s clear just how much City relied on the passing of their midfielders. That’s not at all surprising. This is what Pep Guardiola teams do. They get great passers into dangerous areas and then use them to spring goal scorers for great chances. In that manner Silva and De Bruyne look very similar. But, looking at them from a different angle, the midfielders differ to a large degree along another important axis. Silva also has this annoying (for opposing defenses anyway) habit of getting into the penalty area. He takes 8.70 touches in the box per 90 minutes, that’s way more than De Bruyne’s 3.02. It’s much closer to winger Leroy Sane’s 9.38, or even winger and also kind of forward Raheem Sterling’s 12.33 than De Bruyne. The combination of playing a lot passes into the box and also getting a lot of touches in the box is a rare one. Usually high numbers of touches in the box are the provenance of out and out strikers. Guys like Sergio Aguero, Harry Kane and Alexander Lacazette led the league this season along with Mohammed Salah who while not a pure striker was mostly a god, so he gets included. They were the only four players to get over 15 touches a game. But, when you narrow down the list to looking at players who both create and get into the box something interesting happens. There were only four Premier League players last season who had both more than two open play passes per 90 into the penalty box and more than eight touches in the penalty area. Silva, Sanchez, Sadio Mane, and Eden Hazard. In that company David Silva looks less like a midfielder and more like a winger who has been crammed into the midfield. There are important differences, of course. Silva is a much less prolific shooter than the other guys. He shot only 2.09 times per 90 minutes, even Hazard, who is the second least shot happy of the group shot it 2.50 times. And all these other wingers seem to spend lots of time in the box because they dribble the ball there. Silva seems to show up by magic. He only completed 0.66 dribbles per 90, the rest of them were all over 1.5 with Sanchez the highest at 3.25.

Silva for Spain

The fact that the numbers paint him like a weird little magical winger for Manchester City help to better explain his role for Spain. Spain grows creative midfielders. I assume that somewhere next to the riojo vines the slick passing midfielders grow until they are harvested aged for 16-18 years and then released on the world. Even before looking at the players in Spain’s squad, just look at the set of midfielders that didn’t make the cut. Juan Mata, Cesc Fabregas, and Asier Illaramendi, for example, would all get into the squad for about 28 of the 32 teams in the tournament at minimum. Spain didn’t bother because they’ve got Silva, Andres Iniesta, Thiago, Isco, Koke and Saul (to say nothing of Sergio Busquets backstopping them). How exactly to cram all those players onto the field at once is an interesting problem. If all you did was take a quick glance at Silva’s topline numbers it wouldn’t suggest that he was the best candidate to get bumped out to the wing. Isco shoots more and spends at least part of his time at Real Madrid in that role, Iniesta has played there more over the course of his career, and with Silva being so good as a free eight, why move him? The answer is that part of what made Silva so good as a free eight was his ability to basically play as a stealth third winger. And, as it turns out, when he took on the role for Spain, in the absence of the kind of high quality goal scoring he was surrounded by at Manchester City, he stepped up that part of his game as well. Silva scored five goals over Spain’s qualifying campaign, leading the team. The way Silva interpreted his free eight role translated perfectly to the right wing. He gets to do most of the same stuff, but also be a more aggressive scorer. That’s not to say that playing him there is necessarily Spain’s best option. Whenever a team has so many similar players to fiddle around with there are bound to be multiple solutions and an abundance of ways to align the pieces. It's just that, despite appearances, Silva’s Premier League numbers suggest that he was incredibly well equipped to play on the wing, and UEFA qualifying bore that out. If Spain beat Portugal (or if they don’t but advance anyway) and make a deep run in the tournament it will be in part due to Silva’s goal scoring contributions. He carried the load in qualifying and he’ll need to do it again during the tournament. It might seem odd, but given how the team has decided to play it’s worked. If they remain stable on the field despite the chaos around them they'll be one of the few teams that could walk away World Cup champions.   (Header Image Courtesy of Press Association)

The Lost Boy

Remember Bojan? That’s an unfair question to ask of a 27 year old, whose life remains largely ahead of him. It is, however, a question the football world has asked about Bojan Krkíc since he was a teenager. This is a world that has always been uncomfortable with his present, preferring to talk of his past and what — if anything — his future could entail. In 2011 and in an apparent bout of masochism, Brian Phillips waded through a 200-page forum thread about Bojan. “It opened at around the time of his debut, with a lot of bold predictions about how he’d be the best player in the world,” he wrote. “By 2010, it had largely devolved into an argument about whether he should be sold or sent out on loan.” He was The Future, then that future was from the past, leaving the question of what his revised future might be. All of this and he had yet to turn 21. A few words, then, about Bojan’s present. He is coming off a season on loan at Alavés, his sixth club in seven years, where he scored one goal in a cup match. He is nominally a Stoke City player, but is unlikely to remain there. He is also opening up about struggles with anxiety. “I was called up for Spain against France, my international debut, and it was said that I had gastroenteritis when I had an anxiety attack,” he recently told Sid Lowe. “But no one wants to talk about that. Football’s not interested.” There is an obvious temptation to use what we now know about Bojan’s emotional state to explain the entirety of his peripatetic career. In its tidiness, such a narrative invites us to misunderstand anxiety. Anxiety is messy. It burrows its way into your consciousness and eats away at your ability to contextualize events and feelings. In so doing, it reshapes each life in a different way, and the way it transformed Bojan’s life and career — beyond the fact that it did — cannot be diagnosed from a distance. That most things in one’s life can be interpreted through the prism of mental illness says more about its totalizing effect than causal mechanisms. Every story is a mental illness story when you’re unwell. This is a story about Bojan Krkíc, mental illness, and football. Maybe, but not necessarily, in that order. No solutions are on offer, because this is a story about a question nobody can answer: What happens when a player doesn’t know what to do with himself and football offers no answers? /// Consider the career of Bojan Krkíc. Consider the 900-plus goals he reportedly scored at the youth level with Barcelona, not because it’s of tremendous statistical significance, but because keeping that number in the back of your head puts you in the correct mental space for this story. Consider his first two seasons at Barcelona, where he scored 12 and 10 goals at the pace of one every 180 minutes, before turning 19. This, combined with the context in which some of the goals were scored, was enough to make the case for starlet status. It’s at this point in the historical record that shot data becomes more readily available and the Bojan story gets messier. He averaged 2.84 shots per 90 minutes in 2009-10 and just over 3 in 2010-11, scoring 12 and 7 goals in those seasons. Those would prove to be the rare seasons where Bojan took the bulk of his shots inside the box. Consider a player, now almost 21, for who an average 90 minutes looks something like 2.9 shots and 0.5 goals. Factor in his pedigree, his 900-plus youth goals. What is he, a forward with unremarkable shot totals or an attacking midfielder without the assists or key passes? What do you do with that player? You make him someone else’s problem, obviously. Consider Bojan’s trajectory from Roma to Milan to Ajax to Stoke — a collection of impressive European teams (and Stoke) that aren’t Barcelona. Slowly moving down the continent’s footballing tiers can attenuate the incongruities in a player’s game. But with the transfer market only opening twice a year and the hope attached to a wunderkind’s name taking a long time to fade, it can take years — the heart of a career, really — for a player to find their level. This process is rendered all the more inefficient by clubs seeking out buyers who will recoup their costs even if they can’t fix the player. Consider, then, that Bojan has been the same strange player at just about every stop on his journey through European football. A successful dribbler who completes a high percentage of passes, he offers insufficient penetration for an attacking midfielder and not enough goals for a forward. Playing against lesser competition is not a guaranteed solution to the contradictions in a tweener’s game. At Roma, Bojan pulled off a rare good season for key passes (3.08 per 90 minutes). He was gone the next year, off to Milan and then Ajax, where a dearth of penetration — throughballs, assists, and goals — continued to be an issue. Per 90 minutes, he continued to take about three shots, most of them from outside the box, and complete about 2.5 dribbles while completing roughly 85 percent of his passes. Consider Stoke City under Mark Hughes, football’s island of misfit toys. This project served as a reminder that Bojan was hardly the only ballyhooed player left to languish by football’s upper echelons. Indeed, by 2016, Stoke was close to fielding a transfer rumour listicle from five years prior as its starting XI. All of which is not to say that Hughes had any real idea of what to do with Bojan. Fielded with other amorphous attackers, he exceed his expected goals in his two full seasons (4 goals and 2.6xG in 2014-15; 7 goals and 4.59xG the next year) while his already dubious production of shots and key passes per 90 minutes steadily declined. Consider, finally, Bojan’s recent loan spells at Mainz and Alaves. Even Stoke City has to offload its misfit toys somewhere. He did next to nothing at these clubs. He scored a goal at the former and none at the latter; he produced two expected goals in that period. At Alaves, where he spent all but one match of his 2017-18 season, Bojan’s shots and key passes per 90 minutes (1.03 and 0.41, respectively) fell further off a cliff, as did his minutes. Clubs, especially the ones taking loans from Stoke City, have bigger problems to solve than the Bojan enigma. The transfer and loan market is a mechanism for finding some players’ levels, but one can just as easily get lost that way. Consider all that we know about Bojan Krkíc. Do you know what to do with him? He’s clearly not the 900-plus-goal legend from Barcelona’s youth system, but he has some interesting skills as a dribbler and passer. It’s a weird combination of skills, mind you. Maybe it can still be made to work, but that’d require an unusual tactical system. How many clubs, though, would build a system around the skills of a player who is about to turn 28 and has never put it all together? It seems increasingly plausible that Bojan will spend a decade-plus in football playing for the biggest clubs without anyone having a clue what to do with him. /// Football in the 2000s has cultivated the reputation of a field that relentlessly optimizes its participants. Proof of this doesn’t just come in the form of your Cristiano Ronaldos and Paul Pogbas, Greek gods who deign to play football once or twice a week. Rather, middling players on middling teams are now absurdist phenotypes. Beyond their copious genetic gifts, footballers now have carefully planned diets and conditioning plans. For good measure, the language of statistical analysis has bolstered the belief that inefficiencies can be identified and ruthlessly crushed. There are no schlubs anymore. This self-image exists in the half-space between truth and fiction. It is true that players keep getting stronger and faster. They seemingly recover from calamitous injuries at physiologically improbable speeds. But football’s imagination and capacity for optimization is not limitless. It has simply become better at wringing a little bit more out of the same types it has always trafficked in: powerful, monomaniacal athletes. The sport is not wholly indifferent to psychology; the mental aspects of penalties, for instance, have been endlessly rehearsed. Football in 2018 can make your Harry Maguires more Harry Maguirey and your Mauro Icardis Mauro Icardier. But the further one strays from a footballing archetype, the less football knows what to do with you. Football is less imaginative than it believes itself to be. Case in point: Bojan Krkíc. There’s an obvious precedent for such a player, and Bojan followed Messi out of La Masia, but the undersized, positionally ambiguous attacker remains a difficult type. The likes of Diego Buonanotte and Juan Iturbe ran into similar walls. Football wants more players like Messi but may not have a clear idea how to turn these small attackers who look promising as teens into successful adults. One team pulling it off with one generational talent does not make for an obvious path to professional success. Add something like anxiety into that equation. Being less anguished, one imagines, would have improved Bojan’s play in some way. But maybe not by much. Maybe not in any meaningful sense. There is no direct trade-off between the number of panic attacks one suffers and the number of throughballs one can thread. Maybe if football had done a better by Bojan, he’d have still been the same, strange player, but happier. That sounds like a worthwhile outcome. But this is where the calculus of treating anxiety diverges from a broken leg. At some point, making the most of a person’s potentiality shifts from being explicitly about football into the squishier territory of self-actualization. That, it appears, is where football ceases to care. The strangest part of the Bojan Krkíc story is how profoundly normal the whole thing remains. He is not, for all the ink that has been spilled here and elsewhere, a particularly unusual type: skilled in some ways; lacking in others; anxious about how it all fits together. That’s a lot of us. As stories about footballers struggling with anxiety and depression trickle out, it’s becoming clear that’s a lot of them, too. To the institution of football, however, this remains largely foreign — a reminder football’s closer to the 1990s, when replacing binge drinking with broccoli was radical, than the endlessly optimized future we hear so much about.   (Header image courtesy of the Press Association)

Hear Ye, Hear Ye, the Squid Hath Returned!

Howdy! After a four-year break, I'm returning to Statsbomb to track some of the notable predictions from luminaries such as Opta, Goldman Sachs, and a player to be named later. Four years ago Goldman did... poorly: https://statsbomb.com/2014/06/goldman-sachs-and-the-world-cup/ They dropped 29.77% of their bankroll. Oops! This time around I've cut their bankroll to $10,000 (with an open credit line), because losing large sums of money should be punished. (I'll excuse the snorts of laughter from those of you who know how it really works). The methodology here is the Kelly Criterion. Quite simply, these are the bets you would make to maximize your bankroll growth if you believed the numbers you published. Our good friends at Goldman Sachs have returned with more futbol proclamations. Some notable points:

  1. It's unclear that they are aware of where the World Cup is taking place. I'm as shocked as they are that Russia will be hosting, but let's take that into account with our projections, eh? They have Saudi Arabia as more likely to advance then Russia despite Russia being more than a goal favorite head-to-head.
  2. Betting on Spain, Argentina, France, Brazil, and Germany to be eliminated in the Group stage suggests they don't quite have a handle on just how good the elite teams are.
  3. Betting on England to not get out of the group stage is just good sense.
  4. I'm personally rooting for Japan, so let's hope Goldman wins that one
Team Advance Y/N Risked To Win Result
Uruguay Eliminated 809 3438 0
Russia Eliminated 5092 10948 0
Egypt Eliminated 1056 660 0
Saudi Arabia Advance 2903 24676 0
Spain Eliminated 1156 10543 0
Portugal Pass 0 0 0
Morocco Pass 0 0 0
Iran Advance 2463 14778 0
France Eliminated 956 8604 0
Denmark Eliminated 278 320 0
Peru Pass 0 0 0
Australia Advance 3864 17388 0
Argentina Eliminated 1151 5467 0
Croatia Eliminated 3342 6016 0
Iceland Advance 2918 9980 0
Nigeria Eliminated 3109 1026 0
Brazil Eliminated 490 5645 0
Switzerland Pass 0 0 0
Serbia Pass 0 0 0
Costa Rica Advance 2153 8913 0
Germany Eliminated 1044 9281 0
Mexico Eliminated 297 288 0
Sweden Advance 583 787 0
Korea Republic Advance 223 997 0
Belgium Eliminated 1091 8084 0
England Eliminated 1380 7176 0
Tunisia Advance 1799 8096 0
Panama Advance 443 4386 0
Colombia Advance 839 336 0
Poland Advance 1621 977 0
Senegal Eliminated 4154 3147 0
Japan Advance 928 2320 0

As for their championship futures:

Team Champ Risked To Win Result
Portugal Yes 558 13236 0
Belgium Yes 35 410 0
England Yes 238 4048 0
Colombia Yes 171 8294 0
Poland Yes 108 8646 0
Mexico Yes 126 16695 0
Denmark Yes 110 13475 0
Sweden Yes 91 22767 0
Iran Yes 61 32056 0
Peru Yes 1 126 0
Australia Yes 35 14011 0
Iceland Yes 17 5143 0
Costa Rica Yes 25 10063 0
Tunisia Yes 36 26118 0
Saudi Arabia Yes 26 18863 0
Japan Yes 21 11036 0

Best of luck to our friendly Vampire Squid.   (Header Photo Courtesy of the Press Association)

World Cup Scouting: Sadio Mané

Reaching their first World Cup since the famous quarter final run of 2002, Senegal have produced probably their strongest squad for some time this summer.  Napoli’s Kalidou Koulibaly offers a blend of physical presence and technical guile at central defence. Idrissa Gueye of Everton brings boundless energy in midfield. Higher up the pitch, Monaco’s Keita Baldeis a dangerous dribbling threat matched with strong expected goal and assist numbers, while Ismaïla Sarr at Rennes is an exciting young talent out wide. But with all due respect to those players, if there is a star of this show, it is, of course, Liverpool’s Sadio Mané.  

Mané’s Early Club Career

After getting his first senior football at a Metz side then still in Ligue 2 in France, Mané made the move to Roger Schmidt’s Red Bull Salzburg in 2012. If you know anything about Roger Schmidt, it’s probably that he favours a very fast, very attacking form of counter-pressing, and this suited Mané down to the ground. In Salzburg’s title winning 2013-14 season, Mané generated an excellent 0.89 non-penalty goals and assists per 90 minutes. He nominally played on the left of a 4-4-2 but had licence to cause problems in the box in Schmidt’s hectic system. His excellent form earned him a move to Southampton the following summer, as part of their rebuild as Ronald Koeman replaced Mauricio Pochettino and a number of long serving players were sold on for profit. While Mané had the perfect coach for him at Salzburg in Schmidt and his high pressing game, Ronald Koeman’s tenure at St Mary’s Stadium was somewhat less ideal. Koeman prefers a more conventional defensive structure,, which meant asking Mané to drop back into a conservative shape out of possession rather than aiming to win the ball back high up the pitch. Meanwhile, the Dutchman’s attacking style was heavily focused on crossing. His Southampton side generated more key passes from crosses than any other team in the Premier League, despite only having the seventh most key passes in total. This poor stylistic fit, along with Koeman’s penchant for switching between different formations, denying Mané a familiar role, constrained the Senegalese international somewhat. Still, he managed to put up a respectable 0.58 expected goals and assists per 90 in the 2015/16 season and followed the well worn path from Southampton to Liverpool.  

Mané at Liverpool

Mané was the ideal signing for Liverpool. When he took over the previous October Jürgen Klopp inherited a side with some great pressers (Roberto Firmino, Adam Lallana) and excellent creative passing (Philippe Coutinho), but little in the way of genuine speed. Playing on the right of a 4-3-3 system, Mané offered a threat of pace in behind the defensive line that had previously been lacking. With Coutinho on the left preferring to cut inside as a playmaker, and Firmino playing as a false nine rather than someone on the last shoulder of the defence, Mané had a clear role as the out ball, generally starting in a narrow position on the right and using his acceleration to beat defenders. His position is pretty clear when watching a highlight reel from his 2016/17 season. He starts on the right of a front three, even if Liverpool’s fluid and narrow system led to him ending up in a more central area. Mané’s expected goals and assists were not dramatically different in 16/17 from his time at Southampton (0.56 per 90, versus 0.58 in 15/16, per Understat), but much of his value came more in the direct option he gave for Klopp’s transition play. His xGChain in that season was the highest of any Liverpool player, implying a level of reliance. And indeed, when Mané was unavailable for stretches of the second half of the season, either through AFCON duty or injuries, Liverpool’s system looked less threatening. Playing either a less dynamic player on the right or an altered diamond system without wingers, Liverpool were forced to play predominantly in front of the opposition defensive line, with less of an option to counter with speed. This reliance on Mané was clearly noted by the club and as such they opted to purchase an additional pacey winger in some Egyptian bloke called Mohamed Salah. You may have heard about him recently. Salah’s obvious qualities made him a guaranteed starter this season, and his abilities to cut inside on his stronger left foot necessitated starting him on the right. This has required Mané to move over to the left, as can be seen clearly in StatsBomb’s pass maps. Similarly, when looking at a heatmap of his defensive activity, we can see that his pressing work is now overwhelmingly focused on the left flank. While this hasn’t affected Mané’s own performance too much, it has made him feel somewhat less important to the Liverpool team. Mané’s opposite winger was previously Coutinho, who complemented his skill set. Now, he now has Salah looking to do many of the same things he aims to do.  Add in Andy Robertson overlapping him from left back and providing another outlet and before the sale of Philippe Coutinho in January there was a genuine case that Liverpool’s best side had Mané on the bench. Fortunately for the Senegalese, however, Coutinho was sold, and this led to Mané taking on more playmaking responsibilities. His 2.40 open play passes into the box per 90 is the highest of Liverpool players still at the club (small sample sizes excluded), as seen in the graphic below, showing his value in progressing the ball into dangerous areas. This is probably the most underrated aspect of Mané’s game, with his performances for Liverpool showing excellent link-up play with fellow forwards Salah and Firmino.  

Mané for Senegal

If Mané was at risk of being undervalued at club level this season, Senegal’s system doesn’t pose that problem. Senegal are nominally playing him as the number ten in a straightforward 4-2-3-1 system. Being more of a direct threat than a playmaker in the Mesut Ozil mould, Mané tends to interpret the position by often moving right alongside the striker to make the team look more like a 4-4-2 at times. This has the consequence of making Senegal look flat and limited in terms of passing options, with some of their brightest moments coming when Mané actually drops slightly deeper and is able to use his decent vision to pick out some of the fast outlets around him. In the warm up game against Croatia, Senegal were mostly on the back foot, with Croatia and their set of technical midfielders unsurprisingly dominating possession. This would be fine for Senegal if the side had been better able to keep a compact shape, but they were consistently unsure about whether to have Mané and the other forwards press high or to drop into a deep defensive block. This is obviously something that will have to be improved upon if they want to surprise anybody at the World Cup. In terms of their attacking options, Mané’s role may be the most important question. As previously mentioned, his creative passing is stronger than it is often given credit for, and could be especially useful in this Senegal side. The team has a lot of pace and dribbling talent, with Ismaïla Sarr in particular causing problems on the right flank. If Mané is more explicitly the creative hub rather than his current role as both creator and scoring forward, this could give the side a more cohesive attack, rather than being too reliant on individual quality. A potential positive for Senegal is in the opposition. Both Poland and Colombia are top-heavy in terms of the talent distribution in their squads, while Japan usually play a possession game in tournaments. This could provide Senegal ample opportunities for the pace of their forward line in counter attacks, and Mané can be the key figure. Provided he is given enough of a defined role, Sadio Mané has the chance to really shine in Russia.   (Header image courtesy of the Press Association)

Using Pressure to Evaluate Centre Backs

Analysing centre backs is a subject likely to provoke either a shrug or a wistful smile from an analytics practitioner. To varying degrees, there are numbers and metrics aplenty for other positions but in public analytics at least, development has been limited and a genuine track record of successful application is yet to be found. If centre back analysis is the holy grail of public football analytics, then the search thus far has been more Monty Python than Indiana Jones.

One of the major issues with centre back analysis is that positioning isn't measured directly by on-ball event data and any casual football watcher can tell you that positioning is a huge part of the defensive art. Tracking data would be the ideal means to assess positioning but it comes at a high-cost both computationally and technically, while having a much smaller coverage in terms of leagues than simpler event data provision.

StatsBomb's new pressure event data serves as a bridge between the traditional on-ball event data and the detailed information provided by tracking data, offering a new prism to investigate the style and effectiveness of centre backs. While it won’t provide information on what a defender is up to when he is not in the immediate vicinity of the ball, it does provide extra information on how they go about their task.

Starting at the basic counting level, centre backs averaged six pressure actions per ninety minutes in the Premier League last season. Tackles and interceptions clock in at 0.8 and 1.3 per 90 respectively, which immediately illustrates that pressure provides a great deal more information to chew on when analysing more ‘proactive’ defending. I’m classing clearances and blocking shots as ‘reactive’ given they mostly take place in the penalty area and are more-directly driven by the opponent, while aerial duels are a slightly different aspect of defending that I’m going to ignore for the purposes of this analysis.

The figure below maps out where these defensive actions occur on the pitch and is split between left and right centre backs. Pressure actions typically occur in wider areas in the immediate vicinity of the penalty area, with another peak in pressure just inside the top corner of the 18-yard box. This suggests that centre backs don’t engage too high up the pitch in terms of pressure and are generally moving out towards the flanks to engage opponents in a dangerous position and either slow-down an attack, cut down an attackers options or directly contest possession.

Maps illustrating the location of pressure actions, interceptions and tackles by centre backs in the 2017/18 EPL season. Top row is for left-sided centre backs and the bottom row is for right-sided centre backs.

The location of pressure actions is somewhat similar to the picture for interceptions, although the shape of the latter is less well-defined and tends to extend higher up the pitch. Tackles peak in the same zone just outside the top corners of the penalty area but are also less spatially distinct. Tackles also peak next to the edge of the pitch, a feature that is less distinct in the pressure and interception maps.

Partners in Crime

The number of pressure actions a centre back accumulates during a match will be driven by their own personal inclinations and role within the team, as well as the peculiarities of a given match and season e.g. the tactics of their own team and the opposition or the number of dangerous opportunities their opponent creates. The figure below explores this by plotting each individual centre back’s pressure actions per ninety minutes against their team name. The team axis is sorted by the average number of pressure actions the centre backs on each team make over the season.

Pressure actions per 90 minutes by centre backs in the 2017/18 EPL season (minimum 900 minutes played) by team. Team axis is sorted by the weighted average number of pressure actions the centre backs on each team make over the season.

At the top end of the scale, we see Arsenal and Chelsea, two teams that regularly played a back-three over the past season. Nacho Monreal and César Azpilicueta led the league in pressure actions per ninety minutes by a fair distance and it appears the additional cover provided by playing in a back-three and their natural instincts developed as full backs meant they were frequently putting their opponents under pressure. Manchester United top the list in terms of those predominantly playing with two centre backs, with all of their centre backs applying pressure at similar rates.

At the other end of the scale, Brighton and Leicester’s centre backs appear to favour staying at home in general. Both though are clear examples of there being an obvious split between the number of pressure actions by the primary centre backs on a team, with one being more aggressive while the other presumably holds their position and plays a covering role. This division of roles is perhaps most clearly demonstrated by Chelsea’s centre backs, with Azpilicueta and Antonio Rüdiger as the side centre backs being more proactive than their counter-part in the central defensive slot (Cahill or Christensen).

Liverpool’s improved defensive performance over the course of the season has been attributed to a range of factors, with the signing of Virgil Van Dijk for a world-record fee garnering much of the credit. Intriguingly, his addition to the Liverpool backline has seemingly offered a significant contrast to the club’s incumbents, who all favoured a slightly greater than average number of pressure actions. Furthermore, Van Dijk ranked towards the bottom of the list in terms of pressure actions for Southampton (4.5 per 90) as well, with his figure for Liverpool (3.7 per 90) representing a small absolute decline. As an aside, Van Dijk brings a lot to the table in terms of heading skills, where he ranks highly for both total and successful aerial duels, so he is still an active presence in this aspect, while being a low-event player in others.

Centre backs are often referred to as a partnership and the above illustrates how defensive units often setup to complement each others skill sets and attempt to become greater than the sum of their parts.

The Thompson Triangle

Mark Thompson has led the way in terms of public analytics work on centre backs and has advocated for stylistic-driven evaluations as the primary means of analysis, which can then be built on with more traditional scouting. Pressure actions add another string to this particular bow and the figure below contrasts the three proactive defensive actions discussed earlier. Players in different segments of the triangle are biased towards certain actions, with those in the corners being more strongly inclined towards one action over the other two.

Comparison of player tendencies in terms of 'proactive' defensive actions in the 2017/18 EPL season (minimum 900 minutes played). Apologies for triggering any flashbacks to chemistry classes. Click figure to open in new window.

There is a lot to pour over in the figure, so I’ll focus on defenders who are most inclined towards pressure actions. One clear theme is that such centre backs frequently featured on the sides of a back-three. Ryan Shawcross is unusual in this aspect given he was generally the middle centre back in Stoke’s back-three, as well as the right centre back in a back four. Ciaran Clark at Newcastle and Kevin Long at Burnley are the only players who featured mostly as one of two centre backs, with their partner adopting a more reserved role.

The additional cover provided by a back-three system and the frequent requirement for the player on the flanks to pull wide and cover in behind their wing-back seemingly plays a large part in determining the profile of centre backs. This illustrates the importance of considering team setup in determining a defenders profile and should feed into any recruitment process alongside their individual inclinations.

The analysis presented provides descriptive metrics and illustrations of the roles played by centre backs and is very much a first look at this new data. While we can't gain definitive information on positioning without constant tracking of a player, the pressure event data provides a new lens to evaluate centre backs and significantly increases the number of defensive actions that can be evaluated further. Armed with such information, these profiles can be built upon with further data-driven analysis and combined with video and in-person scouting to build a well-rounded profile on the potential fit of a player.

Now all we need is a shrubbery.

The World Cup Hates Analytics (And That's Awesome)

It’s the most wonderful time of the (every fourth) year. It’s World Cup season folks. The footballing extravaganza that needs no introduction. Every four years die-hard fans and casuals alike join together to scream their heads off and root for teams they can barely find on a map and players who they claim they’d take a bullet for despite still not knowing quite how to pronounce their name. It’s great. That same specialness also makes the World Cup incredibly challenging for analytics. Most good analysis basically boils down to problem solving. How can we use the tools at our disposal to answer questions? What happens when we hit roadblocks along the way? How can we work around those? Can we use the tools we have? Can we build new tools? Is there a way to create shortcuts to a reasonable answer while also putting in the work to establish best practices for later? What new, unrelated questions arise that we will also have to work on answering? International football raises a whole host of problems to be solved that the club game simply doesn’t have. There are so few games, spread out over such a long time horizon that accurately gathering and applying specific information is next to impossible. By the time international teams have played enough games to say anything definitive about them, the players on the field have changed completely.  

France: A Model of Changing Consistency 

France is a good example of this. They seem like a team that has been relatively stable over the last World Cup cycle. Their manager has remained consistent. Didier Deschamps, for better or worse, has managed the squad for going on six years now. Their results have largely been good and getting better. After a promising group stage at the 2014 World Cup they lost in the quarterfinals to Germany. They followed that up by reaching the finals of the 2016 Euros at home. Now, they’re one of the favorites in Russia. Bookies place them only behind Brazil, Germany and Spain. France’s progress seems extremely tortoise like, taking slow, steady steps up the international ladder. Then you look at their lineups. This is how France lined up in their last game in the 2014 World Cup, their last game of the Euros, and a projected opening lineup for this World Cup. There’s a lot of change there. Of the starting 11, only Paul Pogba, Antoine Griezmann and Hugo Lloris are constants. It’s also possible to make the argument Blaise Matuidi will start this time around, but at the same time the only reason Griezmann started in 2014 was that Franck Ribery was hurt in the run-up to the Cup. Additionally none of the three subs who appeared in the final two years ago are on this squad. A full three quarters of the back line has changed. Samuel Umtiti is the only holdover. Four starters from two years ago, Bacaray Sagna, Patrice Evra, Moussa Sissoko and Dmitri Payet aren’t even on the squad. That’s not unreasonable. Sagna and Evra were old, even in 2016. Sissoko wasn’t very good then, and he’s still not very good now, and Payet is hurt or he certainly would have been in Russia. But it’s still a lot of turnover. Looking at it from a squad wide standpoint, only ten players played both in 2016 and made the current squad. Only five players were members of the 23 man squad in 2014, 2016 and 2018. This isn’t an issue limited to France either. Germany has only twelve holdovers from their squad two years ago. Eight players, so roughly a third of the team, have played in all three tournaments. Spain, the paragon of consistency over the years has only ten players in their squad from two years ago and nine that played in all three tournaments. This is just kind of how the international game works. This shouldn’t be surprising of course, football is a game that’s constantly in motion. Four years ago Liverpool were coming off a miracle second place season and contemplating life without their megastar Luis Suarez. This year they reached the Champions League final without Suarez, and the three other biggest attacking forces from the 2013/14 team, Raheem Sterling, Philippe Coutinho, and Daniel Sturridge. Things change fast.  

So Few Games, So Much Time

In the club game there are plenty of games to analyze. Things might always be changing, but games are also always being played. It’s just harder in international competition. There are only so many important matches to consider. Qualifying matches are often against extremely weak opposition. How much information does beating San Marino by six goals instead of eight really tell us? Especially when the players who play in those matches may, in fact, be drastically different than the ones who end up suiting up for a major tournament. How seriously should we consider the recent (and not so recent) records of teams when we look at how they’ll do this time around? The short answer is that it’s still useful. The longer answer is that measuring international team performance is something slightly different than measuring club team performance, and it’s important to understand the distinctions. Evaluating national teams, over years and years of performances is mostly about establishing what their baseline talent levels are. Nations, of course, can become more or less talented over the years, but usually those changes will be gradual. Using some form of ELO system (usually modified with some special bells and whistles) allows for a broad look at national team results that gives a pretty accurate view of their talent level. This has lots of advantages. Lots of player variation on squads comes down to injury. Players like Rafael Varane, Diego Costa or Mario Gomez were all regulars for their national set up while missing one of the last three major tournaments due to injury. While that might have changed how strong those respective teams were at those tournaments, it didn’t change the overall outlook for those nations going forward. Additionally, even in a player’s absence, a decent rating system understands that their likely replacement won’t be much worse. Dmitri Payet got hurt just before the World Cup, but Florian Thauvin is a similarly talented replacement. After 2014 Philipp Lahm retired. Somewhat miraculously, Germany hasn’t missed a beat as Johsua Kimmich has stepped right in. A team’s talent pool is larger than the 23 players it brings to any given tournament. Long term rating systems capture the talent level of the pool fairly well and create an accurate stable picture. The problem is that tournaments are snapshots, not long term averages. If Neymar isn’t at 100 percent this tournament it will matter a great deal for Brazil’s chances of walking away with the trophy. It won’t, and shouldn’t, matter very much for how good a team Brazil is going forward, but that will be cold comfort if they get eliminated in the quarterfinals. Neymar is a giant super star, so that dynamic is obvious. What’s less obvious is finding players who don’t stand out quite so clearly, but are similarly crucial to their team’s success. It’s simply very hard to tell, given the limited nature of international play, exactly which players are unreplaceable. During a league season even a five game sample can give a lot of relevant data as to what's changing on a team. By the time a team has played five games at the World Cup they'll be in the semifinals. Small sample sizes are an intractable problem. Analyzing the club game gives managers, pundits and fans the option of simply waiting for more data to come in. By the time you get more data in the international game the your infant will be heading off to kindergarten. ELO based systems are great, and they're perfect for providing a set of priors to base analysis of a major international tournament on. But, it’s important to do guess work from there, and subjectively try to separate the bounces of the ball from the real systemic issues quickly. Otherwise by the time the problem gets diagnosed the team will be on the plane home. The World Cup is an amazing tournament. Its resistance to precise analytics is part of the charm.   (Header image courtesy of the Press Association)

What If Your Club Lost All Its Players: The Sporting Lisbon Story

What if your club lost all its players and got almost nothing in return? Sporting CP in Portugal may be about to find out.

Thinking about hypothetical situations is fun. Everybody's had those conversations with friends at a bar. “What if Manchester City were never bought by Sheikh Mansour?”, you say before everyone goes on a rant about the prospect of a world where Stephen Ireland is still their number seven and Michael Johnson became one of England’s great captains. It's the same hypothetical people play on Football Manager, taking out all the players from an elite club to see what happens or starting a save with Barcelona using only players from La Masia. But, what if I told you this experiment is happening in real life?

Now, the story is happening in real life. In Portugal, Sporting CP will likely see a sizeable portion, if not their full-squad, resign this summer. Here's how it happened.

The Background

Bruno de Carvalho was elected president in 2013 and started a very positive period for Sporting. The club took steps to reduce the distance between them and the other two big teams in the country. Results improved, ticket sales improved, player sales had a large boost – 4 of the top 5 most expensive sales in club history occurred during this period – and the club's financial stability improved. As a result, investment increased – 4 of the top 5 most expensive arrivals in club history also occurred during this period – and, at least in large part, became smarter as well.

Carvalho's improvements also came with controversy. The man was quite confrontational. He didn't shy away from conflict in any shape or form, sparring  with the media or personalities connected to rival clubs (one particularly memorably incident involved West Ham's owners). And while the results improved under the new regime, the club continued to fall short of their ultimate goal of achieving their first league title since the 2001/2002 season.  The environment worsened and eventually became toxic. The confrontations turned inward, ultimately resulting in public criticism and threats of mass suspension of players in April.

Then things got even worse. After Sporting fell short of a Champions League spot and before the Cup final that they would end up losing, a large group of fans entered the club’s training ground and physically attacked the squad. There were some injuries, striker Bas Dost suffered cuts to his head, but beyond the physical impact, the mental toll of the event was undoubtedly enormous. With a large number of fans blaming the President for installing such a confrontational climate around the club and for the lack of defense measures that could’ve prevented the attack.

Regardless of how people feel about the club’s last few months, both on and off the pitch, the threat of a wave of resignations from the squad members became very real when the first few came to fruition last week. Rui Patricio, team captain and starting goalkeeper for the last 10 years, delivered a 34-page resignation letter in which he details the events that happened during the afternoon of the attack and the inadequate relationship that stood between the president and the players for the last few months.

The player chose to go forward with this move after a transfer to Wolves was supposedly denied through last minute demands. Following the captain, promising young forward Daniel Podence also delivered his letter of resignation – the 22-year-old works under the same agent which is what presumably facilitated the process. Both players resigned under ‘fair cause’, claiming a lack of safety in their work environment from both a mental and physical stand-point. And now the floodgates may be open. Other players might follow their lead, or, at the very least, demand the club sell them. The club’s biggest assets are all rumoured to be pushing for an exit in some capacity.

A Precarious Moment for Sporting and Portugal

First, it seems like the ideal situation for a lot of European clubs to take advantage of: players worth millions able to sign on a free for a fraction of what their price would have been six months ago will be music to the ears of teams from the top leagues. William Carvalho has attracted interest from Marco Silva’s Everton, while Arsenal are rumored to have already had an offer denied for Gelson Martins, which could tempt him to go the resignation route.

According to the press, there’s also the possible interest from Portugal’s other two big teams in Sporting players. That possibility is more dangerous for the health of the league. While getting a talented asset from a direct rival on a free will lead to a net positive result in the present, it won’t be beneficial in the long-term. It will help lower the competitive standard of the league in the long-term – a problem that is already very clear in this competition – and help prevent the currently benefiting team from getting to a higher level in the future. This isn't just one team selling to another where both teams benefit. Given the current situation, "selling" club doesn’t benefit from the player’s exit in any way – actual sales are a different story entirely. Having a high-quality Porto, Benfica and Sporting (and Braga now) is advantageous for all four of them.

From the Sporting’s perspective there’s a clear need for stability before everything else. There’s still a lot of players threatening to come forward if the President doesn’t step down, manager Jorge Jesus just left for Al Hilal and how well they deal with this back-room crisis, will reflect on how quickly they can start assessing the issues in the squad and preparing next season. Luckily for them, despite losing the Cup final and only coming third in the league, they’ll still go straight into the Europa League group stage, getting the chance to start the season much later.

In an ultimate hypothetical scenario where all the team’s major players leave with no financial benefits for the club, we’d likely see them give a much larger chunk of their minutes to younger players coming through from their academy, coupled with more minutes for players who were perhaps second options this season. The team would undoubtedly lose individual quality, but they’d still have enough in them to be in the league’s top three while developing some players who would otherwise not been given a chance. If well managed it could be a scenario that they bounce back from. If not, it could deepen a dark period in the history of the club’s football team.

The most likely scenario will not be that drastic, but it will still be fascinating to watch how the club deals with this situation and how each player manages their interests between working conditions and the prospect of playing more next season – particularly if they didn’t have that much involvement this campaign. It truly feels like a novel that gets a chapter added on a daily basis. Don’t be surprised if a day, a week, or a month from now this has continued to snow-ball in an even bigger issue. It's the kind of situation that's fascinating to consider as a hypothetical. If only this was all just a video-game experiment.

(Header image courtesy of the Press Association)

World Cup Scouting: Who Should England Play in Midfield?

The World Cup is upon us and there are some reasons for optimism about the England national team. The side made it through qualification without breaking a sweat, conceding only three goals across ten games, and contains some of the most exciting attackers in the Premier League. One significant area of concern, however is central midfield. Looking through the team, it's difficult to find anyone who naturally excels in the all-around central midfield role. Jordan Henderson and Eric Dier are most accustomed to playing at the base of a midfield. Dele Alli and Jesse Lingard are used to playing in more advanced roles closer to the forward line than the midfield. There’s Ruben Loftus-Cheek, a central midfielder by trade, but one who has only experienced one season of regular senior football, and it was on the left of a four man midfield. Then there’s Fabian Delph, a natural midfielder who has just had the season of his life at left back. The days of Paul Scholes, Steven Gerrard, and Frank Lampard are long gone. Dealing with this issue seems to be at the heart of manager Gareth Southgate’s formation switch. After sticking with a solid 4-2-3-1 throughout qualification, he has largely embraced a 3-5-2 system since then. This is not the 3-4-3 system Southgate experimented with at times in 2017, instead it's a formation which noticeably uses a midfield three. In the friendly against the Netherlands for example, Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain and Jesse Lingard (numbers 7 and 11 in the picture) were generally found level with each other, alternating at taking more advanced roles. Out of possession, the full backs generally moved into more defensive roles next to the centre-backs, leaving the three central midfielders to screen the back line. While in possession, one of the forwards (more often than not Raheem Sterling, number 10 in the image) will frequently drop into a deeper role, creating space for the two central midfielders to advance. This system demands a lot of energy from the central midfielders.  They need to move into more advanced roles assisting the attack while also returning to their roles in a quite a defensive shape without the ball. Plenty of athleticism will be required. And while the shape is clearly designed to mitigate the problem of a lack of creative passers in the England squad, any ability to help transition the ball forward will be of great use. As such, let’s take a look at the options:  

Ruben Loftus-Cheek

Perhaps surprise inclusion in the squad, Ruben Loftus-Cheek’s skillset is fairly wide-ranging and atypical of a central midfielder. Despite being a full six foot, three inches tall, Loftus-Cheek has a lot of mobility and was able to be an important transition player on the left of Crystal Palace’s 4-4-2 system this season. While nominally playing out wide, Roy Hodgson’s system was often so narrow that he ended up in positions more commonly associated with the central role he has played for Chelsea’s youth sides. In that role he turned into a surprisingly productive dribbler of the ball. While hitting 3.5 dribbles per 90 at age 22 is a strong but not exceptional figure (the research has long indicated that players peak early in terms of volume of dribbles), many players can be generally wasteful with this. Loftus-Cheek avoided that pitfall, consistently managing to recycle the ball well after dribbling, leading to good counter-attacking opportunities for Palace. The data gathered by StatsBomb's own Euan Dewar shows the Englishman as one of the more productive dribblers around, and this is evident from watching him.

  In an England squad desperately thin in terms of players able to progress the ball, he has the knack for it, albeit through running rather than passing. There are some concerns about his defensive work. While not an unwilling defender, he has spent the season in a more traditional deep block 4-4-2. StatsBomb’s data puts Palace as the second least aggressive counter pressers in the Premier League and this is down to Hodgson liking his side to return to a compact shape without the ball. Most of the England team is going to be made up of players from the aggressive pressers of Spurs, Liverpool and Man City, so Loftus-Cheek my well be a weak link when it comes to understanding when to pressure the opponents and when to sit back. Nonetheless, he does have some real tools that can help the side.  

Fabian Delph

After spending his career as a solid but unremarkable central midfielder for Aston Villa and then Manchester City, converting to left-back led to his emerge as a valuable cog in Pep Guardiola’s machine. At first glance. the decision to include him in the squad as a central midfielder then may seem poorly thought out, but it does make tactical sense. Ever the innovator with fullbacks, Guardiola generally instructed Delph to move inside to a central midfield role alongside Fernandinho in possession, with Kyle Walker at right back shuffling in alongside the centre-backs (John Stones and Nicolas Otamendi for the first half of the season, though he has shuffled the pack since) to form a back three behind them. Southgate is well aware of that structure, and, in fact, referenced it while explaining his decision to play Kyle Walker at centre-back, saying, “he ends up in that area anyway." It’s not a surprise to see the England manager interpret Delph’s role similarly. The familiarity of Delph, Stones, and Walker all playing roles in a defensive unit structured similarly to Manchester City’s could be of use when international football generally doesn’t allow players the time to form strong relationships on the pitch. What’s less exciting about Delph is what he does on the ball. At City he is fortunate enough to play alongside two of the best creative passers on the planet in Kevin De Bruyne and David Silva. Delph can keep his passing relatively simple and letting those two run the show (and with Guardiola’s strict positioning, there are always a number of options available). England would require him to be a more creative outlet, which is something he’s never been able to do to great effect. As such, he might be more suited to playing in the knockout stages, against higher quality sides who will look to dominate possession, when England will need to retain a strong defensive structure before using players like Sterling and Kane on the counter.  

Jesse Lingard

While he is not someone who might be seen as a central midfielder in, say, a 4-2-3-1, Southgate’s system does allow for players who function closer to what is now being described as a “free eight”, with the licence to play as something more akin to a number ten a lot of the time than a “true” midfielder. Lingard has played in a number of roles this season, but looked particularly dangerous playing as a free eight in Manchester United’s 3-1 victory away to Arsenal in December. The attribute Lingard probably excels at the most is pressing, with Will Gurpinar-Morgan’s research putting him as the best player in the Premier League at regaining possession via pressure, and second best at applying pressure generally. What’s interesting is how much he does this across the pitch rather than in any one specific area, as shown in this graphic: Pressing ability is usually thought of in terms of energy and work rate, qualities Lingard has in abundance. But what is also key is the intelligence to take up the right positions to pressure the opposition player on the ball, and this is what really makes him special. This excellent positional work is to be seen in an attacking sense as well, with his 0.39 expected goals per 90 minutes the best of the players on this list. A lot of Lingard’s goals this season have come from him managing to slip away from defenders to find space for a shot, even in a congested penalty area. Lingard’s off the ball work is outstanding, but his on the ball actions don’t quite reach the same heights. His 1.18 key passes per 90 is unimpressive when one considers he’s an attacking midfielder for a team as stocked with attacking talent as Manchester United. Juan Mata, Alexis Sanchez, Anthony Martial, Paul Pogba, and the shipped out Henrikh Mkhitaryan were all better chance creators for the same United team this season. When watching Lingard, he does sometimes have the frustrating tendency to favour the safer passing option, and his passing accuracy of 87.8% is more indicative of a limited range than anything else. It seems as though he’s most suited to high tempo, frantic games, while one imagines England’s first two fixtures against Tunisia and Panama will not fit that mould.  

Dele Alli

The most established player on this list and yet paradoxically the youngest. He’s coming off a season where his goal scoring work declined somewhat (0.30 expected goals per 90 compared to 0.43 the season before), but was balanced out with greater work in terms of chance creation and a strong all-around game. Alli hit almost identical xGChain in both years. He's a more than able presser, coming up not too far behind Lingard in Gurpinar-Morgan’s “possession regains via pressure” metric. Like Lingard, part of the reason for his good pressing work is in the intelligent positions he takes up, and that is one area where he measurably stands out. Looking at StatsBomb’s data for actions under pressure, Thom Lawrence showed that no player in the Premier League last season had a lower percentage of his passes made or received in the final third “under pressure”. The implied value in this is that Alli appears to be particularly adept at evading pressure from opposition players in the final third, being able to find areas of space even in an often congested zone of the pitch. This excellent appreciation of space is probably the thing that sums up Alli’s game the best. His passing is useful, but this comes less from superb technique than good tactical intelligence that helps him find teammates in space. Part of this is from a good understanding with the other Spurs players, and while this would typically be a negative for a player in an international side, that won't necessarily be the case give how many of his Tottenham teammates are in the England side. Harry Kane is likely to be the fulcrum of England’s attack, with boths Kieran Trippier and Danny Rose probably providing delivery from wide areas. Adding another important Spurs cog in Alli could help England to have a more coherent attack than many nations selecting players from a number of different clubs.  

Conclusion

With Southgate opting to start Lingard and Alli in Saturday’s friendly against Nigeria, it seems likely that these two are his preferred options in midfield. This is deserved on merit, with the two of them being the best performers of the options in the Premier League last season, but there are concerns over their fit. Both are active pressers who look to make intelligent runs off the ball and get into dangerous positions, and neither of them are associated with a lot of creative passing or dangerous dribbling through midfield. In this regard, there’s a serious case for playing Ruben Loftus-Cheek in the first two games, who has at least shown a penchant for dribbling forward through midfield and generating fast attacking chances for those in front of him. Conversely, against the better sides in the knockout stages, Fabian Delph has a strong argument for playing, having looked comfortable all season in a defensive unit with Kyle Walker and John Stones. As such, a fair amount of mixing and matching throughout the tournament could be the best approach.   (Header photo courtesy of the Press Association)