Month: January 2020

This May will mark seven years since Manchester United last won the Premier League title. And it is unlikely they will hold up the trophy anytime soon, either.

It’s a familiar story at this point. Upon Sir Alex Ferguson’s retirement in 2013, United made a whole host of bad decisions, blowing a fortune on the wrong players and having them coached by the wrong managers. Ole Gunnar Solskjær’s gang are just the latest iteration of how they continue to relieve the same ugly chapter.

Currently fifth in the table, the underlying numbers show a modest improvement, but nothing drastic. An expected goal difference per game of +0.55 is an entirely respectable fourth-best in the division, with a fairly supercharged Leicester season keeping them out of the Champions League places.

 

 

It’s on the defensive end where their real strength lies. United are a good shot suppressing side, with their 10.22 conceded per game the fourth-best in England’s top flight. They combine this with a solid xG per shot conceded of 0.10, the sixth-best in the league and better than the other top shot suppressors. United are not supremely talented at any one aspect of defending, but the strong performance across the board makes them a tough side for any opponent to break down.

 

 

This represents a genuine improvement—and a necessary one— as United no longer have their defensive cheat code. In many of the dark post-Ferguson years, David De Gea almost single-handedly kept his team afloat. His decline has been exaggerated by some, but it’s been a while since he’s performed many heroic feats. He’s looked a smidgen above average this season, and with the difficulty in finding long-term repeatability in xG overperformance, United probably shouldn’t bank on him saving them a significant number of goals going forward.

 

 

United's defensive solidity has come at the cost of the attack just kind of . . . being there. Their1.26 xG per game is almost exactly the league average. Both their shot volume and quality are fairly mediocre. It’s all very whatever.

 

 

The one area where they do clearly excel is in counter-attacking shots. This intuitively makes sense given what we see on the pitch. United’s primary attacking weapons are Marcus Rashford, Anthony Martial and Daniel James, while Jesse Lingard and Mason Greenwood have also stepped in this season. All primarily want to run into open space on the counter rather than build in possession in front of a deep block. A significant part of the side’s disappointing performances is that they don’t have obvious answers when denied the space to launch counter-attacks.

Perhaps surprisingly, Rashford is their primary creator in the final third. He leads the side in open play passes into the box per 90, well ahead of fellow attackers Martial and James, despite not being primarily thought of as a “passer”. That he’s added this to his game recently, in addition to his decent scoring and dribbling threat (as seen below), is impressive, especially given the underlying mediocrity of the team's attack. It’s so frustrating that he's now out injured, given he looks on the cusp of making the leap to being a genuine star.

 

 

Some might point out that Liverpool also have three attackers who primarily want to counter into open space, and they would be correct. Mohamed Salah, Sadio Mané and Roberto Firmino certainly thrive in counter opportunities much more so than when forced to break down a deep block. Jurgen Klopp’s side, though, have two critical advantages over United. The first is an expertly drilled counter-pressing situation aimed at forcing such opportunities rather than waiting for them to come naturally. The other is their use of the fullbacks as additional playmakers in wide areas, stretching the play and forcing opponents out of a narrow shape with their crossing threat. At right-back, United have Aaron Wan-Bissaka, a defender with a superb ability to shut down opposition wingers but real limitations in possession. He’s better at many things than his Liverpool counterpart Trent Alexander-Arnold, but there’s a humongous gap in quality on the ball when breaking down sides. On the other side, Luke Shaw isn’t incapable, but he lacks both the athleticism and technique that Andy Robertson possesses (Brandon Williams has shown some promise, but at this point nothing more than that). Solskjær’s side do not have the option of creating for their attackers through the fullbacks.

 

 

If creating for the attackers through the fullbacks is not a viable option, the work must come from the midfield. Let’s start with the elephant in the room. Paul Pogba has not played a lot of football for United this season and it seems possible that he won’t ever again do so. This would be a great shame, as Pogba is the only midfielder at the club with genuine vision and a consistent ability to move the ball forward into dangerous areas. In his brief appearances this year, mostly early in the season, he’s shown this, unlike everyone else at the club.

 

 

After Pogba, United’s player second in deep progressions per 90 is Fred. Yes, Fred is, in Pogba’s absence, the player most responsible for moving the ball into the final third for this team. Next is Ashley Young, but he's now at Inter Milan. It is obvious to pretty much everyone that these players are not the playmakers a club needs to compete at the highest level. This club just does not have playmakers in the side. There are many ways for a team to build well in possession and create opportunities, but no coach has yet devised a system that can consistently create dangerous chances without anyone who’s good on the ball.

This is, first and formost, a squad construction problem. At the very least, no one at the club seems to be under the illusion that this is a squad capable of challenging for major titles, or will be any time soon. After a number of big-name, high-price signings brought in under David Moyes, Louis van Gaal and José Mourinho, the club seem to have accepted that targeting mostly younger players who fit their desired style of football is a much more sustainable model. While none could be dubbed a huge success so far, the summer 2019 signings James, Wan-Bissaka and Harry Maguire have all broadly done what they were bought to do, and by this club’s recent standards that’s a big success. United do have a plan, and seem intent on sticking with it. That’s a marked change from 2013–18.

Having a plan is the first step, and it’s a big one. But the next step is having the expertise to execute it. United need to target and acquire the right younger players capable of high tempo attacking football. That their summer signings consisted of the highest-profile English centre-back, the most promising young right-back in last season’s Premier League not named Alexander-Arnold, and a young winger coached at the international level by Ryan Giggs does not suggest a great reservoir of knowledge lurking within their recruitment setup. The next challenge is to take these players and coach them into a proactive style that fits into the fast-paced, Ferguson-esque mould but who is capable of breaking down the many teams who will sit deep and allow United to keep possession. Solskjær has the aforementioned squad limitations to deal with, but even in their best performances, his side have played reactive, counter-attacking football all season. There has yet to be real evidence of a plan while in possession.

There are any number of talented people working in recruitment at football clubs who would jump at the chance to transform United's process. On the manager side, Mauricio Pochettino is currently sitting at home, while almost any manager not currently in an elite job would be interested in the challenge, prestige and salary delivered by Old Trafford. It’s not that Solskjær is doing a bad job, per se. It’s just that there’s no obvious reason to think he can build the side the club need to challenge for titles again. United are currently looking like a competent side, which seems like a miracle compared to recent years, but it’s still well short of what they need to get back to the top.

Stats of Interest

Sticking with Manchester United for a moment, it’s now been over a year since Jesse Lingard last scored a Premier League goal. Considering he did not previously have a reputation for poor finishing, this seems like a bad streak that should come to an end sooner or later.

 

 

Alisson became the first goalkeeper this season to earn an assist at the weekend, and on his first key pass of the campaign. But he’s not the most creative goalkeeper in the league. That honour falls to Nick Pope, with 4 key passes adding up to 0.55 xG assisted this season. We all knew Burnley were direct, but using the goalkeeper as an actual attacking weapon like this is quite something.

Moise Kean finally got off the mark for Everton last night. It’s been a tough start for him in England, made all the more frustrating by some poor finishing from reasonable production. The goal is overdue, but it may signal the moment when he really kicks on.

 

Thanks to a strong finish, RB Leipzig have secured Bundesliga’s imaginary autumnal championship called “Herbstmeisterschaft” in German and start the second half of the season as league leaders. What distinguishes the team? And where are its vulnerabilities?

The last five Bundesliga games ahead of the winter break largely serve as the foundation for this analysis. In these, Leipzig without fail played in a 4-4-2/4-2-2-2 formation which has once again become the customary formation of the team after an asymmetrical 3-5-2 had intermittently been used. 

Attacking organisation

On the whole, Leipzig show themselves, especially in games against visibly inferior teams, to be a dominant unit that has developed confidence in its qualities in possession. In that way, this differentiates this Leipzig team from the ones in previous seasons in which the possession game seemed less competent.

The first build-up phase, typically starting a few metres ahead of their own penalty box, is coined by a distinct calmness. The central defenders aim to establish this phase of the game with initial passes and thus prepare a move without hastily forcing an attacking passing lane. Instead, the first passes go toward one of the central midfielders or fullbacks without those passes carrying much consequence.

The most common move entails the ball being played to a full-back, who forwards it diagonally to a winger who has moved inside. From there, the ball is either laid off to a team-mate behind or around him or the player opens himself up into the open space. The fullbacks, though, differ from each other in terms of their play-style and positional characteristics quite severely. Lukas Klostermann, for one, is someone who wants to make forward runs early, while Nordi Mukiele hangs back much more often and thus receives more touches of the ball in the first build-up phase.

This is how Leipzig's initiating of play presents itself. The Pass Sonar underlines how the central players at the halfway line—most commonly the central defenders—rarely play vertical passes into the attack, rather shifting play toward the wings.

Furthermore, the two holding midfielders serve different functions. Konrad Laimer clearly is the more attacking-minded of the two central midfielders which expresses itself in his aggressive advancing up the pitch. Laimer works very well as a receiver for the aforementioned layoffs from one of the wingers—in this case the right winger. On the half-left side, though, Diego Demme hangs back further and so covers the space behind. Instead, it is Timo Werner who moves toward the left side and thus offers the left winger an option to forward passes to him. Thus, while Laimer is actively looking for tight spaces and high-pressure situations, Werner attempts to evade the tightness and to penetrate the opponent's defensive formation from the flank.

The Passing Network and Average Positions illustrate the diverging roles of players in the position groups. Klostermann is the full-back that advances higher. Laimer most often pushes forward a bit from the half-right space. Comparing the wingers, Nkunku typically chimes in more concretely in the No.10 space.

Occasionally, Demme will produce a different build-up structure by dropping between the centre backs and thus automatically pushing the fullbacks a bit more forward. When the wingers move inward more quickly accordingly, this opens a lane for Klostermann, for instance, who can use it to sprint and receive the ball at full speed.

As attacks develop into the final third of the pitch it becomes apparent how Leipzig use simple, but well-thought-out, positional play. The wingers usually move inward with the left winger adapting himself to the movements of Werner, who himself can also fall back into the half-space. The inward movement of the wingers and the advancing runs of the full-backs create a consistent staggering in terms of width, without it becoming too flat thanks to forward and backward movements within the lanes themselves.

This GIF shows the processes when Leipzig can advance into the opposing half without much resistance, which happened time and time again in the win over Düsseldorf, for example. 1) Werner presents himself in the half-space and does not evade toward the left flank due to limited space. 2) Sabitzer and Forsberg or Nkunku shape their runs toward the middle or into the points of intersections based on personal preferences and in adaptation to the strikers' movements.

On the whole, Leipzig create a strong presence at the points of intersections even against a back-five and thus occupy the entire back line. 3) Both full-backs use the open wings for runs and at times position themselves at the offside border, thus occupying their immediate opponents. Alternatively, one of the full-backs receives an uncontested pass. 4) The four-man block in behind is responsible for coverage and can transition into Gegenpressing in case of a loss of possession.

Defensive Transitioning

Typically, Leipzig are able to avoid being surprised by counters after losses of possession deep in the opponent's half. Often times, singular proactive movements from the defenders prove sufficient, with them looking to duel with the intended receiver of a long ball and thus pushing him off the track. In situations in which Leipzig give up the ball a short way ahead of the box and centrally, usually one or two players immediately behind will step in. On the right side that might be Laimer and Sabitzer who are in close proximity to the ball anyway. High pressure on the opponent is being applied especially ahead of the halfway line, so that there is little time for decisions and the new ball-carrier cannot even get into position for a long shifting pass.

Looking at them individually, some players behave differently in defensive transitioning. Laimer, for one, is an aggressive defender, whereas Demme is a man-orientated pursuit-player, mostly trying to eliminate his direct opponent as a receiving option. When losing possession at the halfway line, and thus in situations where only defenders will be behind the ball, the back-four typically moves back toward its own penalty box in orderly fashion and also moves closer together in an attempt to fend off potential crossing attempts in the middle and not to let potentially fatal holes develop by going into early duels.

Laimer's Defensive Activity over the entire season thus far shows how he behaves quite dominantly on his usual half-right position. The picture is slightly distorted because he played a number of matches on the right wing.

Defensive Organisation

Against the open build-up play of the opponent, so, when they build-up in an orderly fashion from the back, Leipzig often play in a 4-4-1-1/4-2-3-1 formation. The allocation of the two strikers at times will adapt to the opponent and may even vary within games slightly. The players have some liberties in these aspects. Interestingly, in the 4-4-1-1 it is not rare for the more physical Patrik Schick to be positioned as the temporary No.10 and stay in proximity of the opponent's central midfield. Werner is then being used further ahead as a runner who tries to push wide-standing centre backs toward the flanks and to guide passes that way as well. 

The flanks, though, are not being defended head-to-head. Especially in the 4-4-1-1, Leipzig's wingers are positioned more centrally in the midfield line and only move in on the opponent when he receives the ball, in order to prevent an uncontested diagonal pass forward. Leipzig's central midfielders, in turn, are typically man-orientated when an opposing player pushes forward through the centre in an attempt to present himself as a receiving option behind the halfway line.

Leipzig's pressing structure in the 4-4-1-1 distinguishes itself by the staggering between Werner and his striking partner as well as the adapted movements of the wingers who will orient themselves either to the full-back, a dropping holding midfielder or even one of the opposing centre backs.

Sporadically, Leipzig's defenders in the back line tend to pursue dropping movements from the wingers or central strikers, thus abandoning space at the offside border. This can take its toll, however, when another opponent runs into the space behind the defender for a layoff pass from a winger or central striker. Most of the time, the defenders will abort their pursuing runs in time, but a certain, albeit small, risk of danger remains.

Leipzig's defensive problems are, in fact, larger when the team moves back in a 4-4-1-1 or a 4-4-2 and tries to defend while using a low press. The statics of Leipzig's defensive formation are then a curse for the team, since it only rarely allows immediate access, instead turning into a passenger when the opponent turns to quick passing moves. Leipzig live off their strength in duels and intensity in proximity to the ball, but they can only develop when the team is in movement. Otherwise, they turn into a relatively simple man-orientated defensive team that is constantly a step too late and only rarely manages to block passing lanes, simply because it fails to disengage from its own man-orientation.

Over the last five matches, Leipzig failed to decisively disturb the opposing passing flow. This was especially true for the games against Hoffenheim and Dortmund. Still the team manages to defend opposing attacks in a way that no shot is actually fired off. Attempts on goal by the opponent mostly are a result from an attempt to play on the counter or from a very inviting position from open play when Leipzig's defence is ultimately beaten.

Building up with a back-three and full-backs that are positioned higher up the pitch seems like an effective means against Leipzig. The full-backs would push Leipzig's wingers back, while the numerical advantage in the first build-up line would allow for a secure passing and, situationally, for advances through the half-spaces. Rarely, Leipzig tinker with their pressing formation in a way that at least one of the wingers moves toward one of the opposing centre backs. 

Of course, someone like Emil Forsberg will occasionally make such a run, but usually, high-positioned opposing wing-players and dominance in the early build-up phase should make Leipzig turn to a retreat into passivity.

Offensive Transitioning

The aforementioned structure in pressing, with Schick as a hanging striker, has the major benefit of the Czech being able to immediately function as a pass receiver after winning the ball. Schick is the first target player who can, for example, lay the ball off for a sprinting Laimer. Laimer most often leads the first wave in advancing after winning possession, while the third ball will more often than not end up at the feet of the defenders who themselves move forward. Especially after third balls, the next pass usually is a medium-length ball toward the flanks where, for instance, Timo Werner or Christopher Nkunku will be located to move away from the contracted defence and receive the ball.

Set Pieces

Corners are not necessarily a Leipzig speciality. Defensively, the team again and again seems vulnerable, which is also down to the staggering. Most often, five players position themselves more or less behind one another at the edge of the six-yard box, with one of those five possibly taking on a man-marking task. Ahead of them, there are three more Leipzig players in a tight man-marking scheme, trying to defend against the opponents' runs. Since a number of players are positioned exactly on a line, the inner five-man block can be levered out, for instance with a short corner and a flick-on toward the far post—be that straight-away horizontally or diagonally from the corner of the six-yard box. The block remains static, after all, forming a density of defenders that is restricted in its reactivity. 

Example of Leipzig's staggering for a defensive corner…

…and how an opponent can beat Leipzig following a corner.

For attacking corners, three Leipzig players may, for example, position themselves centrally ahead of the six-yard box. Three more players stand further back at the penalty spot, with one of them often dropping back from there toward the short side of the penalty box. In other cases, five Leipzig players stand ahead of the penalty spot and run in a diversified manner and in timely accord to the corner's being taken toward the six-yard box. Here, Werner, as the player bringing up the rear in that block, will move away a bit and not make a direct run inside. Another player mimics a run toward the corner flag, however abandoning it when he's pursued. Schick, then again, occupies the six-yard box in this alignment and works as a nuisance for the goalkeeper as far as the rules will allow it.

For crosses from free-kicks in the half-spaces, four Leipzig players will occasionally position themselves in the opposite half-space and start their runs, almost classically, shortly ahead of the offside border. Three more players hang back a few metres and can free themselves for a short pass. Schick, in turn, will sometimes gain more of a head of steam from further back and thus enter the box with more dynamism as long as he is not running into an offside position before the free-kick is being taken in the first place.

Leipzig's major advantage is the pure physicality that Schick, as well as Yussuf Poulsen or Dayot Upamecano, brings to the table for corners. Even from static positions, when they are situated at the six-yard box, they can win aerial duels.

So how do Leipzig distinguish themselves?

• The team no longer lives off only their intensity and speed, even though those elements still play an important role since almost no other Bundesliga team can piece together this many exact passes and receptions at high speeds.
• The many movements within the structure in possession make life hard for man-orientated defensive lines. They also train the passing communication of Leipzig and encourage their intuitive actions high up the pitch.
• Werner more present than ever by not only chiming in on the left side, but also more and more actively asking to receive the ball in the half-space. Spending time as a play-making or heavy-on-touches striker in a 3-5-2 also bears fruit.
• The strength in duels by which Konrad Laimer and also Stefan Ilsanker distinguish themselves is of high importance in defensive transitioning, since it puts a stop to a number of attacks. Only rarely a physical collision will be interpreted as a foul by the aggressor when defending counter-attacks, as long as there is only minimal contact between the legs.
• Passiveness is a curse for Leipzig just as much as a match in which they are too dominant. At times, the team will give up a bit on their strong positional play when they are in the lead, while also becoming less precise in the transition into the final third of the pitch. This lack of precision results in a loss of dominance and a less strong Gegenpressing because of the weaker staggering in the initial phase.

How can Leipzig be beaten?

1. Building up with a back-three, in connection with secure ball-circulation and constant advancing of the wing-players without the general aspiration to actually include them immediately into the passing, can force Leipzig into the role of a passive defender.
2. Once dominance is achieved, the challenge is that the attacking players have to be in constant movement to be available as receiving options and to create opportunities for layoffs and subsequent through-balls. 
3. To defend against Leipzig's build-up, it has to be attacked at its weakest point. The weakest point is the well-used pass from the full-back to the winger that has moved inside. Here, an opponent has to give the winger a little space at first to provoke the pass, but then force the immediate attack to either intercept the pass or create a loss of possession through a duel.
4. Corners offer a number of options with short-flight balls and flick-ons toward the far post.

At the beginning of this season, I wrote that we should all be grateful to Gian Piero Gasperini for letting us admire Josip Iličić's best season ever. An undoubtedly gifted player who, until last season, had not been able to fully express his immense talent to finally blossomed, albeit at a mature age — not uncommon for attacking players in Serie A.

In the past, Iličić has been hampered by a seemingly endless string of minor injuries. The aches and pains often limited him both in games and in training, so much so that his teammates gave him one of the most hilarious nicknames in European football: “Grandma”. Perhaps his mercurial character hindered his performance and development. After all, the only thing he hates more than fantasy football is warm-up exercises.

Yet, after an infection in his neck lymph nodes forced him to miss two months and meditate on his retirement from football, Atalanta's number 72 came back in September 2018 with renewed enthusiasm and the desire to enjoy playing football while making it enjoyable for everyone’s watching him. 

With Iličić as their most skilled player, Atalanta went on to earn a place at the Coppa Italia final and the first Champions League qualification in their history. Iličić’s influence went far beyond his 12 goals and 7 assists, and in my opinion, he was the bona fide MVP of Serie A in 2018–19.

At 31 years old, his tenth season in Italy seemed to be his career season, the one that would definitively consecrate him in the history of the competition as well as in the hearts of Atalanta fans, who in a recent poll named him the best player in the history of the Dea with almost 80% of the votes. A place he already deserved unquestionably: The Slovenian is one of three players who scored at least one goal and served up at least one assist in each of the last ten Serie A championships, and the league's 9th top goal-scorer of the decade with 79 goals, an enviable haul considering he is not a pure striker.

It seemed unimaginable that the Slovenian fantasy player would raise the level of his game even higher, offering performances unparalleled in Europe. In StatsBomb's database, Iličić's 2018–19 season had a statistical output comparable only to that of Lionel Messi and Neymar, but in the 967 minutes he has played this season he has — incredibly — managed to make another leap forward (Iličić plays a hybrid role between a striker and a trequartista, but I chose the attacking midfielder radial template because I believe it is more explicative)

To put into context what Iličić is doing this season, let’s start with shots. He averages 5.03 shots per 90 minutes, more than anyone else in Serie A this season, Cristiano Ronaldo excluded (the Juventus striker averages 5.44 shots per 90) and a 26% increase in comparison with last season.

It is extremely rare for a player to average so may shots. Over the last couple seasons (2019–20 included), only two players have averaged at least 5 shots per 90. They are, unsurprisingly, Ronaldo and Messi (Harry Kane did so in 2017–18) Apart from sheer volume, what is interesting is that Iličić has increased his shot volume without compromising the overall quality of his attempts — quite the opposite. The Slovenian’s current open play xG per shot average is 0.126, an increase of 31% compared to last season’s 0.096. Don't get me wrong; 0.126 xG per shot is not an extraordinary average, but it represents a significant improvement for a player that was and still is a trigger-happy shooter who attempts 2.8 shots from outside the box every 90 minutes. 

He can still refine his selection, but an average of 0.55 is enough to lead Serie A in xG per 90 among players with at least 900 minutes played. He is one of just 11 players in the top 5 European leagues to reach that value this season. Iličić has already scored nine goals, three goals shy of his career-best last season.

That’s a little more than three more goals than expected, not a huge overperformance, especially given the historical rhythm at which Atalanta’s offense, which is on pace for a 100+ goals season, is performing. The side have scored 48 goals so far, the highest total achieved by any team at this stage of the season since Fiorentina in 1958–59. He has also almost doubled his touches into the box (from 7.00 to 12.57) and therefore his reputation as a goal-scoring threat.

An analysis of Iličić's creativity reveals the stellar results don't change. The former Palermo and Fiorentina player leads the league in xG assisted per 90, too. And widening the perspective to the European level, only 8 other players in the big 5 equal or exceed Iličić’s output of 0.35 xG assisted. Considering he averages “just” 0.28 assist per 90, he has recorded fewer assists than expected so far.

The Slovenian is top of the league in open play key passes, creating at least 0.54 more chances on average than any other player in Serie A (his teammate Papu Goméz is second with 2.25). Thomas Müller is the only player in Europe to average more open play key passes (3.04 per 90) than Iličić. 

His passing happens where it matters, and it does so at an exceptional rate. Iličić leads the league in passes inside the box (and is one of just 8 players in the big 5 averaging at least 1 pass inside the box per 90) and his 2.42 open play passes into the box per 90 are good enough to make the top 15 across European leagues.

Iličić’s stats surely benefit from playing for a crazily good offensive team, but on the other hand, Gasperini’s scoring machine’s performances are also dependent on him. Atalanta average a league-best 1.76 xG per 90, while Iličić’s contribution, measured in terms of xG chain (the xG of possessions a player is involved in starting from open play) is 1.55. This alone accounts for how important the attacker is for his team’s offensive developments.

Successful dribbles are basically the only statistic where “Grandma” Josip didn’t improve in comparison to last season. He has always been a high-risk, high-reward decision-maker, a trait reflected by a success rate of 59%. Still, he completes 3.35 dribbles, which is enough for third-best in the league. 

Combine his high volume of shots with his high volume of dribbles, and you get a very exclusive group. Messi is the only other player to top five shots and three dribbles.  This list summarizes how Iličić is playing by presenting the main per 90 underlying stats and revealing his rank in the 2019–20 season.

• 1.12 Scoring contribution (1st)
• 5.03 Shots (2nd)
• 0.84 Non-penalty Goals (1st)
• 0.55 Non-penalty xG (1st)
• 0.28 Assist (14th)
• 2.79 Open-play key passes (1st)
• 0.35 xA 1st (1st) 
• 1.01 Passes inside the box (1st)
• 2.42 Passes into the box (5th)
• 1.09 xG Build up (2nd)
• 1.55 xG Chain (1st)
• 8.38 Deep progressions (10th)
• 54.36 Carries (10th)

Do I need to write that Josip Iličić is currently the best player in Serie A? Well, if that's not enough, here's a nice little bonus. According to his data biography Messi has never finished a season averaging 5 shots, 3 successful dribbles and 2.5 open play key passes. Iličić is currently averaging 5.03 shots, 3.35 successful dribbles and 2.79 open play key passes. Not too shabby.